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A Reflection on Hesiod's Cosmos The Beginnings of Greek Philosophical Speculation

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Resumo

O objectivo deste trabalho é demonstrar que, a estrutura do cosmos de Hesíodo está baseada em pensamento filosófico. O primeiro capítulo oferece uma visão geral de Hesíodo e seu trabalho. A análise do conceito hesiódico de justiça levar-nos-á à base do seu sistema moral. Analisa-se também a etimologia das palavras relevantes para o estudo das obras de Hesíodo e as posições de outros estudiosos em relação a eles.

O próximo capítulo estuda a cosmogonia de Hesíodo, enfocando-se no conceito de caos, como entendido desde a Antiguidade, e desenvolve-se a minha proposta de igualar o caos com o conceito lógico de "conjunto vazio". Posteriormente, apresento um modelo analógico, onde a sequência Caos-Gaia-Ouranos é comparada com a sequência 0-1-2, associando Chaos ('o número 0') com o primeiro que veio, Gaia ('o número 1') com a outredade interna, e Ouranos ('o número 2') associado à multiplicidade.

O capítulo três é dedicado ao conceito de *moira* em Hesíodo, e sua recepção noutras cosmogonias arcaicas, permitindo-me propor um modelo para *moira* ligado à 'vontade de Zeus' e a manifestação da sua justiça, como eixos paradigmático e sintagmático, que sustentam o cosmos de Hesíodo.

O capítulo quatro mostra como alguns elementos da cosmogonia hesiódica foram entendidas por alguns dos filósofos pré-socráticos, mostrando uma forma de avaliar o grau de complexidade dos conceitos, quando comparados com os conceitos hesiódicos homólogos.

Finalmente, chegamos à conclusão geral de que Caos é um objecto lógico na fundação da cosmogonia hesiódica e que *moira* e a "vontade de Zeus", manifestando a sua justiça, constituem a estrutura lógica do cosmos de Hesíodo. A comparação com os pré-socráticos mostra que o pensamento contido nas obras de Hesíodo tem um considerável grau de complexidade, em nada inferior ao desenvolvido pelos pré-socráticos.

Palavras-Chave: Hesíodo, Cosmogonia antiga, Origens do pensamento grego, Épica grega, Filosofia pré-socrática.

Abstract

The purpose of this dissertation is to prove that the structure of Hesiod's cosmos is supported by philosophical thought. The first chapter offers a general vision of Hesiod and his work, following a Hesiodic theme: justice, this leads us to the basis of his moral system. Here, I also analyse etymologies of words relevant to the study of Hesiod's works and the positions of other scholars with respect to them.

The next chapter deals with Hesiod's cosmogony, focusing on the concept of chaos, as understood since Antiquity, and my proposal equating chaos with the logical concept of 'empty set'. Subsequently, I present an analogical model, where Chaos-Gaia-Ouranos are compared to 0-1-2 (considered as the sequence of the three first natural numbers), associating Chaos ('the number 0') with the first that came into being, Gaia ('the number 1') with internal otherness, so as to separate herself from Ouranos, who, like 'the number 2', is associated with multiplicity.

Chapter Three is dedicated to the concept of *moira* in Hesiod, and its reception in other archaic cosmogonies, allowing me to propose a model for *moira* linked to 'the will of Zeus' and the manifestation of his

justice, as the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axis that supports the Hesiodic cosmos.

Chapter Four shows how some elements of the Hesiodic cosmogony were understood by some of the pre-Socratic philosophers, showing a way to evaluate the degree of complexity of those concepts, when compared with their Hesiodic counterparts.

Finally we arrive at the general conclusion that chaos is a logical object in the foundation of the Hesiodic cosmogony and that *moira* and the 'will of Zeus', manifesting his justice, constitute the logical structure of Hesiod's cosmos. The comparison with the pre-Socratics shows that the described Hesiodic thought have a considerable degree of complexity, in no way inferior to the ones developed by the pre-Socratics.

Keywords: Hesiod, Ancient Cosmogony, Origins of Greek Thought, Greek Epic, Pre-Socratic Philosophy.

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Préfacio

A finalidade desta tese é demonstrar que a estrutura do cosmo e sua origem, tal como descritas por Hesíodo na *Teogonia* e em *Trabalhos e Dias* pode ser caracterizada como pensamento filosófico. Esta é uma posição controversa porque a tradição académica tem considerado Hesíodo principalmente como mitógrafo e poeta. Estritamente falando, a “filosofia” é uma busca sistemática da verdade com uma linguagem própria, que aparenta ser diferente da linguagem e dos objectivos dos poemas de Hesíodo. No entanto, se atentarmos na descrição feita nos poemas hesiódicos, e usarmos diferentes aproximações metodológicas que envolvem a filologia, a lógica, a linguística, a matemática e a hermenêutica analógica, veremos que ela contém uma proposta implícita sobre a origem do cosmo que é sistemática, ateísta e filosófica. Torna-se também evidente que os conceitos de Hesíodo não são alheios ao pensamento filosófico pré-socrático, tendo pelo contrário exercido sobre ele uma marcada influência.

O primeiro capítulo da tese oferece um estudo geral de Hesíodo e suas obras, seguido duma análise do conceito de Justiça, o que conduz à base de seu sistema moral. Neste contexto analisam-se as etimologias das palavras relevantes e discutem-se as diferentes posições académicas sugeridas a seu respeito. Com esta análise, podem-se avaliar as opiniões contemporâneas sobre o lugar de Hesíodo na história do pensamento

grego. Descreve-se o uso das palavras *dike*, *themis* e *nomos*, associadas ao conceito de Justiça. É bem conhecido que a justiça de Zeus é fundamental no estabelecimento do seu reino e é uma das características da nova ordem associada à vontade de Zeus.

O capítulo 2 trata da cosmogonia de Hesíodo, focalizando-se no conceito de *Chaos*. Primeiro discute-se como foi este entendido na antiguidade. A seguir, analisam-se as principais ideias contemporâneas sobre o *Chaos* hesiódico, conceito associado a uma abertura bocejante, ao vácuo ou a um lugar físico. Discute-se a possibilidade de *Chaos* ser o espaço após a separação de *Gaia* e *Ouranos*. No entanto, mostra-se que estes modelos são inadequados para representar o *Chaos*, cuja característica fundamental é 'ser o primeiro a devir'. Isto leva-nos a propor que o *Chaos* é um conceito lógico usado por Hesíodo para completar a sua cosmogonia, e que pode ser modelado pelo 'conjunto vazio', tal como é entendido na matemática contemporânea. Mas o modelo não se fica por aí. De facto, propõem-se como modelo da sequência *Chaos-Gaia-Ouranos* a sucessão de números naturais 0-1-2, onde o zero está associado com o primeiro a devir, o *Chaos*, *Gaia* com o um, representando a unidade e a 'outredade', e *Ouranos*, que se separa de *Gaia*, com o dois, o início da multiplicidade. Modelar matematicamente o mundo foi uma das coisas que os gregos souberam fazer muito bem e, por tal motivo, para entender o pensamento grego é fundamental a seguir os métodos usados por eles. A discussão da possibilidade de aplicar

esse modelo lógico-matemático ao *Chaos* induz-nos a inquirir sobre a sua temporalidade. Com o intuito de obter pistas para responder a essa questão investigamos o valor semântico do aoristo épico *geneto*. A partir de resultados actuais da linguística indo-europeia e do estudo do sistema verbal hitita chegamos à conclusão de que é possível atribuir a esta forma verbal um valor semântico estativo; baseamo-nos também em paralelos com os textos védicos e hititas, e no uso desta forma verbal na primeira tabuinha da criação babilónica, *Enûma Eliš*, bem como no livro do Génesis. O uso de formas verbais com significado estativo é comum àqueles textos cosmogónicos sagrados, particularmente quando as primeiras entidades devêm. Isto faz-nos discorrer sobre as ideias de eternidade, imortalidade e temporalidade. No fim do capítulo investiga-se o papel de *Gaia* na cosmogonia de Hesíodo e a sua relação com o conceito de 'outredade' e a sua função profética no estabelecimento do reino de Zeus. Dessa forma põem-se em evidência as relações com *Chthonia*, deidade que aparece em Ferecides de Siro e Álcman. Assim, o cosmo hesiódico começa a emergir perante nós como sujeito à vontade de Zeus e à *moira*.

O capítulo 3 inicia-se com o estudo do conceito de *moira* em Hesíodo e noutras cosmogonias arcaicas, permitindo-nos propor um modelo para *moira* associado à vontade de Zeus. A ligação de *moira* com a vontade de Zeus é não somente um tema hesiódico, mas está presente noutras cosmogonias como a comentada no papiro de Derveni. Com os

conceitos de *moira* e de vontade de Zeus está relacionado o de justiça. Estes conceitos aparecem como centrais nos eixos paradigmático e sintagmático que mantêm o cosmo de Hesíodo. A primeira secção do capítulo é dedicada a uma análise textual do conceito de *moira* e das suas características nos poemas hesiódicos.

Após esta revisão oferecem-se algumas considerações metodológicas para introduzir os eixos paradigmáticos e sintagmáticos e formar uma estrutura que modele a interacção de *moira* com a vontade de Zeus. Analisa-se como exemplo o caso do castigo de Prometeu. Este modelo representa o novo cosmo organizado no reino de Zeus que, por sua vez, é coadjuvado na distribuição da justiça por outras deidades, entre as quais Hécate. A seguir estudam-se as possíveis interpretações de *moira* e sua inter-relação com Zeus noutras cosmogonias, tais como o Papiro de Derveni, o fragmento cosmogónico de Álcman e a cosmogonia de Ferecides de Siro.

Do ponto de vista linguístico estudamos a variação semântica do verbo ἐπικλώθω, associado a *moira* em diferentes textos da literatura grega conhecida. Esta análise traz como resultado um paralelismo diacrónico entre a variação do conceito de deidade e a função de ‘tecer o destino dos homens’.

Finalmente no capítulo 4, ao assumir a importância que Hesíodo teve na *Paideia* grega, fazemos um breve estudo sobre a influência de

Hesíodo nos filósofos pré-socráticos. Com este estudo pretendemos conhecer melhor como foi Hesíodo entendido pelos pensadores gregos, e como os conceitos que ele transmitiu nos seus poemas foram assimilados pelos primeiros pensadores gregos. Assim, este capítulo, sem ser exaustivo nem o pretender ser, focar-se-á na recepção de elementos hesiódicos pelos filósofos pré-socráticos. Observa-se como certos elementos da cosmogonia de Hesíodo foram compreendidos por alguns dos filósofos pré-socráticos, mostrando uma maneira de avaliar o grau de complexidade daqueles conceitos, quando comparados com as suas contrapartes em Hesíodo.

Após ter escolhido alguns dos pré-socráticos começámos por Anaxágoras. Examinam-se a relação entre o *apeiron* de Anaxágoras e o *Chaos* de Hesíodo; também considero a importância de *Gaia* como centro do cosmo e a possibilidade de *Gaia* ser tida como *arche*. Sabemos, por exemplo, que as suposições dos filósofos Milésios explicaram a mudança dos elementos naturais dum estado primitivo a outros estados como um processo sequencial de diferenciação, onde trabalham em conjunto forças opostas, como a repulsão e a atracção, o amor e a discórdia, a noite e o dia. Outras ideias de Hesíodo, como a presença fundamental e fundacional de *Gaia* e a importância de *aer* no universo físico, encontram-se no pensamento de Anaxágoras e de Empédocles. Os conceitos de imortalidade, eternidade e atemporalidade são também relevantes nesta pesquisa, porque estabelecem diferenças diacrónicas na sua semântica,

mostrando variações no grau de abstracção do pensamento. Por exemplo, o conceito de eternidade, que é uma propriedade do 'ser' de ser permanente no fluxo do tempo, é menos elaborado de que o conceito de imortalidade, que supõe um ser que 'nasceu' ou 'se desvelou' mas que não morrerá. Isso leva-nos à pergunta, o quê ou quem foi o primeiro ser? Analisamos a relação entre o *apeiron* de Anaximandro e o *Chaos* de Hesíodo, concentramo-nos nas características de eternidade e imortalidade e portanto na complexidade do conceito analisado. A seguir inquirimos sobre Anaxímenes, para quem o primeiro princípio é *aer*. Após um breve excuro sobre Thales, concluimos a análise dos Milésios na sua relação com Hesíodo.

Na última secção focamos a nossa atenção em Pitágoras, Xenófanés, Parménides, Heraclito e Empédocles. Analisa-se a posição de Xenófanés na poesia e na filosofia, concordando com Werner Jaeger na importância vital que este filósofo teve na consolidação do monoteísmo e na concepção de um deus único e eterno, que partilha de algumas características divinas de Zeus. Interessante para a nossa análise é a imutabilidade do 'ser' em Xenófanés, a qual comparamos com a do *Chaos*. Seguidamente faz-se uma breve referência aos pitagóricos e ao princípio geral da eternidade dos números.

Finalmente uma análise de Parménides e Heraclito, em relação com Hesíodo, volta a mostrar elementos cruciais para a 'classificação' do

pensamento hesiódico como filosófico. Assim a viagem mística de Parménides relembra a ‘revelação’ recebida por Hesíodo através das Musas. Heraclito oferece-nos elementos hesiódicos como a importância dada à ‘guerra’, que é comparável com a importância hesiódica dada à ‘discórdia’, além da eterna tensão entre os opostos. O último pré-socrático que trazemos ao nosso estudo é Empédocles, que foi por sua vez influenciado por Heraclito e, como ele, por Hesíodo. Em Empédocles encontramos o tema hesiódico da ‘discórdia’.

Em resumo, de acordo com as conclusões dos capítulos prévios, por um lado, *Chaos* é um objecto lógico na fundação da cosmogonia de Hesíodo e, por outro lado, *moira* e a vontade de Zeus estão associadas à distribuição da justiça divina, o que constitui a estrutura lógica do cosmo de Hesíodo. A comparação com os filósofos pré-socráticos mostra também que o pensamento de Hesíodo tem um grau de complexidade considerável, e que não é menos complexo do que aquele desenvolvido pelos pré-socráticos, pelo que podemos afirmar que os poemas hesiódicos manifestam claramente um pensamento filosófico.

Introduction

The purpose of this dissertation is to prove that the structure of the cosmos and its origins as described by Hesiod in the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days* can be characterized as philosophical thought. This is a controversial position because scholarship to date has viewed Hesiod as a mythographer and a poet. Strictly speaking, 'philosophy' is a systematic search of the truth, which on the surface Hesiod's poems do not appear to be. Nevertheless, if we look carefully at his description, and apply various approaches involving philology, logic, mathematics and other methodologies derived from the analogical hermeneutics and from computer sciences, we see that what he produced is, in fact, a comprehensive philosophical approach to the origins of the world, involving a description of an atheistic cosmogony inside a theogony. It also becomes apparent that Hesiod's concepts are not inconsistent with later philosophical/pre-Socratic thinking, suggesting common strains in the roots of these systems and his influence on later philosophers, such as the pre-Socratics, generating many different interpretations of some Hesiodic concepts.

The first chapter offers a general overview of Hesiod and his work, following the Hesiodic theme of justice which leads us to the basis of his

moral system. In this context I analyse etymologies of words relevant to the study of Hesiod's works and the positions of scholars with respect to them. The first section is dedicated to methodological discussions, including a brief account of structuralism up to today's structuralist vision of the Munich School, founded by Wolfgang Steigmüller¹. I shall show different aspects of the structuralist programme that involves the fields of mathematics, social sciences, linguistics, computing sciences, biology and philosophy. With this background and based on this approach there follows a discussion on the key passage of Hesiod to which I dedicate a good part of this thesis, namely his cosmogony, which is found in *Th.* 116-128. Looking at that text, I make some general observations about the primeval entities Chaos, Gaia and Ouranos, giving an idea of their relevance to the position I take in the thesis and pointing out that, behind the definition of those primeval entities, we can find philosophical concepts which were also fundamental to the work of other ancient authors. With this analysis, I am then able to assess modern opinions on the place of Hesiod in the history of Greek thought. I shall describe the use of the words *dike*, *themis* and *nomos*, associated with the concept of justice. It continues with the establishment of the kingdom of Zeus whose main characteristic is justice which includes the restoration of honours to the gods.

¹ Some of the metodological considerations about structuralism and mathematical concepts that I am using in this thesis could be found also in my collective working paper Boxer *et al.*, *The Structure of the Triple Articulation*.

In this chapter I discuss Hesiod's works, the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days*, both widely regarded as his genuine works. It includes an analysis of the Hesiodic world, including the concepts of justice, honour and *moira*. In contrast with the original concept of *moira*, as each person's lot, fate or destiny, I introduce my proposal to extend the concept of *moira* to stand as a structure for the entire cosmos as Hesiod conceived it, a conclusion I arrive at by adopting the methods of syntagmatic and paradigmatic analysis². By these means I am able to propose that *moira* is the basis for the construction of Hesiod's moral system as well as of the cosmos.

It is well known that Hesiod's works are devoted to the justice of Zeus, because it is a main characteristic of the new order that Zeus will establish. In the *Works and Days* the analysis of the justice of Zeus reaches a point that allows us to outline a moral system. That moral system and the application of the justice of Zeus will be linked to two essential elements in the Hesiodic Cosmos: *moira* and the will of Zeus. Together, and sometimes acting in an overlapping way *moira* and the will of Zeus will keep the unity of the cosmos that has come into being. The cosmos was put under the reign of Zeus, after the Titanomachy, where Kronos, Zeus' father was defeated and dethroned.

²The basis, definitions and concepts of syntagms and paradigms, and the fundamentals of paradigmatic and syntagmatic analysis could be found in Roland Barthes works, e. g., Barthes, *Éléments de sémiologies*.

Chapter 2 deals with Hesiod's cosmogony, focusing on the concept of Chaos, as understood since Antiquity. These ideas include that Chaos is a yawning gap, a vacuum or a physical entity, like the space between the Gaia and Ouranos, after their separation. Following the discussion of those ideas, I will show that they are inadequate for explaining what Hesiod meant by 'Chaos'. I point out that, in Hesiod, Chaos has as a main characteristic that it was the very first thing that came into being. This leads me to propose that Chaos is a logical concept used by Hesiod to complete his cosmogony, which can be equated with the 'empty set'. The analysis of other characteristics of Chaos by our logical-mathematical approach, takes us into a discussion of whether Chaos is temporal or atemporal, as well as whether such atemporality could be derived from a new semantic analysis of the verbal form '*geneto*'. This verbal form has been traditionally interpreted as epic aorist, i.e., an aorist without augment. I propose a stative meaning for the verbal form '*geneto*' and support this view with two observations. The first is that, from a linguistic point of view, it is known that proto-Indo-European had in its verbal system verbal forms with stative meanings. Those stative meanings are mostly associated with injunctive forms, as it happens in Vedic cosmogonic texts. The second observation is from outside the Indo-European literature, coming instead from the Babylonian *Enûma Eliš* and the Hebrew *Genesis*. The use of verbal forms with stative meanings is common in those sacred cosmogonic texts, particularly when the first entities are said to have come

into being. The use of stative raises questions about temporality, time, eternity and related matters. At the end of the chapter I discuss the role of Gaia in Hesiod's cosmogony and her relationship with 'otherness', as well as her prophetic role in the establishment of Zeus' Kingdom. I trace a link between Chthonie, the deity who appears in Pherekydes' cosmogony, and her relationship with Alkman's *poros* and Pherekydes's *muchos*. At this point the Hesiodic cosmos starts to appear depicted in and a design seems to emerge underneath the will of Zeus and *moira*. *Moira* and the will of Zeus are the subjects of study in Chapter 3.

Chapter 3 is dedicated to the concept of '*moira*' in Hesiod and in other early cosmogonies, allowing me to propose a model for *moira* linked to the will of Zeus. The linking of *moira* to the will of Zeus is not only a Hesiodic theme, but it is also present in other Archaic cosmogonies. In Hesiod *moira* and the will of Zeus are also linked to justice and its manifestation, which appear as the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axis that supports the Hesiodic cosmos. In the first section, I take up the concept of *moira* and its characteristics by considering all instances of *moira* in Hesiod.

After this review of the concept of *moira* I consider a methodological issue. I start with discussing the use of syntagmatic and paradigmatic structures as an aid to understanding Hesiodic cosmology. Taking the example of the punishment of Prometheus, I show that the paradigmatic

axis is related to *moira* and the syntagmatic axis is associated with the will of Zeus. From there I pass to the relationship between *moira* and *dike* and note how both work as foundations of? the new cosmos organised by Zeus. Zeus has helpers, like Hekate, who has far-reaching realms, but Zeus is the only god wise enough to apply *moira* with justice to human beings and to the gods. I present a summary of different possible interpretations of the meaning of *moira* in Hesiod, and then study the meaning in other Archaic cosmogonies, such as those in the Derveni papyrus, Alkman's cosmogonic fragment and Pherekydes of Syros. I look at parallels between those Archaic cosmogonies and Hesiod.

An important characteristic of *moira* in Greek literature is its association with the verb ἐπικλώθω. There are in fact changes in how this verb is used with *moira*. In Hesiod we do not have the verb ἐπικλώθω, even when the Moirai are mentioned.³ The verb 'to spin' is associated in Greek literature mostly with *Moira* or the gods. In extant Homeric text, spinning is used once in association specifically with Zeus, and six times in association with the gods in general. Both the Derveni Papyrus and Aeschylus use spinning in connection with *Moira*.

The importance that Hesiod took in Greek *paideia*⁴ leads us to dig, without being the first to do so, into the question of Hesiod's influence on the pre-Socratic philosophers, helping us to understand Hesiod and to

³ *Th.* 542 (Edited by Most).

⁴ Cf. for example, Vernant, *The Origins of Greek Thought*, 52.

understand how he was understood. In Chapter 4 I will be focusing on those basic concepts of Hesiod that I discussed in previous chapters, i.e. Chaos, *moira* and otherness. I consider how some elements of the Hesiodic cosmogony were understood by some of the pre-Socratic philosophers, showing a way to evaluate the degree of complexity of those concepts, when compared with their Hesiodic counterparts. It is from this discussion that I arrive at the general conclusion that Chaos is a logical object in the foundation of the Hesiodic cosmogony and that *moira* and the will of Zeus, which deliver his justice, constitute the logical structure of Hesiod's cosmos. Comparison with the pre-Socratics will show that the Hesiodic thought has a considerable degree of complexity, and no less complex than the ones developed by the pre-Socratics and can be characterised as philosophy just as pre-Socratic thought can.

To compare Hesiod with the pre-Socratics, I will start with on the review of scholarship on Hesiod and how the pre-Socratics saw him. I will examine the relationship between Anaxagoras' *apeiron* and Hesiod's Chaos; I will also consider the importance of Gaia as the centre of the cosmos and how Gaia could be considered *arche*. We know, for instance, that the Milesian philosophers' assumptions related to the change of natural elements from a primitive state by a sequential process of differentiations working together with contrary forces, like, love and strife, night and day, were borrowed from poetic cosmogonies like Hesiod. Other ideas of Hesiod, like the fundamental and foundational presence of Gaia

also appear in Anaxagoras and Empedocles.⁵ Immortality, eternity and timelessness are important in this research because they are links between Hesiod and the pre-Socratics, because they are concepts that define time and the vision of the cosmos and reveal the degree of abstraction of the thought. For example, the concept of eternity, meaning, a property of the being to be permanent in the flux of time, is less elaborate than the concept of immortality, which supposes a being that 'was born' and will not die. That also takes us to the question of what was before the first being. Then, we have two questions in the second case, and one question on the first case. I analyse the relationship between the *apeiron* of Anaximander and Hesiodic Chaos, paying attention to the eternity and immortality of both entities/principles and to the degree of complexity that the construction of those concepts demand. The next pre-Socratic that I call to my discussion is Anaximenes, for whom the first principle is air.

With this brief analysis of Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes, I finish my analysis of the Milesians and Hesiod. I then turn my attention to Pythagoras, Xenophanes, Parmenides and Heraclitus and Empedocles. I analyse Xenophanes' position on poetry and philosophy, agreeing with Werner Jaeger that it was of vital importance to the consolidation of monotheism and the conception of a unique, eternal god.⁶ Some

⁵ cf. Kingsley, 'Notes on Air', 26-9.

⁶ Jaeger, *Theology*, 59.

characteristics of Xenophanes' god, however, are shared by Hesiod's Zeus. The fixity of 'the being' and Chaos is also compared. From here I briefly mention the Pythagorean proposal to the first principle: the numbers. I will compare some of the achievements of the pre-Socratics with Hesiod's ideas, in order to show that if the pre-Socratics' ideas are philosophical, then the Hesiodic counterparts should be considered just as philosophical, too.

Keeping in mind that my observations on Parmenides, where we find several echoes of Hesiodic thought, starting with the beginning of the poem where Parmenides is taken by the goddess to a place, where she will show him the truth.

Continuing with another pre-Socratic, Heraclitus, who, to the fixity of the Parmenides' 'being' opposes the flux / constant change embodied in his eternal fire, contrasting with your 'the fixity'. Heraclitus will conceive the world as a permanent tension between opposites in that keep the unity in permanent and tensional strife. Thus being is composed of πόλεμος ('war'), and war takes the place of the Hesiodic Zeus in the cosmos.⁷ The last pre-Socratic whom I discuss is Empedocles, who was influenced by Heraclitus and, like him, by Hesiod. In Empedocles we find the Hesiodic theme of strife. The brief discussion on some of the pre-Socratics and the evidence of the presence of many different Hesiodic

⁷ DK 22B53.

themes in the development of their philosophical thought, shows that at least those common themes are philosophical. In addition, specific subjects such as the treatment of Chaos and *moira* in Hesiod reinforce my thesis that Hesiod could be considered an early philosopher.

Chapter 1

An Approach to Hesiod

1.1. Generalities

Thales of Miletus has been considered the first philosopher since the time of Aristotle. However, Diels⁸ included specific fragments of Hesiod in his compilation of pre-Socratic philosophers. Since then, the debate about including Hesiod amongst the philosophers or not has been heated. I will present elements of Hesiod's works that support the view that Hesiod can be said to have had philosophical thought, concentrating on his cosmogonic thought, investigating his concept of Chaos, the relevance of Gaia in his cosmos and how justice and *moira* depict a structure of a cosmos that is presided over by Zeus as a *primus inter pares*.

When I talk about philosophical thought in Hesiod, I am saying that he has addressed implicitly or explicitly concepts in the scope of ontology, such as the concepts of otherness and multiplicity, cosmogony, *chaos* and

⁸ DK 4B 1-8.

moira, or any other area of knowledge considered part of philosophy. I will explore mainly cosmogonical and ontological concepts, even though sometimes it will be unavoidable to enter into fields of ethics and morals, when analysing, for example, the concept of *moira*. This will be achieved with the help of theories originating in Computer sciences, specifically in artificial intelligence, Mediaeval logic and philological analysis, which includes approaches derived from analogical hermeneutics⁹ and new models of semantic approach to science developed, for example, by Stegmüller¹⁰. *Moira* can be defined as the paradigmatic structure of the universe of Hesiod. A paradigmatic structure could be used for 'knowledge representation nets'¹¹. In mathematical language a knowledge representation net is a structure defined by a directed graph¹², where its vertices represent concepts and its edges represent semantic relations between those concepts.

Concepts such as paradigmatic and syntagmatic structure are products of structuralism¹³. In the beginning of last century, science was influenced by a huge development in the application of concepts derived from the structuralism. 'Structuralism', however, does not refer to a clearly

⁹ Cf., Beuchot, *En el camino de la hermenéutica analógica*, 19-24.

¹⁰ Cf., Stegmüller, 'Eine modelltheoretische Praezisierung der Wittgensteinschen Bildtheorie', 181-195.

¹¹ Malrieu, *Evaluative Semantics*, 114-179.

¹² A directed graph is a graph where the order of the vertices is relevant.

¹³ As I said before some of the concepts and order that I am following here to talk about structuralism could be found in my collective working paper, Boxer *et al.* *The Structure of the Triple Articulation*.

defined 'school' of authors, although the work of Ferdinand de Saussure¹⁴ is generally considered its starting point. It is not possible to speak about a single definition of structuralism, because it is in fact a movement, that took many different forms, according to the field of knowledge where it was applied. In a wide sense, structuralism intends to analyse and study the relations between structures in order to get a deeper knowledge of a certain object.

Lévi-Strauss used a structuralist approach to explain social and cultural structures and analyse myth¹⁵.

Influenced by the structuralism, Chomsky developed the Transformational Generative Grammar¹⁶. Chomsky's theory has had a huge impact in Linguistics and Computer Sciences, specially in Artificial Intelligence. This theory shares with structuralist theories the attempt to make the mathematical language adequate as the meta-language. As Chomsky affirms:

But the fundamental reason for [the] inadequacy of traditional grammars is a more technical one. Although it was well understood that linguistic processes are in some sense 'creative', the technical devices for expressing a system of recursive processes were simply not available until much more recently. In fact, a real understanding of how a language can (in Humboldt's words) 'make infinite use of finite means' has developed only

¹⁴ Cf. de Saussure, *Écrits de linguistique générale*.

¹⁵ See for example, Lévi-Strauss, C. *Anthropologie structurale*, Paris, Plon, 1958

¹⁶ Chomsky seems to be critical about the structuralism, but it seems to me that his theory is structuralist, in a broad sense. About his position on this matter see Chomsky *Language and Responsibility*.

within the last thirty years, in the course of studies in the foundations of mathematics.¹⁷

Structuralism influenced not only Linguistics but also many other subjects of knowledge, creating at the same time the possibility for links among different areas of knowledge and interdisciplinarity. In mathematics Nicola Bourbaki tried to formalise all mathematics based upon the concept of mother structure. Piaget used Bourbaki's mathematical formalisation in his thinking on developmental psychology of children, giving an approach that, together with behaviourism, marked further development in psychology, counselling and pedagogy¹⁸. However, in order to develop the project of artificial intelligence, in the late 20th century, it was necessary to look for a semantic approach to structuralism, and this new approach developed into what was called 'semantic networks' and 'ontologies'. A re-definition of structuralism has been proposed by many scholars, among whom we can mention the group of Philosophy of Science of the University of Munich, directed by Ulises Moulines:

Structuralism was born with Joe Sneed's and Wolfgang Stegmüller's work in the beginning of the 70's. It belongs to the non-statement view, a major stream of contemporary philosophy of science, which claims that the inner structure of a theory is more important than the statements, namely the laws, of the theory. That means also that the method to discover the laws is not of primary importance as long as we can organize them in a coherent

¹⁷ Chomsky, *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*, 8.

¹⁸ About Piaget structuralism see Sriraman, *Leaders in Mathematical Thinking & Learning*, 59-75.

structure. Such a theoretical structure is called a theory-net, which is a semi-lattice structure organizing laws of the theory...¹⁹

The use of this point of view will allow us to approach the concepts of *chaos* and *moira* in Hesiod and his cosmos from a new perspective.

I will concentrate on what appears to be a key passage in Hesiod's *Theogony*, where the cosmogony is related:

ἦ τοι μὲν πρότιστα Χάος γένετ', αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα
Γαῖ' εὐρύστερνος, πάντων ἕδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεὶ
ἀθανάτων, οἳ ἔχουσι κάρη νιφόεντος Ὀλύμπου,
Τάρταρά τ' ἠερόεντα μυχῷ χθονὸς εὐρυοδείης,
ἠδ' Ἔρος, ὃς κάλλιστος ἐν ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι,
λυσιμελής, πάντων δὲ θεῶν πάντων τ' ἀνθρώπων
δάμναται ἐν στήθεσσι νόον καὶ ἐπίφρονα βουλήν.
ἐκ Χάεος δ' Ἔρεβός τε μέλαινά τε Νύξ ἐγένοντο:
Νυκτὸς δ' αὖτ' Αἰθήρ τε καὶ Ἡμέρη ἐξεγένοντο,
οὓς τέκε κυσαμένη Ἐρέβει φιλότῃτι μιγεῖσα.
Γαῖα δὲ τοι πρῶτον μὲν ἐγείνατο ἴσον ἑαυτῇ
Οὐρανὸν ἀστερόενθ', ἵνα μιν περὶ πάντα καλύπτῃ,
ὄφρ' εἴη μακάρεσσι θεοῖς ἕδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεὶ.²⁰

¹⁹ Wajnberg et al., 'A Structuralist Approach towards Computational Scientific Discovery', 412-19. See also, in general, Moulines, 'Structuralism as a Program for Modeling Theoretical Science'.

²⁰ *Th.* 116-128 (Edited by Most).

'First of all chaos came into existence, thereafter however broad-bosomed earth took form, the forever immovable seat of all of the deathless gods who inhabit the heights of Olympus, and murky Tartarus, tucked in a cleft of extensively travelled Earth, also Eros, most beautiful a god among all the immortals, loosening limbs, dominating the hearts and the minds and the well-laid

In the very beginning, chaos came into being. Hesiod starts the cosmogony with this phrase. He is not explaining how chaos came into being; he just says 'Chaos came into being'. This is a point that demonstrates an intellectual intention: something came into being first, before anything else, and we are unable to know this thing well. As we will discuss later, there has been a long debate among scholars about the meaning of the word chaos and many attempts to understand what Hesiod meant by the term. Chaos has been associated with the verbs χαίνω and χάσκω, meaning 'yawn' or 'gape' an interpretation given by Paley²¹ followed by Cornford,²² and then by West²³ and other contemporary scholars. Also the word chaos is cognate with χάσμα, a word used by Hesiod in Th. 740-3²⁴. A relevant point is the affirmation that a first thing came into being. After chaos came into being, Gaia the support of all living things came into being. Note that Gaia came into being after Chaos, but not from Chaos. Eros, as a cosmic force came after Gaia. The descendants of Chaos, that is, Erebus and black Night, came into being asexually. But, Hesiod also tells us that Erebus and Night bore Aether and Day with the presence of Eros. After these asexual and sexual productions, Ouranos is separated from Gaia.²⁵ The poet says that Ouranos is equal to her. Observe that, other than the cosmological principles, such as Day and Night, and the cosmic force of Eros, no other gods exist. There was a unity, one thing in existence, Gaia. When

plans both of all the immortals and all of susceptible mankind.
 Next out of Chaos with Erebus black Night too was engendered,
 and out of Night were the Aether and Daylight together begotten,
 whom she conceived after lying with Erebus lovingly, and bore.
 Earth to begin with engendered her first born, star-studded Heaven,
 equal [*in size*] to herself, to conceal her on every side, in
 order to furnish a solid foundation for the blessed forever.' (Translated by Hine).
 Note that I am taking out the phrase 'in size' because it seems to be added to the text.
²¹ Paley, *The Epics of Hesiod*, 186-7.
²² Cornford, *Principium Sapientiae*, 194 ff.
²³ West, *Theogony*, 192-4.
²⁴ Th. 740-3 (Edited by Most).
²⁵ I will come back to this point in Chapter 2.

Ouranos is separated from Gaia the unity is broken. However, at first²⁶ Gaia does not recognise Ouranos as a different being. Once Gaia recognises Ouranos as different from her, they lie together and the Titans are born.

Within this passage, two philosophical ideas seem to appear. First, the concept of otherness, the recognition of the other as different, is essential to the existence of the cosmos. To lie with Ouranos, Gaia needs to recognise that Ouranos is not herself, then Eros tries to restore the broken unity by joining them. Gaia lies with Ouranos and conceives the Titans: the second generation of Gods. We count Gaia and Ouranos as the first gods. The third concept that seems to be involved in this text is what will be called ἀρχή, the substance from which all things are made, 'the principle'. This would be the main subject of pre-Socratic philosophy. As Gaia is the origin of all things, she resembles the idea essential to the pre-Socratics Gaia is the origin of all beings, ἀρχή. As we know the word ἀρχή was neither used by Hesiod nor by most pre-Socratics. It seems that it was Anaximenes who for the first time used the term in the sense of the 'first principle'.²⁷

Some scholars, such as Geoffrey S. Kirk, have claimed that Hesiod marks the transition between mythological and philosophical thought,²⁸ and

²⁶ In some parts of this thesis, I will use 'ordinality' to mean logical ordinality, and not temporal ordinality. For example, 'first' in this myth does not mean that Gaia appears, and after a period of time Ouranos comes into being; it just means that Gaia was first in a logical sense. It is like when "If a then b", where a is before b in a logical sense.

²⁷ Kirk et al., *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 144-5.

²⁸ Kirk, *Myth*, 238.

that his thought still cannot be considered philosophical. West²⁹ also claims that Hesiod in his genealogy of the gods, including what we have called the cosmogony,³⁰ does not make a cosmological reflection. In his own words:

...Is Hesiod saying anything by means of his genealogy? Translate it into mechanistic terms, and the result is sometimes sense but just as often nonsense. The proposition that heaven was born from earth, or Oceanus from the marriage of the two, is evidently not the answer to the question 'How was the firmament or the fabled Oceanus created?', but to the question 'What is the best way to combine these divine names in a genealogy?' It is a story, not an explanation, not even a silly explanation.³¹

West's position seems extreme, as we will see in Chapter 2, but there is no such innocence in Hesiod's works, particularly in the genealogy. For example, his cosmogony is not just a story, but it contains an explanation of something deeper, e.g., the concept of unity and otherness among other philosophical problems. The unity of the initial cosmos is suddenly broken with the separation of Gaia and Ouranos who were originally equals. As we will see in Chapter 2, this could be an interpretation of the unity that can be found in the horizon, where the sea, the heavens and the earth meet. This is an observation and reflection about nature. In order to pass from the observation of nature into a mytho-poetic representation of that natural event, reasoning is also necessary.

²⁹ West, *Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient*, 204.

³⁰ When talking about the Hesiod's cosmogony, we refer specially to lines *Th.* 116-132.

³¹ West, *Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient*, 204.

We can argue that unity is no more than a poetic resource, and indeed reduces Hesiod's works to poetic resources, in which case we could do the same with the pre-Socratics, Plato, Aristotle and Kant. Still, paraphrasing Wittgenstein,³² the world is expressed and depicted by language, whilst remaining a logical structure. Therefore, if we agree that the idea of unity was only a poetic resource, two questions arise: first, why do the births of the gods happen after the recognition of the destruction of unity, and second, The fact is that, until Gaia and Ouranos had recognised that they were different entities, even though equal in origin, the theogony (by which I mean the birth of the gods) did not take place; only cosmic entities, such as Eros, Day and Night came into being. Once Gaia and Ouranos recognise that they are different, the gods start to come into being. We can say that, until the appearance of otherness, the cosmos is infertile.

Gaia and Ouranos are separated and in search of lost unity, so they embrace each other and bear the first generation of gods. This act represents a desire for unity. In that act, we have a notable example and representation of a connection between two opposite terms: otherness and unity. This co-existence of contraries will be present in all Greek thought, becoming one of its main characteristics.³³

To sum up, concentrated in ten lines of the Theogony (116-26), we find a short but deep reflection on major philosophical problems. The first

³² Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 4.014.

³³ Cf. for example, Lloyd, *Polarity and Analogy*, 15-26.

philosophical problem is the cosmogony and the need of an un-created being. Secondly, and related to the cosmogony, the problem of the unity and the otherness and the problem of the structure of the universe and the relation between *moira* and the will of Zeus. Finally a main concern about the justice. Those are some of the philosophical problems within the Hesiodic poems. The way those philosophical problems appears explains why Hesiod structured his genealogy in the order in which we see it in.

As we have seen the acceptance of existence of philosophical problems in Hesiod has been a debate among scholars. For example, West³⁴ concedes that there existed some speculation about nature during Hesiod's time. However, in the same book, he states in a more explicit way his position on this subject, where he makes the following affirmations:

It seems, however, to have been limited to the interpretation of man's immediate environment. Man is earth and water...Ask what the stars are, and the only answer is that they are children of Eos and Astraios...How was the earth formed? It simply ἐγένετο, after *Chaos* ἐγένετο. We get the impression that Hesiod and his audience did not bother their heads about such questions...³⁵

I think that Hesiod and his audience were indeed concerned; at least Hesiod consciously shows in his *Theogony* and *Works and Days* a particular structure and content in order to answer a question about the origin and order of the cosmos. That answer is given in a systematic and

³⁴ West, *Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient*, 97.

³⁵ West, *Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient*, 204-5.

rational thought very close to the kind of thought that we find in the pre-Socratics. Moreover, it is possible to find in Hesiod several seeds of pre-Socratic thought. The previous example (Th. 116-126) that I have set out above is a sample of what has been under discussion in the debate about whether or not Hesiod can be said to have had philosophical thought.

The lines of interpretation of contemporary scholars, such as West or Rowe,³⁶ were generally proposed by Aristotle and other ancient thinkers. Indeed, Aristotle, in the *Metaphysics* says ἀλλὰ Θαλῆς μὲν ὁ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχηγὸς φιλοσοφίας ὕδωρ φησὶν εἶναι³⁷, referring to Thales as the first to make a general enquiry about nature. Following this tradition, it is accepted that the first philosopher was Thales, who, together with others from the Milesian School, set the basis for philosophy, their enquiries being related to the origins of nature. Therefore, Greek philosophical speculation is assumed to have started around the 7th – 6th century BC.

Before the philosophical speculation of Thales started, the poems sung by the bards, epic poetry, the mythology shared by the different Greek peoples, were the sources for the Greek *paideia*. According to this position we have on one hand the tradition transmitted by the poets and on the other hand the sudden emergence of philosophers. It is natural to question what makes the difference between a poet and a philosopher for

³⁶ Cf. Rowe, "'Archaic thought" in Hesiod', 124-35.

³⁷ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 983b20-1 (Edited by Ross).

the ancient Greeks. The essential difference according to the Greeks themselves is *logos*.

Logos provides the human being with the ability to understand the cosmos. In modern scholarship, we speak of rational and irrational thought. By irrational thought it is common to understand any knowledge derived from a system that includes the gods, metaphysical or supernatural elements. Human beings learned that with the instrument of reason we could reach deeper levels of knowledge. The Greeks themselves never advocated a separation between rational and irrational thought.³⁸ However, with the rise of positivism during the 19th century, so-called irrational thought was neglected in favor of rational thought. Following this idea, the Aristotle's claim that Thales was the first philosopher found strong support, since his system has no mention of the gods. This position has been prevalent since positivism came to dominate the philosophy of science. In this sense, the classification of the first philosophers as rational is based on the assumption that the gods do not form part of their systems. Even scholars like Cornford³⁹ who accepted continuity between mythological and so-called philosophical thought, gave a certain pre-eminence to the latter.

It is also clear that some ancient Greeks believed there to be an opposition between philosophy on one hand, and myth and poetry on the

³⁸ cf. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, 1-27.

³⁹ Cf. in general Cornford, *Principium Sapientiae*.

other⁴⁰. This would suggest a possible path to trace the meaning of philosophy for the Greeks and where to start looking for its origin. A new question arises: are we able to set a clear-cut distinction between philosophical speculation and other manifestations of Greek thought, such as poetry and myth? It could be helpful to see what the Greeks can say about this point. Socrates tells us that poetry should not be allowed in as part of the teachings in the *polis*, as we can read in Plato's Republic, Ταῦτα δὴ, ἔφην, ἀπολελογήσθω ἡμῖν ἀναμνησθεῖσιν περὶ ποιήσεως, ὅτι εἰκότως ἄρα τότε αὐτὴν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀπεστέλλομεν τοιαύτην οὖσαν,⁴¹ arriving at the conclusion that poetry could be dismissed from the city they are describing. Because poetry is like lies and lies are the opposite of the aim of philosophy, which is the purpose of the rulers, it is not difficult to see that Plato proposes an opposition between poetry and philosophy and between poetry and reason. Also according to Xenophanes, πάντα θεοῖς ἀνέθηκαν Ὅμηρός θ' Ἡσίοδος τε ὅσα παρ' ἀνθρώποισιν ὀνεΐδεα καὶ ψόγος ἐστίν, κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν,⁴² meaning that Homer and Hesiod have attributed to the gods everything that is shameful and reproachable among men: stealing, committing adultery and deceiving

⁴⁰ Discussions about the difference, relevance and opposition between myth and philosophy and co-related words, like philosophical and mythical thought could be found in many different authors, starting by the Greek philosophers. It is a complex and debated subject that that is not the purpose of this research. Introductions to the subject, following more and less same path by all books of History of Ancient Philosophy, could be found for example in Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*. Another work on History of Philosophy is McInerny, *A History of Western Philosophy*. Specific and classical discussions on the subject are Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy* and Cornford *Principium Sapientiae*. A more recent account of this matter is the collective book Buxton (ed.), *From Myth to Reason?*

⁴¹ Plato, *Republic*, 607b 1-3 (Edited by Burnet).

⁴² DK 21B11.

each other.⁴³ Xenophanes does not agree with Homer's and Hesiod's descriptions of the gods. He confirms this when he says, ἀλλ' οἱ βροτοὶ δοκέουσι γεννᾶσθαι θεούς, τὴν σφετέρην δ' ἐσθήτα ἔχειν φωνήν τε δέμας τε,⁴⁴ criticizing the fact that human beings believe that the gods have an origin, that they communicate through a language and other human characteristics; in general, it seems that Xenophanes criticizes anthropomorphisation of the gods. Obviously, what is criticized is not the poets and the message or history they tell, but the form in which they tell it. Of course, this is a disputable argument, since what is relevant is the content, and the style is less important. The problem seems to be linked to the creation of a self-image of 'the philosophers' in opposition to 'the poets'. As a consequence, Philosophy is not so much compelled to expunge mythology as to clean itself from the residue of the gods and religious beliefs, that does not affect or diminish the relevance and quality of the divine cult.

The criticism about the use of the myth, including the gods, in philosophical texts can be traced to Plato. For example, in *Gorgias*, Plato opposes Homer and Hesiod and questions the usefulness of poetry as a means through which knowledge can be acquired. In the same discussion,

⁴³ My interpretation from the translation offered by Freeman.

⁴⁴ DK 21B14.

he opposes philosophy and poetry, but at the same time he agrees that myth as analogical thinking could help to unveil the truth.⁴⁵

The problem is that poetry and myth have been put on the same side, then religion was added to myth, we must search and investigate all things separated, without losing sight of the notion that all form part of the human being way of understand 'reality', without discussing what 'reality' means. The creation of myths is a function of societies, in a first attempt to explain themselves, and in general, because it is a first attempt, could not be rational. Aristotle also agrees that myth could complement philosophy and that the language of both could have common elements ; what we can observe in his works is that he will accept that language cannot be totally poetic or totally apodeictic, but if we consider that those are the extremes of a line, the language will move in between, with a preference for a language closer to totally apodeictic philosophical discourse than to a language closer to poetic for mythological discourses⁴⁶. The development of his position is clear in the *Poetics*.⁴⁷

It is not possible to maintain a rigid position about having first poetry and then logical thought. It seems more reasonable to accept the continuity between those two varieties of speculation, even if their forms and approaches appear radically different. In the case of Hesiod, we could

⁴⁵ Cf. e.g., Plato, *Gorgias*, 523a 1-3 (Edited by Burnet).

⁴⁶ See Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 983a3-4 (Edited by Ross).

⁴⁷ Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1458b-1459a (Edited by Kassel).

observe that his poems with his cosmogony will serve as a foundation for later cosmologists, particularly the Milesians. His position about otherness,⁴⁸ his usage of δίκη, his intention to construct a moral system, his use of different degrees of abstraction or construction to talk about justice and his clearly differentiated uses of the words δίκη, θέμις and νόμος make him a prominent poet and thinker of his time.⁴⁹ Instead of trying to oppose poetry and philosophy, it could be more interesting to trace a line between myth and religion or philosophy and religion, without confusing religion with theology. The use of poetry as a style of writing is independent of the subject to be discussed, philosophy, religion or theology.

We need to think as the Greeks did in order to understand what they have done. It is a problem of semantics. Let us take an example. discussed by Aristotle⁵⁰. When Hesiod in his *Theogony* says that a god that does not taste nectar and ambrosia becomes breathless⁵¹. Hesiod is not interested in explaining the meaning of those words, because 'nectar' and 'ambrosia' were words familiar enough to the ancient Greeks⁵². Today, we are unable to describe what 'nectar' or 'ambrosia' are. We do not know whether the ancient Greeks knew or they think they knew what is

⁴⁸ By 'otherness', we mean the recognition of the existence of the other, the recognition of the difference, that as we will show is crucial in Hesiod's poems, particularly in the *Theogony*.

⁴⁹ Cf. below on this Chapter.

⁵⁰ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1000a5-23.

⁵¹ *Th.* 796-7 (Edited by Most). Interpretation mine.

⁵² The discussion I am developing here about Nectar and Ambrosia follows closely, Clay, *Immortal and Ageless Forever*, 112-117.

'nectar' or 'ambrosia', but certainly they were closer to a more accurate semantic than us. In general, those explanations are completely over the head of most mortals, ancient or modern, because the ones that have to eat and drink nectar and ambrosia were the gods. Hesiod is referring to the gods, and we can infer that at least all immortals have had ambrosia and nectar, but we are not able to deduce a definition of either term. This idea of the gods' eating poses some problems. We can try to get more information from the context, but there is a dilemma here. We know that nectar and ambrosia formed part of the gods' diet and that if a god has none of them he or she become 'breathless'. The problem is whether they eat them because they want or because they need. If they eat them just to enjoy, then there is nothing new about the ontology of their being; on the other hand if the gods eat nectar and ambrosia, because they need to, we have a problem. The need of 'food' is proper to and defining of mortal beings. How can we solve this dilemma? It seems we have no solution for it. As far as we know there was a consequence for the one that do not eat them: they become breathless. This becoming breathless do not add anything new. It is not equivalent to dying. It looks more like a state in between life and death, but, still, we know that the god who falls into this state will recover from it after a full year has passed. In conclusion we are compelled to accept that there is no explanation for the gods taking nectar and ambrosia, it is just a fact. They are immortal, but not eternal. An eternal being has no beginning and no end. It is outside of time. An

immortal being is a being that is not mortal. Observe that mortality could be opposed to immortality and eternity, then, it is necessary to define immortal as a being that will not die. We know, however, that the Greek gods can remain or be in a similar state to be dead, such as when they commit perjury after drinking the water of the Styx.⁵³ In such a case, Hesiod says, the god will lie without breathing for a year. This is obviously a state akin to death that a god can be condemned to; after that year the god re-takes 'life' but is not allowed to sit on the council of the gods for another nine years, and is excluded from the banquets of the gods. We must understand that, in Greek thought, 'mortal' is not opposed to 'eternal'. Mortality is contingent, but eternity, when part of a being, is necessary by definition. Contingent is opposed to necessary. Does it make sense for us to enquire about a contradictory statement like that? The answer is yes, because it will reveal how the Greeks thought about their gods and their universe. The positions of philosophers about poetry and philosophy differ, and even the same philosopher had apparently different positions. Still, a common position of the Greeks is that behind philosophical enquiry there is an unchanging order in the universe. This is the assumption behind every rational position. This position is found not only in the thinkers accepted as philosophers but, for example, in Hesiod. When Hesiod composed the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days*, he was

⁵³Cf. *Th.* 775-806 (Edited by Most).

outlining a model for a structure of the universe,⁵⁴ a structure that includes the gods, the mortals, and the cosmos in general. It is natural to enquire about that structure and its nature. I will follow the idea that there is continuity between Hesiod as a thinker and the pre-Socratics,⁵⁵ and I will show that there is such a thing as Hesiodic thought.⁵⁶ We will find in Hesiod some key concepts that help us to determine the model for his structure of the universe. Those concepts are justice, chaos⁵⁷ and *moira*. Examining Hesiod's text, we will see how all these terms are related, leading us to understand the structure of the Hesiodic cosmos. It is not an accident that Hesiod's poems have played an important role in the Greek *paideia*.

Finally, the very well noted influence of the Near East on Hesiod's poems could give us clues to trace the origins of Greek philosophical thought. The influence of Near Eastern cultures on Hesiod can be seen, for example, in the parallels between the myths described in his poems and Mesopotamian, Chaldean and Hurrian-Hittite myths,⁵⁸ in the scientific elements, as in the case of astronomy,⁵⁹ and in the resemblance of didactic⁶⁰ literature to biblical wisdom literature.⁶¹ Because my interest is

⁵⁴ cf. Burkert, 'The Logic of Cosmogony', 87-96.

⁵⁵ cf. Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy* - xiv.

⁵⁶ Contra cf. West, *Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient*, 203-6; also, Rowe, "'Archaic thought" in Hesiod', 125. Supporting a partial continuity between Hesiod and the pre-Socratics, cf. Adrados, *Palabras e ideas*, 27-34.

⁵⁷ One of the most recent discussions on the role of Chaos in Hesiod's cosmos can be found in: Mondì, 'Χαος and the Hesiodic Cosmogony', 1-41.

⁵⁸ About this subject see West, *The East Face of Helicon*, 276-332.

⁵⁹ cf. Pingree, 'Hellenophilia versus the History of Science'.

⁶⁰ cf. Heath, 'Hesiod's Didactic Poetry',

in cosmogonic texts, the texts from Near-Eastern cultures that I will mention are related to cosmogonies.

1.2. Hesiod's Justice of Zeus

Hesiod's cosmos is consistent in his two poems. For him, the cosmos consists of men, gods and nature. Although we do not intend to contrast Hesiod and Homer, it is noteworthy that the Homeric representation of the world is different from the Hesiodic view. Homer bases his vision on a heroic society, which may or may not be a reflection of the Mycenaean past. Hesiod's society is described according to his own age, even though the brief description of the societies of the Golden, Silver and Bronze races and the Heroic race reflect a heroic past.

The three components of the Hesiodic world -- the divine sphere, the natural world and the world of men -- are linked to each other but, to facilitate our analysis, we will deal with them separately. All three share common elements as they are unified by *moira*. Some of those common elements are: a dialectical vision of the opposites and a strong sense of the sacred; also, characteristic to men and gods, the importance given to tradition. The world of the gods consists of the Olympian deities who, together with men, are the protagonists of the Hesiodic poems, including

⁶¹ This debate has recently become animated after the publication of *Black Athena* by Martin Bernal, where he suggests not only the great extent of influence of the Near East and North Africa on Greek culture, but in fact a near-total dependence of Greek culture on them.

the old deities, like Hekate, who had a Near Eastern origin.⁶² Also, personification of certain virtues, e.g. justice, is essential in the Hesiodic world, and these virtues were crucial in his particular, as we note in the *Works and Days*.⁶³

All the gods have their origins in nature and manifest their original characters in their capacity to become cosmic forces.⁶⁴ Their social organization replicates the human structure, with a dynastic monarchy that resembles Mycenaean society or contemporary Hesiodic society.⁶⁵ A dynastic monarchy follows the succession, Ouranos, Kronos and Zeus, which has been compared to Hurrian-Hittite myth of kingship in heaven.⁶⁶ Through τιμή, a final order is established by Zeus. That order is brought about by Zeus himself, allotting to each blessed immortal her/his portion, following *moira* that is necessarily associated with his will.⁶⁷ According to Cornford,⁶⁸ the structure of the universe should be looked for in the social structure of the human society. A question about the social nature of *moira* arises: is it possible that *moira* represents an abstraction of the structure of a privileged social group? A positive answer to this question is hard to accept as the only explanation. It is not possible to forget that

⁶² Cf. Burkert, *Greek Religion*, 171, where he says that she has her origins among the Carians.

⁶³ The book of Jenny Strauss Clay agrees with the position of unity of both poems: *Hesiod's Cosmos*, 8. I have the same opinion, though her focus is mostly literary, and my interest is in the development of Greek thought.

⁶⁴ Zeus acts in nature and has power over it. Thunderbolts and lightning are his weapons, during the Titanomachy and the Typoemachy, and in *Op.* 448 (Edited by Most) it is recognized that Zeus rains.

⁶⁵ Cf. Wernher-Paramo, *Micenas y Homero*, 79-87.

⁶⁶ Cf. West, *The East Face of Helicon*, 101-6.

⁶⁷ This will be the main subject of Chapter 3 in this thesis.

⁶⁸ Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy*, 71.

some of this structural characterization of cosmos is a reflection of the cosmos itself, such as the succession of the four stations, or other 'natural' phenomena. Under the government of the son of Kronos, all gods agree to recognize his authority as legislator and as the *primus inter pares* who oversees the established order. In counterpart, each deity has his own sphere of action, standing as king in his own right and with respect to human beings. They obey only the organizing will and prudent mind of Zeus. Zeus comes to be as a king of kings. He has taken the power in collaboration with the other Olympians. In exchange, he has restored and distributed to each one their honour as we read in *Th.* 881-5:

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ ῥα πόνον μάκαρες θεοὶ ἐξετέλεσαν,
Τιτῆνεσσι δὲ τιμάτων κρίναντο βίηφι,
δή ῥα τότε ὄτρυνον βασιλευμένῃ δὲ ἀνάσσειν
Γαίης φραδμοσύνησιν Ὀλύμπιον εὐρύοπα Ζῆν
ἀθανάτων: ὃ δὲ τοῖσιν ἕως διεδάσσατο τιμάς.⁶⁹

For Hesiod the world of nature is populated by deities, so it is essentially divine, for example: Earth, Sea, Sky, Air, Day, Night, the mountains, the rivers, and the nymphs of the sea and of the Ocean. Due to this divine character, nature itself should surrender to the moralizing

⁶⁹ *Th.* 881-5 (Edited by Most).

‘Filling their fields and their dwellings with dust and a horrible uproar.
Then at last when the blessed divinities finished their labour,
having decided by force their rights in regard to the Titans,
then they invited Olympian, farsighted Zeus to become the
ruler and king of the gods, as advised by the earth-goddess Gaia.
That being settled, he split their prerogative honours among them.’
(Translated by Hine).

process to which Hesiod has submitted the history of the gods. In fact, between human behaviour and the conduct of nature, the poet establishes a close correspondence that leads men to follow the right way as signalled by Zeus. If human being keeps the path of justice, recognizing justice and defending it in public, Zeus will offer him with prosperity, richness and abundance, as Hesiod says in *Op.* 280-1.⁷⁰ Otherwise, they will be punished and the fruit of their labour will be taken away from them. Hard work is advised to avoid hunger and poverty.⁷¹ In this way, nature answers with abundance to the good, transforming itself into an agent of Zeus' will of order and justice. This cosmology can be compared to the cosmologies developed by the Milesians. Cornford,⁷² compared Hesiod's and Homer's cosmologies with Anaximander's cosmology. First he considers that Hesiod's and Homer's cosmologies are systems where the gods form an essential part of them and that Anaximander's cosmology to be free from gods. From there, Cornford compares both cases. Cornford shows that as a consequence of eliminating the gods from his system, Anaximander's cosmology becomes dependent of *moira*. In this way, *moira* appears as the structure of the universe and without any interference of Zeus' will. This is partially true, as we will see, Hesiod's

⁷⁰ γίγνεται· εἰ γὰρ τίς κ' ἐθέλη τὰ δίκαι' ἀγορεύσαι
γινώσκων, τῷ μὲν τ' ὄλβον διδοῖ εὐρύσπα Ζεὺς;
(*Op.*, 280-1, Edited by Most).

'That man who argues a just cause truthfully knowing its justice, Zeus the far-seeing will give great blessings, prosperity, good luck,'(Translated by Hine).

⁷¹ *Op.*, 299-307.

⁷² Cornford, *Principium Sapientiae*, 40 ff.

cosmogony is atheistic. On the other hand, Cornford translates *moira* as destiny or allotment, that is one possible meaning for *moira*. In Hesiod, *moira* will be linked to a dynamic structure, more than to a fixed allotment. For example, from a poetic point of view, we can say phrases such as 'change your destiny', but in general destiny is associated with some inevitable tendency in life that is not changeable. When *moira* is translated as 'allotment', we can think of it in its spatial character, and when it means destiny, we are looking into a temporal character. I believe that this problem of fitting the word *moira* into only one or the other of these meanings could be solved if we understand *moira* as a sort of Kantian *noumeno* or, to reduce the leap of anachronism, one of the Platonic forms. The problem could be that *moira* is a word with a meaning that our mental structure is not able to support, as it should be thought in a non-temporal and non-spatial way. It should be located in the world three of Popper or eventually among the mathematical objects, that according to Plato are not sensibles neither Forms⁷³. *Moirai* would be understood as the primordial structure of the universe, a structure that is logical. It is necessary to say that when I am saying that a structure is logical we are not meaning an abstraction but the kind of objects that, for example, the numbers are.⁷⁴ It

⁷³ Cf. the Allegory of the Divided Line, where the mathematical objects are a particular form of knowledge not in the sensible world or in the world of the Forms. Plato, *Republic*, 509d-513e.

⁷⁴ Cf. Frege, *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik*, 55 ff.

is a logical structure that manifests itself in several ways on the structure of the cosmos itself.⁷⁵

This position agrees in some sense with Cornford's position, in that it is structuralist and positivist. Where we disagree is in his focus on a unique social origin of *moira*, δίκη and νόμος. This position is based on an evolutionist conception of society. In that view, societies are supposed to pass from a 'primitive' totemic stage to a 'glorious' stage characterized by philosophical or scientific knowledge. Those stages are reflected in socio-historical time that projects itself into the creation of the structure of the cosmos. In brief, the evolution of society reflects an evolution in its cosmology. A consequence of this position is that necessary beings are entities that almost disappear, leaving the whole cosmology based on a relativism, that could have deep consequences for the development of science. An extreme position like that is contradictory by itself, because if we assume that a proposition 'A' is true, we cannot assume, in general, that its negation, 'not A', is true at the same time.⁷⁶

It is always presumed in Hesiodic poetry, and firmly anchored in the thought of the poet, that the life of nature is regulated by harmonious laws

⁷⁵ In Chapter 3 I will analyse the nature of *moira*.

⁷⁶ I should add that, in the late 20th Century, several attempts to develop a logic that 'admits contradiction' by different scholars has opened a new field called Non-Classical Logics. Logics admitting contradiction are called 'Paraconsistent'. The first to develop a propositional calculus for a Paraconsistent Logic – without using that word -- was Stanisław Jaśkowski with his paper *A Propositional Calculus for Inconsistent Deductive Systems*. In 1963 Newton C. A. da Costa wrote his *Habilitationen* called *Sistemas Formais Inconsistentes* in Curitiba, Brazil, which is considered the starting point for the study of the logic of the contradiction.

to its own particular character, that are very different from the laws suited to the human world, to its civilization and to human need to live in company. These natural laws, which in the course of divine history lost their validity for a while, were nevertheless reaffirmed *ad aeternum* by Zeus when he took over the heavenly throne; he restored order in the world, combining diverse elements and preserving opposite elements. The manifestation of these laws is given in the equality of the natural elements, for example, heaven and earth in the primary phases of natural life, and the duration of day and night, in a harmonious co-existence of contraries, day and night, lightness and darkness, water and fire, positive forces (rivers, the Nereids⁷⁷ and some winds such as Zephyr⁷⁸ and Notus⁷⁹) and negative and monstrous forces (the lineage of Ceto⁸⁰ and the ill-fated winds, children of Typhoon⁸¹), and in the changing of the seasons, with their periods of heat and cold and with their times of fertility and rest.⁸²

Knowing these laws, the man who lives in contact with nature and who depends on its products can apply the doctrine of the opportune time to do each thing, and his activity can be beneficial.⁸³ The extensive picture of cosmic nature, designed by Hesiod in the *Theogony*, reveals a strong divine character. In the *Works and Days*, on the other hand, we get a

⁷⁷ *Th.* 240 (Edited by Most).

⁷⁸ *Th.* 378-9 (Edited by Most).

⁷⁹ *Th.* 380 (Edited by Most).

⁸⁰ *Th.* 238 (Edited by Most).

⁸¹ *Th.* 143, 351 (Edited by Most).

⁸² *Th.* 339, 499 (Edited by Most).

⁸³ *Th.* 84, *Th.* 233-9 (Edited by Most).

simpler, less impressive and more concrete picture, having as units of measurement human beings and their works. The forests and the mountains are the refuge in the winter and the source of materials for the instruments of work.⁸⁴ The farmed land is the whole; the sea,⁸⁵ on the contrary, presents dangers for the human being and does not seem to enclose the benign divinities registered in the *Theogony*. In the *Works and Days*, therefore, nature has explicitly joined the human being and, at the same time, human fate is linked to divine nature, so that we have found the link that connects and keeps the natural world linked to the divine world: the world of the human being. They are pieces of a broken unity that was the cosmos.

The human world is interpreted with a great deal of realism by the Boeotian poet. Good things and bad things, both having a divine origin, is a mix that human beings should expect. As in the natural world, also in the world of the men, we observe, therefore, the dialectic vision of reality that Hesiod possesses: the positive forces live together, contrasting with the negative forces; nevertheless, among men there exists a principle of responsibility. A human being can enjoy a peaceful life if he lives in harmony with nature and the gods, and does no injustice to his fellow human beings. Men are good by nature; otherwise many of the affirmations and exhortations that appear in *Works and Days* are

⁸⁴ *Op.*, 445-80 (Edited by Most).

⁸⁵ *Op.*, 660-94 (Edited by Most)..

meaningless. Human nature was corrupted by injustice. The human being is special among animals, as he has the divine gift of justice⁸⁶, what establish the difference between the human being and other natural beings. Even though Hesiod notes degeneration in mankind, he seems to be able to suggest a possibility of regeneration. Among mankind there should reign the positive *Eris*, who possesses, by the will of Zeus, a greater authority than her sister, the warrior *Eris*⁸⁷. This non-violent *Eris* should respect the division existing in all the cosmos among the different spheres of influence, and therefore should respect, in the human world, the traditional order that assigns command to kings and obedience and respect to all others⁸⁸. Hesiod recognizes legitimate power and traditional force. The novelty is the relation that the poet establishes with the principle. When a man insults justice, Zeus punishes him.

Men should be respectful to the gods and their designs. As a consequence they receive just treatment from the gods, corresponding to their terrestrial behaviour, becoming protected or punished by them. In harmony, they should find how to act towards nature, shaping their activities to its particular laws. All these are linked to the paradigmatic structure of the universe that together with *moira* are the subject of Chapter 3.

⁸⁶ *Op.* 275-85 (Edited by Most)..

⁸⁷ *Op.* 10-5 (Edited by Most).

⁸⁸ *Op.* 16-25 (Edited by Most).

1.3. Justice, Not Only of Zeus but also from Zeus

As mentioned above, my interest is to show that there is systematic and rational thought in Hesiod's works. To show systematized thought in Hesiod implies that I will discuss concepts and links between them that form a system. This and the following sections are dedicated to the study of 'justice' as a main concept to outline a possible ethical and moral system in Hesiod.

The question of whether or not Hesiod developed a systematic thought only makes sense if we are unable to show inconsistencies in each work or between works. Clay⁸⁹ in her book *Hesiod's Cosmos*, which continues her study⁹⁰ on the nature of the relationship of gods with humans as presented in early Greek poetry, gives an answer to those statements. Her position is that the *Homeric Hymns*, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* tell us stories from the heroic age, and the Hesiodic poems describe Hesiod's cosmos. On one hand the *Theogony* presents a divine perspective, narrating from the origin of the cosmos to the accession of Zeus to the throne of Olympus, whereas *Works and Days* takes a human view on human affairs. She goes further, affirming that the presence of the gods in *Works and Days* is not circumstantial. Nevertheless, I would say it is more

⁸⁹ Clay, *Hesiod's Cosmos*, 1-3.

⁹⁰ Mention should be made of Jenny Strauss Clay's previous book, *The Politics of Olympus: Form and Meaning in the Major Homeric Hymns*, where she starts addressing these subjects.

than circumstantial that the divine presence in *Works and Days* occurs in a non-explicit way through implicit processes. These implicit processes are inspirational, e.g., the deliverance of the justice of Zeus through the princes.⁹¹ Deities like Nereus,⁹² Hekate⁹³ and the Muses⁹⁴ help Zeus in his task to inspire the right judgements. However, she shows that those two poems are related and they complement each other in the description of Hesiod's cosmos. I agree with her, and I will come back to this view in my discussion of Hesiod's moral system. I will start my analysis through the Greek terms for justice, which will prove to be fundamental in supporting Hesiod's moral system.

1.4. Terms Related to Justice

The Greek terms related to 'justice' appear in Hesiod in four different ways: under the word δίκη, and its personification Δίκη, the goddess, as θέμις and its personification, the goddess Θέμις. It is possible to say that δίκη is associated with the application of justice to men, and θέμις is the established laws, in a cosmic sense. As we will see, many scholars agree⁹⁵ that those two 'referents' of justice are linked

⁹¹ *Th.* 84 (Edited by Most).

⁹² *Th.* 233-9 (Edited by Most)..

⁹³ *Th.* 411-52 (Edited by Most)..

⁹⁴ *Th.* 233-9 (Edited by Most)..

⁹⁵For example, C. Gioffredi, 'Su i concetti di Θέμις e Δίκη in Omero', offers us a comparative analysis of Δίκη and Θέμις, concentrating on Homer. See also: Heinemann, *Nomos und Physis* ; Hölkeskamp, 'Nomos, Thesmos und Verwandtes', 115-146 ; and Ronnet, 'Θέμις and δίκη chez Homère et chez Hésiode'.

to Zeus. However, I will show that the justice delivered to men is δίκη who belongs to Zeus and is delivered with the help of other deities. θέμις also is acquired by Zeus; it is what we can call 'cosmic justice'. δίκη is delivered to men only, not to animals or to gods and goddesses. Finally, δίκη is the support of Hesiod's ethical system, which forms part of Zeus' plan.

1.5. Δίκη

The bibliography on δίκη is huge and from diverse points of view. Hirzel⁹⁶ analyses the meaning of δίκη from a philological point of view within the Greek language. Ehrenberg⁹⁷ follows Hirzel and finds in early Greek texts the concept equivalent to the neo-Tomists right-reason, founding Greek justice on an ultimate necessary being. Bonner and Smith⁹⁸ offer a diachronic analysis from Homer to Aristotle, passing through Plato; a similar approach can be found in the set of papers edited by Berneker.⁹⁹

The book of Lloyd-Jones¹⁰⁰ supplied us with a collection of almost the whole bibliography on the subject to that date, and it started to explore cautiously some new ways of research, until then centred on the study of

⁹⁶ Hirzel, *Θέμις, Δίκη, und Verwandtes*.

⁹⁷ Ehrenberg, *Die Rechtsidee im frühen Griechentum*.

⁹⁸ Bonner-Smith, *The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle*.

⁹⁹ Berneker, *Zur griechischen Rechtsgeschichte, Wege der Forschung*, 697-770.

¹⁰⁰ Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus*.

Greek system of laws, more than on the meaning and relevance of justice for the development of Greek civilization. An excellent review of his book can be found in Herington¹⁰¹. Shortly, I can say that the main contribution of Lloyd-Jones on his book is to offer a method based on an etymological analysis of words related to the conception of Justice, showing us a map of terms, instead of suggesting a unique definition. I agree with his position, since an implicit definition of terms has the advantage of being in context. In order to offer an explicit definition of an object, we need to separate the words that define each part of the object, but an implicit definition is relative to the context. Following this idea, it is necessary to discuss the etymology of the word δίκη.

According to *Lfgre*, the etymology of δίκη¹⁰² is related to 'δείκνυμι', which has the basic meaning of 'to show'. Palmer¹⁰³ leads us to an original meaning of δείκνυμι as 'marker', the kind used to delineate borders between estates. West agrees, and expands on that interpretation: 'A straight row of markers would be the result of a fair demarcation, while if

¹⁰¹ Herington, *Review* on Lloyd-Jones, 395-8.

¹⁰² According to Giovanni Semerano, δίκη is related to the Sumerian word DI.KU₅.GAL and the Babylonian *diquallu*, which has the meaning 'supreme judge': Semerano, *L'infinito*, 35.

¹⁰³ Palmer, 'The Indo-European Origins of Greek Justice'. This article represents, still today, an invaluable contribution to the study of 'justice' among the Greeks, where he makes a philological analysis of 'justice' framed in an Indo-European perspective. Unfortunately Hittitology was in its beginning, leaving some gaps that Benveniste, with *Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-europeennes*, came to supply and showed other directions of research, even though Benveniste wrote it as a specialized book for non-specialists. Using a strong structuralist foundation, he tries to re-construct some of the Indo-European institutions, including justice, based upon a philological analysis. With a similar focus we have the article of M. Gagarin, 'Δίκη in Archaic Greek Thought'; see also his 'Δίκη in the *Works and Days*', which offers an account of most classical meanings of δίκη.

some of the stones were moved so as to take in an additional piece of land, the row would be crooked'.¹⁰⁴

Although I agree with the useful interpretation of West, as a strictly semantics interpretation, I propose to extend the definition through a paradigmatic approach, obtaining a multiple point of view. A semantic approach is based on different meanings of a word, a paradigmatics approach not only uses multiple meanings but also looks at the change of those meanings in different texts, through different periods of time taking into account discontinuities that appear in each different axis of action. In our case I am going to look to the word 'dike' through different texts. In this sense Beall¹⁰⁵ goes a step further than West, adding as a new axis the structure of the Hesiodic poems. Beall's¹⁰⁶ discussion on the semantics and pragmatics of the words involved in the definition of justice depends on how we understand, mainly, the structure of the *Works and Days*, which has been a matter of debate for many scholars.

We can identify three different parts in the *Works and Days*. The first part we can identify from v. 1-201, tell us a brief history of human being and their relationship with the gods. This part includes the all important myth of the races, where Hesiod expresses his position about the human History: the past days were better than present days. Also,

¹⁰⁴ West, *Hesiod Theogony*, 184.

¹⁰⁵ Beall, 'Hesiod's Treatise on Justice'.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*, 179.

there is present a legal problem between Hesiod and his brother Perses. The second part we can identify includes v. 202-764, where Hesiod describes his society, how it works, how the relationship between its members is developed and how important is to follow precepts that are based in the justice of Zeus. He gives some advises of astronomical nature to be used in day by day works. The last part from v. 765-828 is a general set of rules to follow when working, day by day, month by month. Nelson¹⁰⁷ argues that the existence of three different parts in the Works and Days are not related structurally, even though they have common themes. Adrados¹⁰⁸ and Lardinois¹⁰⁹ take a middle point in the discussion, accepting the existence of common themes that generate structural links, but maintaining that they are to form a unitary work. Lardinois argues that Hesiod's main purpose is to persuade the reader to take his side in his dispute with his brother and the kings of Ascra, using a speech that has a parallel in Menelaus' speech to Euphorbus,¹¹⁰ where the main thread is his wrath, used as a rhetorical devise. Clay¹¹¹ argues that all the themes in the poem are related; for example, she argues in Chapter 5 that Pandora's myth¹¹² and Prometheus's myth¹¹³ form a unity and determine the concepts of work and justice in this poem. She takes Vernant's¹¹⁴ well known

¹⁰⁷ Nelson, *God and the Land*, 45-8.

¹⁰⁸ Adrados, 'La composición de los poemas Hesíodicos', 197-223.

¹⁰⁹ Lardinois, 'The Wrath of Hesiod', 1-20.

¹¹⁰ *Il.* 17.18-32.

¹¹¹ Clay, *Hesiod's Cosmos*, 37-8 and 141-2.

¹¹² *Op.* 60-105.

¹¹³ *Op.* 42-59.

¹¹⁴ Vernant, 'The Myth of Prometheus in Hesiod', 183-201.

interpretation of Hesiod's Prometheus as a starting point, showing that on the one hand, the *Theogony* is centred on the gods and more specifically on Zeus, while on the other hand the *Works and Days* is centred on men. All of this is well supported by the texts. I agree with this position and will develop my idea later, but as the author predicted in her preface when considering the reception of her opinion,¹¹⁵ I consider the complementarity between the two texts not quite as precise, developed, and deliberate as Clay argues it is. This complementarity demands a precise and rigid structure that I find difficult to perceive in the Hesiodic poems.. Yet, the thesis that both poems consistently and systematically represent two views of the world is undoubtedly useful and convincing. Following this position, Beall¹¹⁶ argues that the concept of justice is also determined by the myth of the races or ages.¹¹⁷

1.6. The Hesiodic Poems

As we know, the *Theogony* deals with the birth of the universe and the gods, the battles and strife which establish in the end a kingdom of justice ruled by Zeus. A first structural approach to a text could be made from a statistical point of view and help us to depict an overall structure of

¹¹⁵ Clay, *Hesiod's Cosmos*, ix.

¹¹⁶ Beall, 'Hesiod's Treatise on Justice', 162-4.

¹¹⁷ *Op.* 109-201 (Edited by Most).

Hesiod's poems.¹¹⁸ If we look to the main keywords listed in Table 1, the word with greatest frequency is θεός, followed by Ζεύς and τίκτω.¹¹⁹

Word	Frequency
θεός	82
Ζεύς	67
Τίκτω	58
Θεά	55
ἀθάνατος	49
γίγνομαι	29
ἄνθρωπος	28

Table 1

It gives us an idea of the main subject of this poem: the birth of gods and goddesses with pre-eminence given to Zeus. In fact, from the 1,022 lines that form the poem, 833 (lines 132-964) correspond to the theogony, or birth of the gods, with an important role given to Zeus, including his accession as king of the gods and men, lines 1-116 to the

¹¹⁸ Sowa, 'Verbal Patterns in Hesiod's *Theogony*', 332-44.

¹¹⁹ I understand that this first structuralist approach using statistics does not offer a deep analysis of the text, but the value it has is that it is a purely objective analysis, which, from a scientific point of view, offers at least a safe starting point.

hymn to the Muses,¹²⁰ 17 lines (lines 116-132) to the cosmogony or birth of the universe and cosmic forces, and the remaining lines to the descendants of the Olympians.

On the other hand the main topics of the *Works and Days* are justice and work. In the analysis of frequency of words in Table 2 we can observe that 'Zeus' has the second highest frequency after 'a man' (άνήρ). 'Work', 'a man' (άνήρ), 'man' (άνθρωπος, like *Homo* in Latin), 'justice', 'ox' and 'gods' are mentioned in that order of frequency.

Word	Frequency
άνήρ	54
Ζεύς	43
έργον	37
άνθρωπος	36
δίκη	24
Βούς	23
θέος	22

Table 2

¹²⁰ Walcot, 'Hesiod's Hymns to the Muses, Aphrodite, Styx and Hecate', discusses the use of this term to refer to the hymn to the Muses and Hecate. With respect to the hymn to Hecate (*Th.* 404-52, Edited by West), West prefers to think of it as a gospel: West, *Hesiod's Theogony*, 276.

This brief observation illustrates that the main subjects of the *Works and Days* will be man, work, justice and Zeus. The high frequency of ἀνὴρ shows that the poem is mostly centred on the life of a man. If we add the relative frequency of ἀνὴρ and ἄνθρωπος in the *Works and Days* the result is 90, higher than the frequency of θεός in the *Theogony*. Also with a higher frequency than the gods appears the word 'ox', as a clear clue to the kind of work that is referred to in the poem: farming. Clearly, humankind takes over the gods in the *Works and Days* as the subject of the poem.

The analysis of these two tables fits Clay's position on Hesiod's cosmos, where there is consistency in his two poems. The cosmos consists of men, gods and nature. The three components of the Hesiodic world - the divine sphere, the natural world and the world of men are linked to each other, sometimes not in a transparent way.

The world of the gods consists of the Olympian deities who, together with men, are the protagonists of the Hesiodic poems, including the old deities, such as Hekate, who, according to Burkert¹²¹ and West¹²² had a Carian origin. Also, personification of certain virtues, e.g. justice, is

¹²¹ Burkert, *Greek Religion*, 171.

¹²² West, *Hesiod's Theogony*, 277.

essential in the Hesiodic world, and these virtues were crucial in his own life, as we can note from the *Works and Days*.

Through τιμή (honour), Zeus establishes a final order. Zeus himself brings this new order, allotting to each blessed immortal her/his portion. According to Cornford,¹²³ the structure of the universe reflects the Greek social structure. A question arises: is it possible that that structure represents an abstraction of a position of a privileged social group? A positive answer to this question is hard to accept as the only explanation. It is not possible to forget that some of this structural characterization of the cosmos is a reflection of the cosmos itself, like the succession of the four Ἔραι (daughters of Zeus and Θέμις)¹²⁴ or other 'natural' phenomena. Under the government of Zeus, all gods have to recognize his authority as law keeper and as *primus inter pares* who oversees the established order. As we have said, each deity has his own sphere of action, acting as king or queen of his or her own right and with respect to human beings. They obey only the organizing will and prudent mind of Zeus. Zeus comes to be the king of kings. He has taken power in collaboration with the other Olympians.

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ ῥα πόνον μάκαρες θεοὶ ἐξετέλεσαν,
Τιτήνεσσι δὲ τιμάτων κρίναντο βίηφι,
δὴ ῥα τότε ὄτρυνον βασιλευμένῃ δὲ ἀνάσσειν

¹²³ Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy*, 71.

¹²⁴ *Th.* 901-2 (Edited by Most).

Γαίης φραδμοσύνησιν Ὀλύμπιον εὐρύοπα Ζῆν
ἀθανάτων· ὁ δὲ τοῖσιν ἐὺ διεδάσσατο τιμάς.¹²⁵

For Hesiod if human beings keep themselves to the path of justice, Zeus will be generous to them, γίνεται· εἰ γάρ τις κ' ἐθέλη τὰ δίκαι' ἀγορεύσαι γινώσκων, τῷ μὲν τ' ὄλβον διδοῖ εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς.¹²⁶ Otherwise, they will be punished and the fruit of their labour may be taken away from them. Also, hard work is advised to avoid hunger and poverty, as we can read:

ἀλλὰ σύ γ' ἡμετέρης μεμνημένος αἰὲν ἐφετμῆς
ἐργάζεσθαι, Πέρση, δῖον γένος, ὄφρα σε Λιμὸς
ἐχθαίρῃ, φιλήῃ δέ σ' ἐυστέφανος Δημήτηρ
αἰδοίῃ, βίοντος δὲ τήν πεμπλήσι καλλιήν·
Λιμὸς γάρ τοι πάμπαν ἀεργῷ σύμφορος ἀνδρῖ·
τῷ δὲ θεοὶ νεμεσῶσι καὶ ἀνέρες ὅς κεν ἀεργός
ζῶῃ, κηφήνεσσι κοθούροις εἴκελος ὀργήν,
οἳ τε μελισσάων κάματον τρύχουσιν ἀεργοί
ἔσθοντες· σοὶ δ' ἔργα φίλ' ἔστω μέτρια κοσμεῖν,
ὥς κέ τοι ὠραίου βίοντος πλήθωσι καλιαί.¹²⁷

¹²⁵ *Th.* 882-6 (Edited by Most).

‘Then at last when the blessed divinities finished their labour, having decided by force their rights in regard to the Titans, then they invited Olympian, farsighted Zeus to become the ruler and king of the gods, as advised by the earth-goddess Gaia. That being settled, he split their prerogative honours among them.’
(Translated by Hine).

¹²⁶ *Op.* 280-1 (Edited by Most).

‘That man who argues a just cause truthfully knowing its justice, Zeus the far-seeing will give great blessings, prosperity, good luck,’ (Translated by Hine).

¹²⁷ *Op.* 298-307 (Edited by Most).

In this way, nature answers with abundance to the good, transforming itself into an agent of Zeus' will of order and justice.¹²⁸

1.7. Δίκη in the *Theogony*

There are two instances of the word δίκη in the *Theogony*: the first is in the hymn to the Muses,¹²⁹ where Hesiod points out that Calliope, the queen of epic poetry, is the most important among the Muses, probably in order to give maximum authority to his epic narrative. Hesiod tells us that the Muses help Zeus to deliver justice τοῦ δ' ἔπε' ἐκ στόματος ῥεῖ μείλιχα,¹³⁰ putting sweet words in the king's mouth.¹³¹ The kings or princes are able to settle judgements, as people expect, πάντες ἐς αὐτὸν ὀρώσι διακρίνοντα θέμιστας ἰθείησι δίκησιν· ὁ δ' ἀσφαλῆως ἀγορεύων.¹³² We

'You on the other hand, Perses, remember forever my earnest precepts, and work, you descendant of Zeus, work hard, so that hunger loathes you and shuns you, and may rich-garlanded, honoured Demeter kindly befriend you and fill your granary yearly with foodstuffs. Hunger is always the boon best friend of a man who is shiftless. Even the gods are disgusted, like men with a chap who is lazy, living in idleness, like drones lacking a stinger to sting with, wholly exhausting the labours of bees by being voracious, shirking all work. But care for your labours and put them in order, so may your granaries fill up quickly with seasonal produce.'

(Translated by Hine).¹²⁸ *Th.* 861-85 (Edited by Most).

¹²⁹ *Th.* 1-103 (Edited by Most).

¹³⁰ *Th.* 84 (Edited by Most) 'Out of his mouth flow honey-sweet words.' (Translated by Hine).

¹³¹ This verse has a parallel in *Od.* 8.171-2 (Edited by Mühl), ὁ δ' ἀσφαλῆως ἀγορεύει αἰδοῖ μείλιχῃ,... ('...as he speaks decisively, with honeyed respect...', translation mine).

¹³² *Th.* 85-7 (Edited by Most) 'Look to the same who decides between differing sides with unbending. Righteousness; speaking decisively, firmly he can in a little While understandingly put an end even to serious quarrels.' (Translated by Hine)

should note here that these right judgements come from Zeus and they are opposed to crooked judgements, σκολιῆς δὲ δίκης κρίνωσι θέμιστας, which are delivered by bad kings.¹³³ Zeus' judgements end any quarrel.¹³⁴ Even when those judgements are realized through princes, justice comes from Zeus and the princes are used as channels.

However, Zeus is not alone in his project of applying justice to the universe. Zeus is setting up a new universe. He has been helped by the Muses using the good kings as vessels, and is helped by Hekate,¹³⁵ as we can read in the hymn to Hekate.¹³⁶

Hekate, goddess of the underworld,¹³⁷ helps Zeus in the administration of justice. This goddess will be associated in later periods of Greek history with the underworld and with sorcery,¹³⁸ she is invoked e.g., by Medea,¹³⁹ and she is a goddess who transmits herself through inspirational process. According to Boedecker,¹⁴⁰ Hekate is linked to sorcery and to the moon, but I cannot find that link in Hesiod.

A question to raise is why this hymn to Hekate appears in the

¹³³ *Op.* 221 (Edited by Most and translation mine).

¹³⁴ *Th.* 85-7 (Edited by Most).

¹³⁵ This seems to be the first appearance of this complex goddess in Greek literature. A comprehensive study on Hekate is found in Johnston, *Hekate Soteira: A study of Hekate's Roles in the Chaldean Oracles and related Literature*; and see her 'Crossroads'. See also Wortmann, 'Die Sandale der Hekate-Persephone-Selene', 155.

¹³⁶ *Th.* 411-452 (Edited by Most).

¹³⁷ Cf. Burkert, *Greek Religion*, 171.

¹³⁸ On the association of sorcery and witchcraft, see in general Rabinowitz, *The Rotting Goddess*; and Clay, 'The Hekate of the Theogony'.

¹³⁹ *Eur. Med.*, 395-7.

¹⁴⁰ Boedecker, 'Hekate: A Transfunctional Goddess in the Theogony?'

Theogony. The presence of this hymn in the *Theogony* and the special exaltation of Hekate, as the main deity among all other peers with the exception of Zeus, has been a difficult problem to solve. West takes the view that Hekate was a special deity in Hesiod's family.¹⁴¹ On the other hand, Mazon¹⁴² and Pfister,¹⁴³ argue that Hekate was a goddess of particular esteem for the popular classes, to which Hesiod himself belonged, which is the reason for deciding to give special tribute to her. As a helper to Zeus in the deliverance of a new order for the universe, she should have an esteemed place in the *Theogony*. She is honoured from the beginning, having among her realms the sea, heaven and earth:

οὐδέ τί μιν Κρονίδης ἐβίησατο οὐδέ τ' ἀπηύρα,
ὅσσ' ἔλαχεν Τιτῆσι μέτα προτέροισι θεοῖσιν,
ἀλλ' ἔχει, ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἔπλετο δασμός.
οὐδ', ὅτι μουνογενῆς, ἦσσον θεὰ ἔμμορε τιμῆς
καὶ γεράων γαίῃ τε καὶ οὐρανῷ ἠδὲ θαλάσση,
ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἐπεὶ Ζεὺς τίεται αὐτήν.
ὧ δ' ἐθέλη, μεγάλως παραγίνεται ἠδ' ὀνίνησιν·
ἐν τε δίκη βασιλεύσει παρ' αἰδοίοισι καθίζει,
ἐν τ' ἀγορῇ λαοῖσι μεταπρέπει, ὅν κ' ἐθέλησιν.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴¹ West, *The East Face of Helicon*, 276-8.

¹⁴² Mazon, *Hesiod*, 21-4.

¹⁴³ Pfister, 'Die Hekate-Episode in Hesiods *Theogonie*', 2.

¹⁴⁴ *Th.* 424-29, 434, 430 (Edited by Most).

'Zeus son of Cronos in nothing abused her and took nothing from her that was in gift to the Titanic gods who came earlier, rather she holds on, as at first the initial division decided, and wields her ancient rights on the earth, on the sea and in heaven;...'
(Translated by Hine)

'...but instead she has far more, since Zeus honors her...'

The justice of Zeus reaches all different parts of the cosmos, and therefore it is necessary to give to Hekate the privilege of acting in all realms. This idea of reaching throughout the universe is confirmed in the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* where Hekate is said to be πρόπολος and ὀπάων to Persephone.¹⁴⁵ Traditionally the use of these two words has been interpreted as meaning that Hekate acts as Persephone's attendant¹⁴⁶ in her descent and ascent to and from Hades. Nevertheless, Johnston¹⁴⁷ interprets the use of these two contradictory words as meaning the omnipresence of Hekate, which is coherent within the extent of her realm.

The administration of justice is a process associated with the new structured universe of Zeus, and also the costumes and the glories of the immortals are transmitted.

ἐν θαλίῃς· ἐρατὴν δὲ διὰ στόμα ὄσσαν εἶσαι
 μέλπονται, πάντων τε νόμους καὶ ἦθεα¹⁴⁸ κεδνὰ
 ἀθανάτων κλείουσιν, ἐπήρατον ὄσσαν εἶσαι.¹⁴⁹

(Translated by Most).

‘...but yet much more still Zeus presents her in kindness:

Sitting by reverend kings enthroned she assists them in judgement.

Him whom she wants to she mightily gives good things in abundance.

So in the forum of folk she advances the man whom she favours.’

¹⁴⁵ Johnston, *Hekate Soteira*, 23; this gives us an idea of what Johnston calls ‘circumspicuity’, that a being surrounds everything.

¹⁴⁶ Luppe, ‘Hekate als ‘Amme’ der Persephone. Philodem [περὶ εὐσεβείας]’ 1088 VI 12-15’, 34.

¹⁴⁷ Johnston, *Hekate Soteira*, 23.

¹⁴⁸ According to West, ἦθεα should be interpreted as manners and νόμους as ordinances: West, *Hesiod’s Theogony*, 178.

¹⁴⁹ *Th.* 65-67 (Edited by Most)

Another helper of Zeus is mentioned in *Th.* 233-239.¹⁵⁰ Those laws sung by the Muses are kept in the memory of Nereus, the eldest child of Pontos, Νηρέα δ' ἀψευδέα καὶ ἀληθέα γείνατο Πόντος, πρεσβύτατον παίδων.¹⁵¹ Nereus is a deity about whom we have little information and who is far less famous than his daughters, the Nereids, who leave an important mark on art and literature. We know that he is called the old man, because αὐτὰρ καλέουσι γέροντα, οὔνεκα νημερτῆς τε καὶ ἥπιος, οὐδὲ θεμίστων λήθεται, ἀλλὰ δίκαια καὶ ἥπια δήνεα οἶδεν.¹⁵² Nereus is called 'wise counsellor', εὐβόουλου, an epithet found in Pindar's *Pythians* 3, 86 ff and Bacchylides, 1, 7. According to Kirk,¹⁵³ Nereus is a prophet figure. Gentili holds the same opinion in his commentary on Pindar's *Pythians*: 'Nereo, il vecchio saggio dio del mare, oracolare al pari di altre divinità marine. . . .'¹⁵⁴

Then, justice in the *Theogony* is transmitted through the princes and can involve other deities such as the Muses, Hekate or Nereus.

'Sing of the customs and noble characters of the immortals.' (Translated by Hide).

'They sing is lovely, and they glorify the ordinances and they' (Translated by Most).

'They as they went to Olympus rejoiced in their beautiful voices.' (Translated by Hide).

¹⁵⁰ *Th.* 233-9 (Edited by Most).

¹⁵¹ *Th.* 233-4 (Edited by Most) 'Nereus, true, unforgetful and honest, was born of the Sea, the Eldest of all of his children, . . . ' (Translated by Hine).

¹⁵² *Th.* 234-6 (Edited by Most) ' . . . so sometimes they call him the Old Man,

for he is truthful and gentle and never forgetful of justice,

seeing that all of his knowledge tends towards kindness and healing'. (Translated by Hine).

¹⁵³ Kirk, *The Nature of the Greek Myths*, 78.

¹⁵⁴ Gentili, *Pindaro*, 421.

1.8. Δίκη in Works and Days

In *Work and Days*, after the invocation of the Muses, there follows a discussion about good and bad strife (*Eris*), as described in the next passage:

Οὐκ ἄρα μόνον ἔην Ἐρίδων γένος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ γαίαν
εἰσὶ δύο· τὴν μὲν κεν ἐπαινήσειε νοήσας,
ἢ δ' ἐπιμωμητή· διὰ δ' ἄνδιχα θυμὸν ἔχουσιν.
ἢ μὲν γὰρ πόλεμόν τε κακὸν καὶ δῆριν ὀφέλλει,
σχετλίη· οὐ τις τὴν γε φιλεῖ βροτός, ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἀνάγκης
ἀθανάτων βουλήσιν Ἔριν τιμῶσι βαρεῖαν.¹⁵⁵

Competitiveness was important in Greece, a typical attribute of this society.¹⁵⁶ Being very simplistic, we could say that competition brings about good things, but when cultivated to excess, it can lead to violence and destruction, which will oppose justice. This human behaviour would invite divine intervention through the kings to settle any quarrel that came up, with justice that comes from Zeus used in order to preserve the structure of the universe. The will of Zeus is a source of fame or obscurity

¹⁵⁵ *Op.* 11-16 (Edited by Most).

‘There is not only one sole Discord; for on earth; she is two-fold:
One of them nobody would find fault with on closer acquaintance,
one, you'd deprecate, for they have totally different natures.
Wickedly one promotes all the evils of warfare and slaughter;
no one of humankind likes her; out of necessity, at the
will of the blessed immortals, they treat grim Discord with honor.’ (Translated by Hine).

¹⁵⁶ Nick Fisher, ‘The Culture of Competition’, 525.

for mortal men, ὄν τε διὰ βροτοὶ ἄνδρες ὁμῶς ἄφατοὶ τε φατοὶ τε¹⁵⁷, the poet also reminds us the action of Zeus among men:

ῥέα μὲν γὰρ βριάει, ῥέα δὲ βριάοντα χαλέπτει,
ῥεῖα δ' ἀρίζηλον μινύθει καὶ ἄδηλον ἀέξει,
ῥεῖα δέ τ' ἰθύνει σκολιὸν καὶ ἀγήνορα κάρφει
Ζεὺς ὑψιβρεμέτης, ὃς ὑπέρτατα δῶματα ναίει.¹⁵⁸

In this passage Zeus is associated with the destiny of men, and seems almost to drive the destiny of each man. We know that δίκη and θέμις are linked: κλύθι ἰδὼν αἰὼν τε, δίκη δ' ἴθυνε θέμιστας,¹⁵⁹ Zeus is asked to make crooked judgements straight. It means that Zeus delivers justice and can rectify a judgement that was not right. In fact, since the justice of Zeus is delivered through the kings, if there is a judgement of a dispute that people can see is crooked, it is understood that it was the king who made the crooked judgement. He did not deliver a judgement from Zeus' mind, but one coming from his own mind. This is why Zeus is sought to make right bad judgements.¹⁶⁰ Hesiod uses the same word, ἰθείησι, in the dative plural. We find it three times in Hesiod to qualify

¹⁵⁷ *Op.* 3 (Edited by Most).

‘Through him, moreover, are humankind undistinguished or famous,...’ (Translated by Hine).

¹⁵⁸ *Op.* 5-8 (Edited by Most).

‘Easily making a man strong, easily he overthrows him, easily humbles the proud as he lifts up high the obscure and easily straightens the crooked as well as deflating the puffed-up-- Zeus who is deathless and thunders aloft and dwells in the highest.’ (Translated by Hine).

¹⁵⁹ *Op.* 9 (Edited by Most). ‘Listen to me and behold, make straight your decisions with justice.’ (Translated by Hine).

¹⁶⁰ *Op.* 5-12 (Edited by Most).

δίκη, particularly when it comes from Zeus, and shows the perfect character of Zeus' justice.¹⁶¹

The best and perfect judgements come from Zeus. Hesiod uses the myth of the races of humanity to continue his discussion about strife and the consequences of violence, which is contrary to a society that follows the true and perfect justice of Zeus.¹⁶² For our analysis it is relevant to note that the men of the silver race are unable to offer honours to the gods, οὐδ' ἀθανάτους θεραπεύειν ἠθέλον οὐδ' ἔρδειν μακάρων ἱεροῖς ἐπὶ βωμοῖς,¹⁶³ and they are unable to control their strife, ὕβριν γὰρ ἀτάσθαλον οὐκ ἐδύναντο ἀλλήλων ἀπέχειν.¹⁶⁴ Ultimately, the reason why Zeus decides to destroy this race is their failure to honour the immortal gods, Ζεὺς κρονίδης ἔκρουσε χολούμενος, οὐνεκα τιμὰς οὐκ ἔδιδον μακάρεσσι θεοῖς οἳ Ὀλυμπον ἔχουσιν.¹⁶⁵ It is no accident that the poet associates a great tendency to violence with a failure to honour the gods. This failure to honour the gods can lead a society to injustice, as it is from Zeus that justice comes. The second race of men created were not able to control their own violence, they fought each other all the time, and therefore they forgot the common laws of society. Among those forgotten social laws is the one that requires every mortal to honour the gods. This

¹⁶¹ *Op.* 33-41 (Edited by Most).

¹⁶² The myth of the races is described by Hesiod in *Op.* 109-201.

¹⁶³ *Op.* 135-6 (Edited by Most). '...nor were they willing to serve the immortals or make sacrifice using the Blessed ones' sacrosanct altars.', (Translated by Hine).

¹⁶⁴ *Op.* 134-5 (Edited by Most). 'They could not keep themselves back from their wicked. Violence on one another.' (Translated by Hine).

¹⁶⁵ *Op.* 138-9 (Edited by Most). 'Thereupon Zeus son of Cronos suppressed them all in his anger, Seeing they did not worship the gods who inhabit Olympus.' (Translated by Hine).

is the sense of θέμις, custom.

All men and gods have a place in the structure of the cosmos that Zeus is determining. Hesiod advises his brother Perses to pay attention to justice and not to foster ὕβρις, insolence or violence, as insolence is bad for a poor man, ὦ Πέρση, σὺ δ' ἄκουε δίκης μηδ' ὕβριν ὄφελλε· ὕβρις γάρ τε κακὴ δειλῶ βροτῶ.¹⁶⁶

Even the powerful man cannot support insolence, says Hesiod. He continues by telling Perses that the best path is the one leading to justice, as justice will win over insolence when the time comes.¹⁶⁷ Men can make crooked judgements and drag justice in the direction that corrupt people want. Nevertheless, this will produce a noise that will awake clamour for the abduction of the virgin Justice. Justice, Δίκη, is a goddess and at the same time the application of justice or judgements, as we can see in the next passage:

τῆς δὲ Δίκης ῥόθος ἐλκομένης ἢ κ' ἄνδρες ἄγωσι
δωροφάγοι, σκολιῆς δὲ δίκης κρίνωσι θέμιστας·
ἢ δ' ἔπεται κλαίουσα πόλιν καὶ ἦθεα λαῶν,
ἠέρα ἐσσαμένη, κακὸν ἀνθρώποισι φέρουσα,
οἷ τέ μιν ἐξέλάσωσι καὶ οὐκ ἰθεῖαν¹⁶⁸ ἔνειμαν.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁶ *Op.* 213-4 (Edited by Most). 'Pay more attention to justice and curb high-handedness, Perses; Violence ill suits men who are lowly' (Translated by Hine).

¹⁶⁷ *Op.* 217-8.

¹⁶⁸ See my comment on *Th.* 85-6, section 1.7. See also *Il.* 16.387ff.

¹⁶⁹ *Op.* 220-4 (Edited by Most).

'There is a tumult when Justice is dragged where men who are venal hijack her, those who impose false judgements with crooked injustice. Weeping, she visits the city and seeks out haunts of the people,

For Hesiod the presence of justice is essential to keep the cohesion of society, which depends on the deliverance of straight judgements to all men, strangers and local: οἷ δὲ δίκας ξείνοισι καὶ ἐνδήμοισι διδοῦσιν ἰθείας καὶ μὴ τι παρεκβαίνουσι δικαίου, τοῖσι τέθηγε πόλις, λαοὶ δ' ἀνθεύσιν ἐν αὐτῇ.¹⁷⁰ As a consequence, justice will bring prosperity and peace, the all-seeing Zeus will not allow war or decree violence: εἰρήνη δ' ἀνά γῆν κουροτρόφος, οὐδέ ποτ' αὐτοῖς ἀργαλέον πόλεμον τεκμαίρεται εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς.¹⁷¹

Additionally, if a man follows justice and delivers good judgements, he never will be hungry, because the land will be generous to him: οὐδέ ποτ' ἰθυδίκησι μετ' ἀνδράσι λιμὸς ὀπηδεῖ οὐδ' ἄτη, θαλίης δὲ μεμηλότα ἔργα νέμονται.¹⁷²

All this is part of Zeus' plan and it is expected of each man to participate in it. Special advice on their participation is given to the princes, whom the poet asks:

dimly enveloped in mist, she's bringing misfortune to humans those who have driven her out do not behave to her rightly.' (Translated by Hine).

¹⁷⁰ *Op.* 225-7 (Edited by Most).

'Others deliver correct just judgements to stranger and fellow countryman, never transgressing a bit the way of the righteous, theirs is a stalwart city and flourishing people within it.' (Translated by Hine).

¹⁷¹ *Op.* 228-9 (Edited by Most).

'Peace that cherishes children is over the land, and all-seeing Zeus never ever allots them cruel and terrible warfare.' (Translated by Hine).

¹⁷² *Op.* 230-1 (Edited by Most).

'Neither disasters nor famines befall men just in their dealings; at their convivial banquets they eat the fruits of their labours.' (Translated by Hine).

ὦ βασιλῆς, ὑμεῖς δὲ καταφράζεσθε καὶ αὐτοὶ
τήνδε δίκην· ἐγγύς γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἐόντες
ἀθάνατοι φράζονται ὅσοι σκολιῆσι δίκησιν
ἀλλήλους τριβουσι θεῶν ὅπιν οὐκ ἀλέγοντες.¹⁷³

They all are under the eyes of the gods, who, together with thousands of entities,¹⁷⁴ are the guardians of justice,¹⁷⁵ to be more precise, τρις γὰρ μύριοί εἰσιν ἐπὶ χθονὶ πουλυβοτείρῃ ἀθάνατοι Ζηνὸς φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων, οἳ ῥα φυλάσσουσιν τε δίκας καὶ σχέτλια ἔργα ἠέρα ἐσσύμενοι, πάντη φοιτῶντες ἐπ' αἴαν.¹⁷⁶ Justice as a goddess has a special place among the eternal gods and goddesses; she is honoured among them. The gods and goddesses honour the virgin Justice who has a place next to Zeus, and if a king delivers a crooked sentence she immediately acts on the mind of men to help them to discover the foolishness of their prince and advises them of the consequences of those

¹⁷³ *Op.* 248-51 (Edited by Most).

‘Princes, behold for yourselves how just is this heavenly justice, for the immortals are closer than you suppose to the actions of mankind closely observing how some of us, steeped in crooked injustice, grind one another right down, not minding the gods’ indignation,...’
(Translated by Hine).

¹⁷⁴ They could be the entities mentioned as forming the golden race in *Op.* 109-26.

¹⁷⁵ Cf. my comments in the previous section where Zeus is said to be helped on the deliverance of justice.

¹⁷⁶ *Op.* 252-5 (Edited by Most).

‘For on the bountiful earth there are thrice ten thousand immortal spies in the service of Zeus to watch over men who are mortal. They watch just judgements and villainous deed at the same time. Dimly enveloped in mist they wander all over the broad earth.’
(Translated by Hine).

acts to their land.¹⁷⁷

1.9 Δίκη, Θέμις and Νόμος

In Zeus' newly structured universe another concept will play a role: νόμος. For Hesiod this word is related to farm work, the cultivation of the land, the dance of the seasons, and its relationship with day-to-day life in an agrarian society:

Πληιάδων Ἀτλαγενέων ἐπιτελλομενάων
ἄρχεσθ' ἀμήτου, ἀρότοιο δὲ δυσσομενάων.
αἱ δὴ τοι νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας τεσσαράκοντα
κεκρύφεται, αὐτὶς δὲ περιπλομένου ἐνιαυτοῦ
φαίνονται τὰ πρῶτα χαρασσομένοιο σιδήρου.
οὕτως τοι πεδίων πέλεται νόμος οἳ τε θαλάσσης
ἐγγύθι ναιετάουσ' οἳ τ' ἄγχεα βησσήεντα
πόντου κυμαίνοντος ἀπόπροθι, πίονα χῶρον,
ναίουσιν· γυμνὸν σπείρειν, γυμνὸν δὲ βοωτεῖν,
γυμνὸν δ' ἀμάειν, εἴ χ' ὄρια πάντ' ἐθέλησθα
ἔργα κομίζεσθαι Δημήτερος, ὥς τοι ἕκαστα
ὄρι' ἀέξηται, μή πως τὰ μέταξε χατίζων.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁷ *Op.* 256-64.

¹⁷⁸ *Op.* 383-94 (Edited by Most).

‘Just as soon as the Pleiades, daughters of Atlas, have risen,
gather your harvest; begin to plough when those sisters are setting.
For forty nights and days is this bright constellation occluded,
till, when the year has in part completed its annual cycle,
they reappear in the heavens at sunrise: time then to sharpen your sick
this, it appears, is the rule that governs the plains and all those who
live by the seashore, also all those who inhabit the glens and

Νόμος is a law, but different from δίκη and θέμις. It is the natural law established by Zeus to rule the lives of all beings, including human beings, τόνδε γὰρ ἀνθρώποισι νόμον διέταξε Κρονίων, ἰχθύσι μὲν καὶ θηροῖ καὶ οἰωνοῖς πετεηνοῖς ἔσθειν ἀλλήλους, ἐπεὶ οὐ δίκη ἐστὶ μετ' αὐτοῖς.¹⁷⁹

Animals have no knowledge of justice and as a consequence they can eat each other. That is their natural law (νόμος); violence is their nature. However, for human kind, Zeus offers justice, which is better. Man has knowledge of that justice. Even though the justice of Zeus covers the universe, the difference between men and beasts is that men have knowledge of justice and the beasts do not.¹⁸⁰

We have also Θέμις, who is a representation of justice and symbolizes the correct order of everything. The etymology of Θέμις, according to Kražovec¹⁸¹ comes from the root τίθημι and means 'to place' or 'to establish'. Θέμις is the mother of the Ὠραι, Εὐνομία, Εἰρήνη and

hillsides remote from the billowing sea, *fertile* land to live in:
straight from your bed, *naked*, plough, sow and thus take in the harvest,
If you are eager to do the work of Demeter in due time,...

(Translated by Hine with some italicized variations mine).

¹⁷⁹ *Op.* 276-8 (Edited by Most)

‘Zeus son of Cronus ordained one rule of behaviour for mankind, but quite another for fishes and animals, likewise for birds, who commonly eat one another: there's no fair play in such creatures.’
(Translated by Hine).

¹⁸⁰ About the order of the universe and the relationship between νόμος, δίκη and εὐνομία, see Fränkel, *Dichtung und Philosophie des fruhen Griechentums*, 145.

¹⁸¹ Kražovec. *Reward, Punishment, and Forgiveness*.

Δίκη.¹⁸² Θέμις represents cosmic justice and the order of the events of the world, and is respected, divine and atemporal.¹⁸³

On one hand θέμις¹⁸⁴ is a cosmic and abstract justice, and on the other νόμος is a set of rules that are defined by custom or tradition or as consequences of natural laws. Heinemann¹⁸⁵ proposed the concept of νόμος as a set of natural laws. Ostwald¹⁸⁶ and Piccirilli¹⁸⁷ follow that tradition, but they argue that those laws do not need to be written: they were sung. In fact, we do not know whether those laws were written or not, and when a law in the sense of νόμος becomes a law in the sense of δίκη. Some authors like Hölkeskamp¹⁸⁸ consider there to be a clear difference between those three terms related to justice and that they had a diachronic development according to the needs of the *polis*. Other scholars, like Papakonstantinou,¹⁸⁹ think that during the archaic period those concepts were mostly fixed. However, according to Yamagata, ‘δίκη, in Homer, is a way an individual or a society usually is hence often ‘should be’. It is generally a human matter rather than a divine concern, and not necessarily a compelling model of behaviour’.¹⁹⁰ The kings, as in Hesiod, are in charge of delivering justice. She also says that a king can

¹⁸² *Th.* 900-3 (Edited by Most).

¹⁸³ Gioffredi, 'Su i concetti di Θέμις e Δίκη in Omero', 69-77.

¹⁸⁴ Cf. *LfgE*, Θέμις.

¹⁸⁵ Heinemann, *Nomos und Physis*, 61-3.

¹⁸⁶ Ostwald, 'Was there a concept *agraphos nomos* in classical Greece?', 84, 96.

¹⁸⁷ Piccirilli, 'Nomoi cantati e nomoi scritti', 7-14.

¹⁸⁸ Hölkeskamp, 'Nomos, Thesmos und Verwandtes', *passim*.

¹⁸⁹ Papakonstantinou, 'Written Law, Literacy and Social Conflict in Archaic and Classical Crete', 135.

¹⁹⁰ Yamagata, *Homeric Morality*, 72.

change δίκη as according to what he thinks is the right way to achieve harmony in his society. On the other hand, θέμις represents a more rigid set of behaviour, even though in practical cases it seems to be equivalent to δίκη.

Yamagata¹⁹¹ observes that 'θέμιστες are laws or customs which have existed in human society for a long time and often believed to be god-given'. The interpretation of Bonner and Smith¹⁹² goes in another direction, as they think that θέμις is eternal and delivered by human agents. Yamagata continues comparing δίκη and θέμις, defining δίκη with the expression 'what is usually done'¹⁹³ and θέμις with 'what should be done'.¹⁹⁴ Also, she says that the interpretation of θέμις by a king becomes δίκη. Yamagata herself cites Ronnet¹⁹⁵ in respect of the difference between δίκη and θέμις, 'celle d'une réalité statique, l'ordre établi, et d'une virtualité dynamique, l'absolu moral, qui se concretise au gré des détenteurs d'autorité.' Yamagata's position is that θέμις is 'a moral absolute', not a changeable set of laws. If we accept that moral absolute, this should be founded in a non-contingent being that cannot be a human being, but rather a god.

Hesiod interprets the human world as composed of good and bad things, both linked to a divine origin, and human beings should expect a

¹⁹¹ Ibid, 78

¹⁹² Bonner and Smith, *The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle*, 10.

¹⁹³ Yamagata, *Homeric Morality*, 78.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Ronnet, 'Θέμις and δίκη chez Homère et chez Hésiode'.

mixture of both. As in the natural world, also in the world of men, we observe, therefore, the dialectical vision of reality that Hesiod possesses. Positive forces live together, contrasting with negative forces.¹⁹⁶ Among men there exists a principle of responsibility: a human being can enjoy a peaceful life if he lives in harmony with nature and the gods and does no injustice to his fellow human beings. He believes that men have a tendency to be good; otherwise many of the affirmations and exhortations that appear in the *Works and Days* are meaningless. Injustice corrupts human nature. Justice is a divine gift that makes human beings special among animals. Even though Hesiod notes degeneration in mankind, he seems to be able to suggest a possibility of regeneration. The positive *Eris*¹⁹⁷ should reign among mankind, because it possesses, by the will of Zeus, a greater authority than its sister, the warrior *Eris*. This non-violent *Eris* should respect the division existing throughout the cosmos among the different spheres of influence, and therefore should respect, in the human world, the traditional order that assigns command to kings and obedience and respect to all others. Hesiod recognizes legitimate power and traditional force. When justice is insulted, Zeus punishes them.

Men should be respectful to the gods and their designs. As a consequence they receive just treatment from the gods, corresponding to their terrestrial behaviour, becoming protected or punished by them. In

¹⁹⁶ *Op.* 270-9.

¹⁹⁷ *Op.* 11-24 (Edited by Most).

harmony, they should find how to act towards nature, shaping their activities to its particular laws.

1.10. Hesiod's Ethics

Knowing the laws and justice, the man who lives in contact with nature and who depends on its products can apply the doctrine of *καίρος* to do each thing with good timing, and his activity could prove beneficial. The extensive picture of cosmic nature, designed by Hesiod in the *Theogony*, reveals a strong divine character. In the *Works and Days*, on the other hand, we get a simpler, less impressive and more concrete picture, having as a unit of measurement human beings and their works. The forests and the mountains are the refuge in winter and the source of materials for the instruments of work.¹⁹⁸ The farmed land is what supports life, but in contrast the sea¹⁹⁹ presents dangers for the human being and does not seem to enclose the benign divinities registered in the *Theogony*. In the *Works and Days*, therefore, nature has explicitly joined human beings and, at the same time, human fate is linked to divine nature, so that we have found the link that connects and keeps the mortal world to the divine world: the world of the human being. They are pieces of a broken unity that was the Cosmos.

¹⁹⁸ *Op.* 445-480.

¹⁹⁹ *Op.* 660-694.

For Hesiod, the laws that rule the human being transform themselves into moral precepts, because they depend on the divine justice of Zeus. One of those moral precepts of Hesiod is the concept of reciprocity, which contributes to the cohesion of a society.²⁰⁰ This precept in practical terms is related to good behaviour towards neighbours and family, behaviour that will attract the favour of the gods. This good behaviour applies also to the princes, who are helpers of Zeus in the application of his justice. In order to explain his understanding of justice and its application, Hesiod tells us a fable, which elucidates better his position. This is the fable of the Hawk and the Nightingale²⁰¹ described in the following passage:

Νῦν δ' αἶνον βασιλευσιν ἐρέω φρονέουσι καὶ αὐτοῖς·
ὦδ' ἴρηξ προσέειπεν ἀηδόνα ποικιλόδειρον
ὔψι μάλ' ἐν νεφέεσσι φέρων ὀνύχεσσι μεμαρπώς·
ἦ δ' ἐλεόν, γναμπτοῖσι πεπαρμένη ἀμφ' ὀνύχεσσι,
μύρετο· τὴν ὃ γ' ἐπικρατέως πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπεν·
'δαιμονίη, τί λέληκας; ἔχει νύ σε πολλὸν ἀρείων·
τῆ δ' εἷς ἦ σ' ἂν ἐγὼ περ ἄγω καὶ ἀοιδὸν ἐοῦσαν·
δείπνον δ', αἶ κ' ἐθέλω, ποιήσομαι ἠὲ μεθήσω.
ἄφρων δ', ὅς κ' ἐθέλη πρὸς κρείσσονας ἀντιφερίζειν·
νίκης τε στέρεται πρὸς τ' αἴσχεσιν ἄλγεα πάσχει.'

²⁰⁰ On the subject of reciprocity, cf. Seaford, *Reciprocity and Ritual: Homer and the Tragedy in the Developing City-State*, 190 ff.

²⁰¹ About the character of fable of this text including some comments on the links to Near-Eastern literature see Lonsdale, 'Hesiod's Hawk and Nightingale', 403-12.

ὡς ἔφατ' ὠκυπέτης ἰρῆξ, τανυσίπτερος ὄρνις.²⁰²

In these eleven lines, we have good part of Hesiod's thought on the relationship of justice and society. The first thing is to clarify in the best possible way what exactly represent the hawk and the nightingale.

According to West the theme of this fable is ὕβρις and δίκη.²⁰³ Vianello follows West, regarding the hawk as a representation of ὕβρις and the nightingale is a representation of δίκη.²⁰⁴ I agree with them partially. Their interpretation is a plausible one, but it is possible to arrive at other valid interpretations from a different reading of the words. When I speak of valid interpretations I mean that those interpretations respect the rules of logic, including set theory and the mediaeval theory of supposition. Let us transform the fable into propositions so we can study them from a logical point of view. The entities that appear in the fable and their possible interpretations, as far as I can see, are: Zeus, a hawk, human beings, the nightingale, the gods, kings and the Muses. About these figures, I can formulate, among others, the following premises:

²⁰² *Op.* 202-12 (Edited by Most).

‘Now I shall tell you a fable, for kings who have understanding.
A hawk spoke to a speckle-necked nightingale cruelly, as he
lifted her up to the clouds while gripping her tight in his talons.
Piteously she, transfixed by his crooked claws, was lamenting
when the imperious hawk addressed her in arrogant parlance,
"Why, little lady, such shrieks? One stronger than you now has got you;
where you are going I'll take you myself, though you are a songstress,
for as I please I'll make you my dinner or give you your freedom.
Witless is one who attempts to strive against those who are stronger:
when he is stripped of the prize it's injury added to insult."
Thus said the fast-flying hawk, that bird with the generous wing-span.’
(Translated by Hine).

²⁰³ West, *Hesiod's Works and Days*, 204.

²⁰⁴ Vianello, *Obras de Hesíodo: Los trabajos y los días*, n. 202-212, CCXCVII.

1. Zeus is the hawk; the human being is the nightingale.
2. The gods represent the hawk; the human being is the nightingale.
3. Kings represent the hawk; justice, *δίκη*, is the nightingale.
4. Kings represent the hawk; human beings are the nightingale.
5. Hesiod is the nightingale; the gods, Muses and *Δίκη* represent the hawk.²⁰⁵

A closer analysis of those statements shows that statement 2 contains statement 1.

Also, statements 3 and 4 can be reduced to:

3'. Kings are the hawk and justice is the nightingale, or human beings are the nightingale.

However, since what makes the difference between human beings and other animals is justice,²⁰⁶ statement 3' can be reduced to:

3". The hawk represents kings and the nightingale represents justice.

At this point we have reduced those initial five statements to two:

²⁰⁵ The consequences of this statement are largely discussed in Nelson, 'The Justice of Zeus', 235-47.

²⁰⁶ *Op.* 277-8.

2. The hawk represents the gods/Zeus and the nightingale represents the human beings.

3". Kings are hawks and justice is a nightingale.

Now, it seems that 2 and 3" are not reducible to each other. Statement 2 – gods are the hawk and human beings are the nightingale – seems to appeal to the power of the gods to take over the life of a man and decide on it. On the other hand, 3" seems to refer to ὑβρις, interpreted by Hays as the violence derived from a superiority and the pride that kings rely on when they deliver crooked judgements.²⁰⁷ In that sense justice, represented as a virgin without protection, is violated and taken away.²⁰⁸

Our conclusions allow us to affirm that the hawk and the nightingale are metaphors for metaphysical entities, the hawk representing ὑβρις and the nightingale representing justice, δίκη. Of course these metaphysical entities manifest themselves through physical entities like kings, people and gods. Even the traditional interpretation of the fable is included in our result, I has been able to show a more general representations of the characters of the fable. Also, this logical analysis allows us to provide a rational justification for the classical interpretation given by West and Vianello.

²⁰⁷ Hays, *Notes on the Works and Days of Hesiod*, 107.

²⁰⁸ *Op.* 256.

The justice of Zeus is fundamental to maintaining the cohesion of a society and it is a moral issue. But, for Hesiod morality is also linked to piety. He says:

Κὰδ δύναμιν δ' ἔρδειν ἱέρ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν
ἀγνώως καὶ καθαρῶς, ἐπὶ δ' ἀγλαὰ μηρία καίειν·
ἄλλοτε δὲ σπονδῆσι θύεσσι τε ἰλάσκεσθαι,
ἤμὲν ὅτ' εὐνάζῃ καὶ ὅτ' ἂν φάος ἱερὸν ἔλθῃ,
ὥς κέ τοι ἴλαον κροαδίην καὶ θυμὸν ἔχωσιν,
ὄφρ' ἄλλων ὠνῆ κλήρον, μὴ τὸν τεὸν ἄλλος.²⁰⁹

Therefore, sacrifices and libations to the gods are essential to keep a just society, in return for which the gods are propitious to the person performing these acts, and making him or her wealthy enough to buy other people's portions, as Hesiod tells us:

μηδέ ποτ' ἐξ ἠούς Διὶ λείβειν αἶθοπα οἶνον
χερσὶν ἀνίπτοισιν μηδ' ἄλλοις ἀθανάτοισιν·
οὐ γὰρ τοί γε κλύουσιν, ἀποπτύουσι δέ τ' ἀράς.
μηδ' ἄντ' ἠελίου τετραμμένος ὀρθὸς ὀμιχεῖν,
αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ κε δύῃ, μεμνημένος, ἔς τ' ἀνιόντα,
μὴ δ' ἀπογυμνωθεῖς· μακάρων τοι νύκτες ἔασιν.²¹⁰

²⁰⁹ *Op.* 336-41 (Edited by Most).

‘And insofar as you can make sacrifice to the immortals
blandly with ritual purity, likewise burning the fat meats.
Gladden the deathless gods with libations and incense at all times
both upon going to bed and at the return of the holy
light, so they'll grant you a tranquil heart and a satisfied spirit;
so you can bid on your neighbour's plot and not he on your own land.’
(Translated by Hine).

To summarise we can affirm that Hesiod's moral system stands on three pillars: work,²¹¹ piety²¹² and reciprocity, particularly with neighbours and family.²¹³ Those three pillars have a teleological function, to preserve the cohesion of the cosmos, a way of restoring the broken unity.

²¹⁰ *Op.* 724-30 (Edited by Most).

‘Never at sunrise pour a libation of glistening wine to Zeus or the other immortals with unwashed hands, or the gods will not be inclined to your prayers but spit them again in your own face. One should not urinate facing the sun while standing erect, but one should remember always to do it at sunset and sunrise. Nor should you piss on the path or next to the path when out walking; nor should you do it when naked in bed; nights clearly belong to the blessed.’
(Translated by Hine).

²¹¹ *Op.* 287-335.

²¹² *Op.* 336-41.

²¹³ *Op.* 342-80.

Chapter 2

Hesiod's Cosmogony

2.1. Introduction

I finished the previous chapter by showing Hesiod's moral system, mostly based on the *Works and Days*. We discussed Hesiod's proposal of justice as the spine for an ordered society. Hesiod proposes that justice is a fuller understanding of reality and order. He has been able to present active justice in the human world, linked to the gods, to the structure of power and to society as a whole. Justice seems to be the support of a coherent society. This is a step into moral philosophy.

However, as we have said above, one of the main problems about accepting Hesiod as a philosophical thinker is the use of myths in his composition. Hesiod seems to use his myths to teach and say something that he believes is true.

We cannot say that Hesiod has developed an epistemology in the technical sense that it has in philosophy; however we can find elements which make clear Hesiod's concern with the truth. In the Hymn to the Muses²¹⁴ of the *Theogony*, Hesiod makes an important reference to

²¹⁴ *Th.* 1-115 (Edited by Most).

ἀληθεία:

ποιμένες ἄγραυλοι, κάκ' ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες οἶον,
ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὅμοια,
ἴδμεν δ', εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν, ἀληθεία γηρύσασθαι.²¹⁵

When Hesiod tells us that the Muses can tell things that are true, and things that are false but seem true, i.e., pseudo-truths, he reveals an interest in the problem of knowledge. As a poet he transmits a knowledge that looks like a truth, but could not be more than a pseudo-truth, a way to express a truth. Certainly, it is not only related to his authority, which comes from the Muses, but also from the fact that he is a poet. Hesiod bases his authority in the divine, represented here by the Muses, and showing to his audience a concern about the truth.²¹⁶ The other two cases where the word ἀλήθεια appears is used to mean 'real name', in παῦροι δέ τ' ἀληθεία κικλήσκουσιν,²¹⁷ 'Few label this day by its real name.',²¹⁸ and to refer to a person who never lies and always tells the truth: Νηρέα δ' ἀψευδέα καὶ ἀληθεία γείνατο Πόντος, πρεσβύτατον παίδων.²¹⁹ ('Nereus, true, unforgetful and honest, was born of the Sea, the eldest of all of his

²¹⁵ *Th.* 26-8 (Edited by Most).

"Wilderness shepherds, ignoble excuses for men, merely bellies. We are accustomed to tell many lies that resemble the facts, and We are accustomed to speak, when we wish to, the literal truth, too."
(Translated by Hine).

²¹⁶ Cf., e.g., a discussion where these lines of Hesiod are compared with Xenophanes' epistemology in J.H. Leshner's commentary in his edition of Xenophanes's fragments: Xenophanes of Colophon. *Fragments*, 165-73.

²¹⁷ *Op.*, 818 (Edited by Most).

²¹⁸ *Op.* 818 (Tranlated by Hine).

²¹⁹ *Th.* 233-4 (Edited by Most).

children.).²²⁰ The problem for us in understanding Hesiod's approach is that he talks about the truth but uses myths and carries out his discussion in a work called *Theogony*.

In the best of cases he is considered a precursor of the philosophical thought or bridge between mythic and philosophical thought, which is the position of G.S. Kirk. According to Kirk, it is generally assumed that Hesiod represents 'the point of transition from mythopoeic to rational modes of thought'.²²¹ For H. Diller,²²² Hesiod represents '*eine Brücke vom mythischen zum philosophischen Denken*'. Behind Diller's conception of knowledge as a progressive and continuous process there is a supposition that there are no gaps between the two different ways of thinking. A transition point could not exist or could be unknowable – It would in fact be impossible to identify a point at which one could divide these two ways of thinking. As we will see from this Chapter and in Chapter 4, Hesiod's concept of Chaos is analogous to the idea of zero and is based on the supposition that there is nothing before Chaos, and that Chaos came into being from nothing. Even though Hesiod never said that, we can infer this from *Th.* 116. This concept is not accepted by the pre-Socratics, as we will see in Chapter 4. Eternity substitutes it for the pre-Socratics, the act of coming into being *ex nihilo*.

²²⁰ *Th.* 233-4 (Translated by Hine).

²²¹ Kirk, *Myth.*, 238.

²²² Diller, 'Hesiod', 151.

The accepted view that Hesiod and Homer are the first two poets in Greek literature, and the fact that they use mythology as language tends to reinforce the idea that a philosophical thought could not be the starting point of a poetic cosmogony. Also, to make consideration of philosophy in a poetic and mythological context more complex, there is a long chronological gap between Hesiod and the thinker considered to be the first philosopher, Thales of Miletus. Even though these factors are not strong premises for concluding that philosophy cannot be found in Hesiod, it is important to address them.

The temporal problem, that Hesiod long predates the first known philosopher, does not take into consideration the likely possibility that there were writers unknown to us today or external influences, such as Near-Eastern cultures, which would account for a continuity of ways of thinking. These assumptions, the evolutionist model of history, and a positivist philosophical position all contribute to seeing Hesiod's works as strictly mythic thought. I will show that Hesiod's cosmogony is more than a mythic explanation of the cosmos and its origin. In the sections below, we will consider Hesiod's cosmogony in the context of a philosophy that discusses the origin of the universe, leaving to Chapter 4 discussion of the relation of Hesiod with the pre-Socratic philosophers.

2.2. Hesiod's Cosmogony: Generalities

Hesiod's cosmogony is a well-studied subject and its comparison with the pre-Socratics has been done by M.C. Stokes in his two papers *Hesiodic and Milesian Cosmogonies I and II*.²²³ Yet Stokes supposes that Hesiod is a mythographer, and he compares him with the pre-Socratics under the assumption that he is comparing mytho-poetic thought with rational thought he says, talking about other scholars, not himself: 'Many scholars have treated the subject in general terms, *abstracting from Hesiodic and philosophical texts certain concepts which appear common to both...*'.²²⁴ With this affirmation Stokes is setting his foundation, because he is almost opposed to that position. Clearly he agrees that there are terms that are common to Hesiodic and philosophical thought; however, he is also opposing Hesiodic thought to philosophical thought. Also, Stokes's main purpose is to complement the work developed by F. M. Cornford in *Principium Sapientiae*,²²⁵ where in the chapter entitled 'The Pattern of Ionian Philosophy', he dedicates his attention to Anaximander, leaving the others aside. In Stokes's forementioned articles he also analyses carefully the concept of Tartarus in Hesiod and how it could be related to his cosmogony, providing a good analysis of Chaos in modern

²²³ Stokes, 'Hesiodic and Milesian Cosmogonies I'; and his 'Hesiodic and Milesian Cosmogonies II'.

²²⁴ Stokes, 'Hesiodic and Milesian Cosmogonies I', 1. (Italic mines)

²²⁵ Cornford, *Principium Sapientiae*.

scholarship.²²⁶ Also, he directs his attention to the first principle (ἀρχή) in the pre-Socratics and how they could be related to Hesiod's cosmology and cosmogony.

In his search for an understanding of Hesiodic thought, there are two assumptions implicit, which are also commonly held by most contemporary scholars: that Hesiod's entities, such as Chaos and Tartarus²²⁷, are physical entities or their abstractions. An example would be to think that Chaos is the gap between heaven and earth or to think that it is a void or empty space. The supposition that there is a physical entity which exactly corresponds to Hesiodic Chaos is a very unlikely solution. As we will see, the very little textual evidence does not point to only a physical answer. The second common explanation of Chaos is to see it as an abstraction of a physical or even a group of several physical entities.²²⁸ However, this second explanation implies that we are using an analogy, which exchanges an unknown object (Chaos) for another unknown object (e.g., a gap), making a translation of the problem from one unknown to another unknown language. Analogies in themselves are not inappropriate as a methodological instrument. Any methodology must choose to model an object and should be predictive, revealing unknown properties of the object studied, but should also have the known properties of the modelled

²²⁶ Stokes, 'Hesiodic and Milesian Cosmogonies I', 1-37; and his 'Hesiodic and Milesian Cosmogonies II', 1-34

²²⁷ Cf. Johnson, 'Hesiod's Descriptions of Tartarus', 8-9.

²²⁸ For a discussion about different kinds of abstractions, see Lowe, *Possibility of Metaphysics*, 210-8.

object. Examples of analogical analysis are to equate Chaos with pure empty space, or to the gap existing between earth and heaven, but these analogies are unable to explain the concept of Chaos. In order to realize the existence of a gap between earth and heaven, it is necessary to suppose first the existence of earth and heaven. That order of appearing could be chronological or logical. But for Hesiod²²⁹ the order in which the primeval entities' come to be is: Chaos, Gaia and Ouranos, in which Chaos cannot be the gap left after the separation of Gaia and Ouranos. In fact, the characteristic of Chaos is to be *πρώτιστα* in the order of coming into being.

What else can we ask about Chaos? For example, is Chaos a state of the matter, or is it an abstraction? Also, does Chaos have a physical existence? All those questions have had a positive answer defended by various scholars, as we will discuss later in nexts sections of this chapter. Answers to some of those questions will show a view of the Hesiodic cosmogony.

The first step we need to take is to look into the Hesiodic cosmogony not only as a mythic text but also as a source of philosophical material within the mythical composition. To expand our vision of the Hesiodic cosmogony, we can revisit the interpretation of the Hesiod cosmogonic conceptions in other archaic cosmogonies, in order to get

²²⁹ *Th.* 116-9.

some additional insights about how other cosmogonies explained their cosmos and how they adapted the Hesiodic concepts. Moreover, there are some Greek cosmogonies that are based on the Hesiodic cosmogony which allow us to trace back some Hesiodic concepts.

Coming back to the problem of the language used by Hesiod, if I am to argue that Hesiod's thought is more than mytho-poetic, the first thing to ask is: why does Hesiod use the gods in his composition? Even though the *Theogony* is devoted to the gods and their lineage as one of the main themes, it is also true that for Hesiod the universe came into existence *by itself*, without being created by a god or gods, therefore it is valid to say that to sustain the whole universe with an order is a process where deities may or may not be involved. Still, we can ask whether or not the gods and their features are the main subject of this poem, or whether or not they are only a context with excellent referents created for the purpose of transmitting other ideas.

In offering an atheistic cosmogony in order to explain the emergence of the universe and the gods, Hesiod takes a step into philosophical thought. Chaos, Gaia and Ouranos are mentioned by Hesiod as the answer to the question:

ταῦτά μοι ἔσπετε Μοῦσαι, Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι
ἔξ ἀρχῆς, καὶ εἶπαθ', ὅτι πρῶτον γένητ' αὐτῶν.²³⁰

Observe that the use of 'πρῶτον' indicates a relativization, opposed to 'πρώτιστα' used in the next line. Then a translation for *Th.* 115 approaches this: 'which one were first [among the others] to come into being?'²³¹ I disagree with the translation given by Most, where the instance of the verb γίγνομαι note that Hesiod uses here Hesiod's answer starts with ἡ τοι μὲν πρώτιστα Χάος γένητ'...,²³² where we learn that Chaos was the first to come into being. Even though Chaos is part of the answer, there is no mention to its divinity, in that text or in any other known text. There is no mention of a deity involved in the process of coming into being of Chaos. At least in his first step, it seems that Hesiod is freeing his cosmogony of divine creation. It is clear that Gaia and Ouranos are gods, and I accept that they are, but they also come to be without divine intervention. Chaos as πρώτιστα to come into being is not at all related to the origin of Gaia. As we saw, Aristotle, Xenophanes and other ancient writers, followed by most modern scholars, accept that Hesiod was not a philosopher because of the presence of the gods and the use of myth in his works.²³³ Jean-Pierre Vernant,²³⁴ however, concedes to Hesiod a

²³⁰ *Th.* 114-5 (Edited by Most).

²³¹ *Th.* 115 (Translation mine).

²³² *Th.* 116 (Edited by Most).

²³³ Kirk et al., *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 7-49; particularly 34-49. Also see section 1.1 of this thesis.

²³⁴ Bottéro et al., *Ancestor of the West*, 157.

degree of revolution. According to him, Hesiod described Greek mythology using a pattern taken from the Near-East, the Hittites and Babylonians,²³⁵ with the novelty of shedding light on the need for an order in the world, order that will need a ruler, Zeus. Also, that order cannot be questioned. I agree with Vernant on those points, and would add that the unquestionability of that order is a milestone for Greek philosophy and science, because the only way to look for patterns is to accept that they exist, and the Greeks in general accepted that there are rules, structures and laws that underlie the universe, society, and their relationship with the gods and with other elements of the universe. He also sees in Hesiod's cosmogony an important change with respect to Near-Eastern neighbours. The first that came into being was Chaos, not water as it has been commonly thought. Vernant also adds that after Chaos came Gaia, who is a solid, visible and stable being and for those characteristics opposed to Chaos.²³⁶ I agree that the attributes listed by Vernant describe Gaia, but I think that the idea that Chaos is opposed to Gaia, in the sense that his

²³⁵ There are several elements in common between Hesiod's *Theogony* and other theogonies composed in the Near-East. As we will discuss there are parallels between Hesiod's compositions and the Hittite mythology. This is a subject recurrent in all recent works on Hesiod or the influence of Near-Eastern cultures in Greek literature. Of particular importance due to its scope and content we have West, *The East Face of Helicon*, 276-333. Cf. Komoroczy, 'Separation of Sky and Earth'. As we will mention later one of the parallel main themes is 'the Kingship in Heaven' as discussed in Littleton, 'Kingship in Heaven', 21-45 The relationship between Mesopotamia and Greek Myth could be found in Penglase, *Greek Myths and Mesopotamia*, 166-92. The *Theogony of Dammu* has parallels with Hesiod's *Theogony*, particularly in its genealogical structure. About the Babylonian Theogony, which differs from the tablets of creation, see Lambert-Walcot, 'A New Babylonian Theogony', 64 ff., and more recently Jacobsen, 'The Harab Myth'. A very recent book on the subject is López-Ruiz, 'When the Gods Were Born', where the author explores different perspectives on the influence of the Near-Eastern cultures on Greek culture, concentrating on the Phoenician influence, bringing some novelties to this lived field of studies.

²³⁶ Vernant, *Origins of Greek Thought*, 157.

attributes are opposed to the ones mentioned for Gaia, is difficult to accept. First, we have no other properties to apply to Chaos other than to be the 'πρώτιστα' that came into being, which does not stand in opposition to Gaia. If Chaos is the very first that came into being, then anything that is not Chaos opposes that order, then it is not a particular characteristic of Gaia. Vernant's account of the attributes of Gaia seems to be correct; however, what does it mean to say that Chaos is the opposite of solid, visible and stable? The opposite of solid could be liquid or gaseous. The opposite of visible could mean invisible. The opposite of stable is unstable. It is clear that Vernant has arrived at the conclusion that Chaos is a physical entity, with properties learnable through the senses. I understand that there is some evidence supporting this position. In fact, the line of Chaos, according to Hesiod,²³⁷ is asexual and formed by Darkness (*Erebus*) and dark Night, which mate to produce Brightness (*Ether*) and Day, their opposites. If we consider Darkness and the Dark Night as characteristics of Chaos, we can arrive at the conclusion that negative characteristics, in the sense of absence of a (positive) characteristic, are the characteristics of Chaos. However, this presents a new problem. If we accept that the descendents of Chaos have characteristics of Chaos, what happens with Brightness and Day; in other words, do they have characteristics of Chaos? They cannot be, because they are the opposite of other characteristics.

²³⁷*Th.* 123-5.

Another scholar who agrees with Vernant that Chaos is the opposite of Gaia is R. A. Prier. He suggests that a logical structure underlies Hesiod's cosmogony:

In logical terms, Chaos is the necessary polar opposite, in a negative sense, to the positive genealogical forces of the cosmos as Hesiod describes them. In particular it is the opposite to Earth ... an unlimited 'other' whose only known boundary rests against its opposite...²³⁸

The problem with this approach is that Prier is supposing the existence of an absolute complement, which is not logically allowed. He says that Chaos is '...an unlimited "other" whose only known boundary rests against its opposite [Earth]'. Figure 1 can help us understand this concept:




Figure 1

²³⁸ Prier, 'Archaic Structuralism', 2.

If we think that Gaia is the circle, then its complement is what is not the circle, the lines/area with lines. Those lines extend infinitely; because there is no limit, there is no boundary for the complement of the circle. Let us make a more formal approach to this idea of the complements. A complement of an object O_1 is another object O_2 that is exactly everything that is not O_1 . The absolute complement of an object is formed by all the objects that do not belong to the object. Suppose that you have a bag containing any number of objects, then the absolute complement is the collection of all objects that are not in the bag. If we change the word bag for the word set we are getting close to Russel's paradox. As we know, Bertrand Russell sent a letter to Gottlob Frege, where he explains why a naïve Set Theory²³⁹ leads us to a paradox.²⁴⁰ The absolute complement induces a contradiction and, for that reason, it is not possible to have a being that is exactly everything that the other is not. In fact, suppose that a being is defined by its extension, let us call that set X , then the absolute complement of X is the set of all elements that does not belong to X . Let us call X^C the absolute complement of X . X^C is the set of all elements that have the properties that are not properties of the elements of X . Let us consider the property of:

²³⁹ All basic concepts and definitions from Mathematical Logic and Set Theory used in this thesis could be found in any good book on the subject. A particular suggestion is Barwise, *Handbook of Mathematical Logic*.

²⁴⁰ Russell explained the significance of his paradox in a famous letter to Gottlob Frege, reprinted in van Heijenoort, *From Frege to Gödel*, 124-5; Frege's reaction is detailed in Appendix II to Frege, *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik*, 127-43. For Russell's own views of the significance of the paradoxes of set theory, see Russell, *Principles of Mathematics* and his 'On Some Difficulties in the Theory of Transfinite Numbers'.

R: X does not belong to X

Therefore, X has that property or X does not have that property. If X has that property, then X is contradictory as it is equivalent to Russel's paradox. Otherwise, X^C has the property R, meaning that X^C is contradictory. Both contradictions come from the supposition that the absolute complement exists. As a consequence, the definition of Chaos according to Prier, defining it as the complement of Gaia is not acceptable. Observe that Prier is talking about the absolute complement, not a relative complement, because after Chaos came into being Gaia came into being and there were no other entities, therefore a relative complement cannot be used to define Chaos in respect to Gaia²⁴¹.

As a consequence, we cannot define the ontology of Chaos by using the complement in respect of Gaia, because it is an absolute complement. Instead we need another approach. That approach can only be based on the fact that Chaos was the very first that came into being. It is true that Prier noted that this fact is relevant for the definition of Chaos, but once he started his path through a paradox, he did not find a way out in this direction. Nevertheless, we should note that his attempt gave us a clue to follow in building a model, using a set theoretical approach.

²⁴¹ Clay in her book discusses the contrast between Gaia and Chaos, but she did not extract a conclusion about the ontology of Chaos. See, Clay, *Hesiod's Cosmos*, 15-25.

Keeping in mind a possible 'set-theoretical model approach' let us re-think the whole process. We could say that Hesiod's *Theogony* describes the origin of the gods, but its main concern is with the origin of the cosmos, in line with the early Greek thought as manifested in the works of the pre-Socratics.²⁴² Cosmogony – understood as the branch of philosophy dealing with theories of the origin of the universe - rests entirely upon the assumption that there must have been a time when the present world-order did not exist; for only on this assumption is its existence something that must be accounted for. This assumption, of course, may well be incorrect. Nevertheless, if we assume that there *was* a time when the present world-order did not exist, Hesiod's cosmogony offers an answer that seems to be rational - and in addition has the virtue of being poetically enchanting – as to how the universe could have come into being by itself. When the word chaos is mentioned, we immediately think about disorder, but Hesiod's concept of Chaos differs markedly from the conventional interpretation of the term, as we will see below in this section.

Hesiod's cosmogonic entities came into being by three different means:

1. *Ex-nihilo*, like Chaos and Gaia,²⁴³
2. From sexual intercourse, like the Titans,²⁴⁴ and

²⁴² Cf. Kirk et al., *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 72-4.

²⁴³ *Th.* 116.

3. Asexually, like Nereus, fathered by Pontos.²⁴⁵

My focus is particularly on the first group. The second group is an anthropomorphic approach and common to other archaic cosmogonies; and the last group can be regarded as the common to other theogonical models.²⁴⁶

According to Hesiod, the Olympian gods are directly descended from the Titans,²⁴⁷ who, in turn, are directly descended from Ouranos and Gaia.²⁴⁸ Their births occurred in the process by which the world-order itself came into being. Thus, the Olympian gods did not create the cosmos but came into being through the process of differentiation.

It was not any god who created the universe. Rather, the genesis of the gods only started when the presence of a universal sex drive represented by Eros appeared. There is no information as to when this force came into being, whether it was created, eternal or a god. We know about his presence in Gaia-Ouranos mingling, from where the theogony started.²⁴⁹ Eros is described as the most beautiful among the gods, and appears again during the birth of Aphrodite.²⁵⁰

Hesiod's cosmogony provides an answer to the question 'If

²⁴⁴ *Th.* 133-7.

²⁴⁵ *Th.* 233-6.

²⁴⁶ Cf. Kirk et al., *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 9-20.

²⁴⁷ *Th.* 453-506.

²⁴⁸ *Th.* 126-210.

²⁴⁹ *Th.* 120.

²⁵⁰ *Th.* 201.

everything needed to be created, then who created the creator?', a question which characterizes several cosmogonies, such as the Babylonian or Biblical cosmogonies. Yet Hesiod's creator-less emergence of the cosmos raises another question: if supernatural deities are not needed in order to explain the origin of the universe, why should the gods not be discarded altogether? Who needs them, and what purpose could they possibly serve? These are complex questions with answers out of the scope of this thesis. The problem of the relationship between human beings and the gods is the subject for the study of religion.

In the particular case of Greek civilization, it seems that, from the Mycenaean world to the time of Homer, the relationship of the human beings with the gods were close.²⁵¹ In Hesiod the most direct intervention of the gods in the human world is related to application of justice as we discussed in Chapter 1. It is mainly delivered by inspirational means. Hesiod himself is inspired by the Muses, who will induce him to speak true things as well as lies that are similar to true things, ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὅμοια, ἴδμεν δ', εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν, ἀληθέα γηρῦσασθαι.²⁵²

Perhaps the gods and their world are seen as no more than allegories. This would be consistent with the atheistic cosmogony offered

²⁵¹ Cf. Dietrich, 'From Knossos to Homer'.

²⁵² *Th.* 27-8 (Edited by Most).

'We are accustomed to tell many lies that resemble the facts, and we are accustomed to speak, when we wish to, the literal truth, too.'
(Translated by Hine).

by Hesiod,²⁵³ where the origin of the universe is without the presence of a divine being. In Hesiod's cosmogony there is intentional speculation, and not only a register of natural cycles.

Eric Voegelin²⁵⁴ argues that Hesiod uses his myths as a means of instruction and that he builds up those myths from his own social experience, representing the kind of order that is expected to exist. For example, in the *Works and Days* Hesiod suffered injustice from his brother and princes who conspired to rob him of his inheritance. A source for a new and different response to explain Hesiod's position could be behind his proposal of justice as the spine for an ordered society. When he discovered a more adequate understanding of reality and order, he then felt himself different from common tradition and contrasted his better truth to the now untruth of the common tradition. Hesiod's works are bound by mythological language, but this is in fact used to express speculative thought.

Underneath the main theme of the *Theogony* is the perpetual tension between order and what is not yet differentiated: the tension between order and unity. This tension is apparent in the problem of maintenance of order against its perpetual danger of collapse into disorder once unity is broken. Voegelin tells us:

²⁵³ *Th.* 116-25 (Edited by Most). For the translation see n. 20.

²⁵⁴ Voegelin, *Order and History*, 132 ff.

The story of the *Theogony* is a cardinal problem in a philosophy of history and order. In non-mythical language, it is the tension between a hard-won civilizational order, precariously in balance, and a rumbling underworld of demonic forces which at any time may break loose and destroy it.²⁵⁵

Hesiod aims to offer a structure where the order established by Zeus links all the different parts of the cosmos. The meaning of order could be found in the development of Zeus' personality as a moral god.²⁵⁶

Hesiod will have to face the problem of existence of gods other than Zeus. How can he explain the pre-eminence of Zeus? A solution is the creation of a theogony,²⁵⁷ where the relationships amongst gods determine and explain his position as ruler, as it was done by his Near Eastern predecessors²⁵⁸, assuming different generations of gods.

Answering to the question about the origin of the cosmos by listing gods in a descending genealogical order leads to the problem of the very first god. Hesiod solved it by adding Chaos to his Theogony as the very first, the one before everything, a nearly indescribable, we can say ineffable being,²⁵⁹ perhaps, like the Christian God, or, like Busanich says

²⁵⁵ Voegelin, *Order and History*, 132.

²⁵⁶ On the character of Zeus as a moral god see, e.g., Yamagata, *Homeric Morality*, 32-6 and 61-101.

²⁵⁷ We have mentioned the Mesopotamian epic of the creation, *Enumma Eliš*. Although in a different tradition, the *Theogony of Dunnu* has a similar cosmogonic structure and names the sky and earth as the primeval deities. Cf. Lambert-Walcot, 'A New Babylonian Theogony', 64 ff; see also Jacobsen, 'The Harab Myth', 6-26.

²⁵⁸ Cf., e.g., Littleton, 'Kingship in Heaven'. and West, *The East Face of Helicon*, 132-7.

²⁵⁹ Cf. e.g., Janowitz, 'Theory of Divine Names'.

insubstantial.²⁶⁰ This is a crucial step, where Hesiod demonstrates his originality as a thinker. To an indescribable primeval origin he adds Gaia and Eros. Gaia is principle and foundation of everything²⁶¹ and Eros²⁶² is a force that will bond his Cosmos in movement. Gaia could be what the pre-Socratics understood as ἀρχή, as understood in Ionian thought,²⁶³ ἀρχή²⁶⁴ that will be interpreted in different ways.²⁶⁵

Hesiod's cosmogony has parallels and differences with other early Greek cosmogonies like the ones presented in Alcman's cosmogonic fragment (7th c. BC),²⁶⁶ the Derveni papyrus - commentary on a cosmogony from the 6th to 5th c. BC - or Pherekydes of Syros²⁶⁷ (6th c. BC). Each of those cosmogonies tries to find a way to solve the problem of the very first being or object, endowing it with eternity²⁶⁸ or making it almost indescribable. I will analyse whether these theogonies are in debt to Hesiod's poem and, if so, to what extent. In this context I will also analyse the reception of the Hesiodic cosmogonic concepts into those cosmogonies.

²⁶⁰ Bussanich, 'A Theoretical Interpretation of Hesiod's Chaos', 215.

²⁶¹ *Th.* 116.

²⁶² *Th.* 120.

²⁶³ On the Ionian thinkers, cf. e.g., Kirk et al., *The Presocratic Philosophers*. 76-181.

²⁶⁴ Note that the Greek word ἀρχή was not used by the pre-Socratics to refer to the principle on which all other things are founded. Nevertheless, following the Aristotelian tradition we continue to refer to those principles (singular or multiple, depending on each philosopher) as ἀρχή.

²⁶⁵ Cf. Chapter 4 of this thesis for a longer discussion about the pre-Socratics and Hesiod.

²⁶⁶ Published in Lobel et al., *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, 52-55; see also the edition of C. Calame, *Alcman*, 104-107. Cf. the article of Glenn Most, 'Alcman's Cosmogonic Fragment'.

²⁶⁷ For the most recent edition of the fragments of Pherekydes of Syros, see Schibli, *Pherekydes of Syros*.

²⁶⁸ I will come back to the problem of temporality of Chaos after I have presented a mathematical model for it. Then, I will discuss the problem of the idea of 'time' related to tense in Hesiod.

Coming back to the cosmogonic passage from Hesiod's *Theogony*, let us see what more has been said on Chaos:

ἦ τοι μὲν πρότιστα Χάος γένητ', αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα
Γαῖ εὐρύστερνος, πάντων ἕδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεὶ
ἀθανάτων, οἷ ἔχουσι κάρη νιφόεντος Ὀλύμπου,
Τάρταρά τ' ἠερόεντα μυχῶ χθονὸς εὐρυοδείης,
ἠδ' Ἔρος, ὃς κάλλιστος ἐν ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι,
λυσιμελής, πάντων δὲ θεῶν πάντων τ' ἀνθρώπων
δάμναται ἐν στήθεσσι νόον καὶ ἐπίφρονα βουλήν.²⁶⁹

Chaos was, according to Hesiod, the first to appear, the first that came into being in the whole universe. What does Hesiod mean by Chaos? Can we locate Chaos? What is the significance of Chaos in Hesiod's vision of the world?

We can identify three main interpretations of Chaos in ancient times. Aristotle in his *Physics*²⁷⁰ identifies Chaos with 'τόπος'. Alternatively, some scholars see Chaos as related to a 'gap' or empty space, opposed to the idea of 'place', in fact it looks to me more like a non-place.

The second position identifies it with water. This interpretation seems to be passed down to the Stoics through Zeno of Citium,²⁷¹ who received this from Pherekydes of Syros.²⁷² Little evidence can confirm this

²⁶⁹ *Th.* 116-122 (Edited by Most). For a translation see n. 20.

²⁷⁰ Aristotle, *Phys.* Δ I, 208b29 (Edited by Ross).

²⁷¹ Zeno of Citium, *Testimonia*, 103 (Edited by Arnim).

²⁷² DK, 7B1a.

heritage, other than the etymology presented by Pherekydes that Chaos derives from χέεσθαι, which means ‘what is to be poured’, and the property of ‘to be poured’ seems to be by antonomasia a property of ‘water’.

The third position mentioned above can be found in Lucian,²⁷³ where Hesiod’s Chaos is interpreted as disordered and formless matter. It is unclear how to support this position with the Hesiodic text; however it is this common meaning that has been passed down to our vocabulary.

In modern scholarship Chaos has been connected with χάσκω, meaning ‘to yawn’. According to Cornford, Chaos is a ‘yawning gap’,²⁷⁴ a position that is followed by Kirk, Raven and Schofield²⁷⁵ and by West.²⁷⁶ While this etymology is doubtful, it is rather consistent with *Th.* 740²⁷⁷, χάσμα μέγ’, οὐδέ κε πάντα τελεσφόρον εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν, where Hesiod appears to gloss Chaos with χάσμα, the great chasm of the underworld. Other interpretations have identified Chaos as *aither* or ‘insubstantial formlessness’.²⁷⁸ The idea of Chaos as a ‘yawn’ or a ‘gap’ could be analogous to the idea of μύχο in Pherekydes of Syros or πόρος in Alkman, as we will see later in this chapter.

²⁷³ Lucian, *Amores*, 32 (Edited by Mcleod).

²⁷⁴ Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy*, 66; and his *Principium Sapientiae*, 194-5.

²⁷⁵ Kirk et al., *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 38.

²⁷⁶ West, *Theogony*, 192-3.

²⁷⁷ *Th.* 740 (Edited by West), ‘Vast is that chasm, and nobody could, if a year were completed’ (Translated by Hine).

²⁷⁸ Mondt, ‘Χαος and the Hesiodic Cosmogony’.

In *Th.* 814 we read that the Titans live around the Chaos²⁷⁹: Τιτῆνες ναίουσι, πέρην Χάεος ζοφεροῖο.²⁸⁰ This is one of the few words associated with Chaos, ζοφεροῖο.

We can see that there is a unique epithet of Chaos in the poem: ζοφερός. That epithet appears in *Th.* 814, where it is clearly tied to the frightening characteristic of the underworld, ζόφος.²⁸¹ This is consistent with the fact that the Night and Erebus are descendants of Chaos. Still, this does not allow us to reach the conclusion that Chaos is a place or has a physical existence. That adjective could be translated as dusky or gloomy, which makes reference to a non-physical state than to a place. Perhaps it is a no-place where defeated deities like the Titans live, in the sense that they are out of the cosmos. Indeed, the phrase πέρην χάεος ζοφεροῖο²⁸² does not indicate a physical place, or even a place: it could be a metaphorical usage of the phrase. On the other hand, the evidence for tying Chaos to the upper world is also persuasive, so much so that it could indicate that Chaos is all places, which could be equivalent to a non-place, because it could be equated to a symbolic form and is timelessness²⁸³. Though Erebus is surely found below the Earth, Night wanders above the ground half of the time, and the offspring of Erebus and Night, Day and Ether are even more clearly figures of the upper world.

²⁷⁹ *Th.* 814, (Translation mine).

²⁸⁰ *Th.* 814. (Edited by Most).

²⁸¹ *Th.* 653, 658 and 729 ((Edited by Most).

²⁸² *Th.* 814 (Edited by Most).

²⁸³ Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms II*, 104-17.

There is another mention of Chaos in Hesiod's *Theogony*, in *Th.* 700, where Chaos may well be placed in the upper world, indeed, *καὶμα δὲ θεσπέσιον κάτεχεν χάος· εἶσατο δ' ἄντα ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἰδεῖν ἢδ' οὔασιν ὄσσαν ἀκούσαι αὐτως, ὡς ὅτε γαῖα καὶ οὐρανὸς εὐρὺς ὑπερθε πάλνατο...*²⁸⁴ Chaos is certainly found above the earth and it is affected by 'a burning heat'. The text says that the burning heat was similar to the one produced when Ouranos fell over Gaia. This seems to be a remembrance. Can we conclude that Chaos is not a pure abstraction? Can we affirm that Chaos has/had a physical reality? Those questions are not so simple to answer.²⁸⁵

Finally, Chaos' cosmogonical importance can be understood when we compare its initial appearance in lines 116-119 with lines 807-810, where the chasm corresponds with the border and origin of earth, sea, sky and Tartarus. This origin and border must be positioned at the horizon, the specific and unique place where sky, earth, sea, and underworld meet. When we look into the horizon, we can still retain an image of Chaos as the beginning of the world, it is not Chaos, but it could be an image, as the image that we see in the sky from a star that died millions of years ago. That image shows us 'otherness'.²⁸⁶

²⁸⁴ *Th.* 700-3 (Edited by Most). 'Then the miraculous fiery heat reached down into Chaos: It was as if as one watched with his eyes and heard with his ears the Earth and the heavens above it collapsed on top of each other.' (Translated by Hine).

²⁸⁵ Cf. below this section.

²⁸⁶ Later in this chapter I will discuss 'otherness' further; here it is enough to say that 'otherness' is linked to alterity,

That Chaos is linked with the underworld more than with the remainder of the cosmos, and the fact that the underworld²⁸⁷ is for Hesiod the place where the past remains; we conclude again that Chaos is a non-place.²⁸⁸

Chaos' line, after the first generation, is entirely asexual. So Chaos is to be opposed to Eros, which is the force that brings things together. They are like opposite and parallel forces. Eros is to play a role in the restoration of the primordial unity. When Eros is present there is sexual procreation.

Although in the hymn to the Muses,²⁸⁹ the proem to the poem, other deities appear, Chaos does not appear in the proem. However, it appears three times elsewhere in the poem and has just a single epithet, which occurs only once. That epithet is the only reason for us to try to interpret Chaos and Tartarus as physical places, as Stokes²⁹⁰ has done. The most attractive idea for Chaos is to think of it as a space between Earth and Sky, following the Peripatetics. As Mondì says, 'Many commentators have been inclined to follow the Peripatetics in explaining Chaos essentially as 'room'²⁹¹, before them, Pherekydes of Syros identified it with water; Achilles Tatius follows Pherekydes, confirming that Chaos

²⁸⁷ Cf. *Op.*, 109-73 (Edited by Most), where the Gold, Silver and Bronze races and iron races created by the gods end their days under earth, perhaps in the underworld. We can infer that the same destiny has had the Iron race, but the text is not clear about it.

²⁸⁸ Bussanich, 'A Theoretical Interpretation of Hesiod's Chaos', 212-219.

²⁸⁹ *Th.* 1-115.

²⁹⁰ 'Hesiodic and Milesian Cosmogonies I'; and his 'Hesiodic and Milesian Cosmogonies II'

²⁹¹ Mondì, 'Χαος and the Hesiodic Cosmogony', 2.

and water are the same, as they are the ἀρχή:

Θαλῆς δὲ ὁ Μιλήσιος καὶ Φερεκύδης ὁ Σύριος ἀρχὴν τῶν ὅλων τὸ ὕδωρ ὑφίστανται, ὃ δὴ καὶ χάος καλεῖ ὁ Φερεκυδης ὡς εἶκος τοῦτο ἐκλεξάμενος παρὰ τοῦ Ἡσιόδου οὕτω λέγοντος [*Th.* 116] “ἦτοι μὲν πρότιστα χάος γένετο”. παρὰ γὰρ τὸ χεῖσθαι ὑπολαμβάνει τὸ ὕδωρ χάος ὠνομασθαι.²⁹²

Thales of Miletos and Pherekydes of Syros suppose water to be the principle of all, which Pherekydes also calls Chaos, choosing this, because it seems that, from Hesiod who says as follows: ‘In truth, Chaos came to be at the very first.’ For he assumes that water was called Chaos from ‘to pour’.²⁹³

And Mondri continues the idea saying: ‘But I have felt varying degrees of discomfort in attributing to Hesiod the pure abstraction of unoccupied space.’²⁹⁴ The problem for many scholars is to accept that Hesiod was able to reach a level of abstraction of ‘pure space’. This supposition has been always in the interpretation of Hesiodic Chaos, and therefore in the interpretation of his cosmogony. Apparently there is a consensus that Hesiod could not have a mind with such broad scope. This idea seems to produce some discomfort: it goes against the ‘established’ view, that Hesiod is a mythographer; one way to remove this ‘unlikelihood’ is to make his idea of Chaos as physical as possible. Behind this position there is an axiom: Greek abstract thought had not yet arrived. There have been two

²⁹² Maass, ‘Isagoga excerpta’ in *Comentariorum*, 3.28-32.

²⁹³ Translation mine from the previous text.

²⁹⁴ Mondri, ‘Χαος and the Hesiodic Cosmogony’, 2.

main lines to deal with that problem. They are two degrees of materialism. The first one is represented by West,²⁹⁵ who with other scholars accepts that Chaos is the space generated from the separation of earth and heaven. The second makes Chaos a more tangible entity, identifying it with mist, fog, upper mist or other physical forces, an interpretation that can be represented by Stokes.²⁹⁶

We need to go further and more carefully in the interpretation of Chaos and his role in Hesiodic thought. In order to go further, I need a finer philological methodology. As Mondì says:

The primary lesson to be drawn from two and half millennia of exegesis is that it is all too easy to see in Hesiod's Chaos practically anything that one is predisposed to see, and the nature of the documentary evidence makes the reason for this variety of opinion readily apparent. Apart from its four occurrences in the *Theogony*, Chaos is found nowhere else in the archaic hexameter corpus, and its relatively few post-Hesiodic occurrences are for the most part directly or indirectly dependent on Hesiod's use of the word and contribute little to the clarification of his thought.²⁹⁷

This is an important fact: trying to characterize Chaos physically or to locate it in a cosmological arrangement has been of little help. Mondì continues, saying it could be useful to compare Hesiod with other Greek

²⁹⁵ West, *Hesiod's Theogony*, 192. See also: Mazon, *Hésiode*, 36; Gigon, *Der Ursprung der griechischen Philosophie*, 31; Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy*, 66 and his *Principium Sapientiae*, 194-5; and Fränkel, 'Drei Interpretationen aus Hesiod', 2.

²⁹⁶ Stokes, 'Hesiodic and Milesian Cosmogonies II', 23; Shömann, *Die hesiodische Theogonie*, 84;

²⁹⁷ Mondì, 'Χαος and the Hesiodic Cosmogony', 3.

and non-Greek cosmogonic principles, being careful to avoid *petitio principii*, because some similarities could be due to mutual influences. However, I think that Mondì himself gives us the clue to follow in another direction, that is, the place in time of Chaos. Mondì says, 'The only aspect of Chaos about which later writers display any substantial agreement is its temporal primacy...'.²⁹⁸ Since I have the direction, it is my duty to follow it. Let me explain more carefully what I see as the way to construct that path. Taking this as a point of departure for our solution, we can begin to construct a path to it.

Before going further, I think it is prudent to explain my methodology. My idea is not to write a long philosophical treatise here, but to show the position that supports my methodological choice.

As I suggested in Chapter 1, if we think that Hesiod's language is not philosophical because it has mythical characteristics, it is as if we are judging a package on the basis of its box. The problem is not so simple, because the shape of the box could tell us something about the object inside. What we have, then, is a problem concerning the relationship between language and the objects of the reality they convey.

This problem, the relationship between language and what is expressed by that language, is not new, and in fact has been discussed

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

since antiquity, for example in India during the Vedic period.²⁹⁹ In *Cratylus*, Plato discusses the link between the names of objects and their ontology.³⁰⁰ After that, Aristotle elucidated a deeper analysis of the links between language and the representation of thought by composing the works belonging to the *Organon* collection. For Aristotle, things could be categorised by species and genus and the meaning of a predicate was determined by an abstraction process.³⁰¹ The Aristotelian theory was studied and developed by many different thinkers, including members of the Stoic School, who had their own theories on the philosophy of language, particularly on the Theory of Meaning³⁰². The next important step in the development of this field was made by St. Augustine, who can be considered the forerunner of the contemporary ideas of 'sense and reference'³⁰³. Those ideas continued to be reworked through out the Middle Ages, especially by Peter Abelard.³⁰⁴ Important developments followed in the works of Petrus Hispanus,³⁰⁵ John Duns Scotus³⁰⁶ and William of Ockham,³⁰⁷ among others, who discussed the theory of supposition.³⁰⁸

²⁹⁹ Cf. Patton, 'Hymn to Vac: Myth or Philosophy?', 182-7.

³⁰⁰ Plato, *Cratylus*, 390e-427d (Edited by Burnet).

³⁰¹ Cf. Strange, *Porphyry: On Aristotle, Categories*. See also Aristotle's *Categories* and in general the *Organon* (*Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Topics* and *On Sophistical Refutations*) and the book Δ of the *Metaphysics*.

³⁰² Kneale, *The Development of Logic*, 138-57.

³⁰³ Augustine, *De doctrina Christiana*, 4th Book.

³⁰⁴ Jacobi, 'Abelard and Frege'.

³⁰⁵ de Freitas, 'Nota sobre Pedro Hispano'.

³⁰⁶ See in general this work: Vos, *The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus*.

³⁰⁷ See in general: Panaccio, *Ockham on Concepts*.

³⁰⁸ de Freitas, 'La teoria de la suposición de Pedro Hispano', 23-38.

In the turn of 19th century, the great development of Mathematical Logic and structuralist Linguistics were fundamental in strengthening the idea that Philosophy is Philosophy of Language. For that reason, during the last century 'language' became, in general, the centre of attention within the many different philosophical traditions. This position became strong due to the progress achieved in the field of logic, which is the reason why this kind of approach has been known as logicism. Many names are associated with logicism since the turn of 19th century, notably Frege, Russell, Carnap and, among the most influential, Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein³⁰⁹ argues that there was an initial set of atomic facts, which belong to what we call the world and a set of complex facts that are formed by junction of atomic facts. In a recursive way the world continues to be constructed by the new complex facts. The new complex facts can join other complex facts or atomic facts becoming another complex facts. After that he asserts that to each atomic fact corresponds an atomic element in the language. Complex facts have their counterpart in the language. Because to each atomic fact correspond a logical structure, the world itself, which is formed recursively from them, can be explained in logical terms. Also, if a fact has no logical structure, it is meaningless. Therefore, Philosophy is just Philosophy of Language. For Wittgenstein, the world is constructed from the language, therefore, if there is something

³⁰⁹ See Jaquette, *Wittgenstein thought in transition*, 17-92. For the definition and discussion about atomic and complex facts see p. 24-7 and p. 67.

about we are not able to speak, we must remain silent.

All this development has necessarily a marked influence in the methodology, not only in natural sciences but also in the humanities.

The methodology I am following has its basis in logicism and also shares with Wittgenstein the relevance given to the language. I accept that 'to know an object is to know its logical form', and that any object that forms reality is known through an interpretation. The degree of complexity of the interpretation could be different. For example, the object *Xáος* in the Hesiodic poems has few characteristics; on the other hand the object called *moira* has many more characteristics, it appears many times, in different contexts and in different authors and we need to learn about its characteristics in other authors to try to determine the logical object represented. Still, the degree of ontological complexity of an object is not proportional to the number of characteristics it shows. Moreover, it seems clear that the degrees of complexity of two objects are not comparable.

In general this methodological approach I am taking is related to the proposal of the Analogical Hermeneutic School founded by Mauricio Beuchot.

The use of an analogy should be done carefully, avoiding the extremes of the positivism and the extremes of post-modern thought. Positivism accepts that there is one and only answer to each problem; and

on the opposite side post-modern thought tends to accept any interpretation as valid. A positivist expects to have a clear and distinctive interpretation with absolute knowledge of the interpreted object; and on the other hand the post-modernist has a tendency to take almost irrational positions, such as to accept any interpretation as valid. On the contrary, the analogicism in analogical hermeneutics, as Beuchot says, 'hace que la hermenéutica analógica no se quede en una única interpretación como válida, pero tampoco en todas como válidas y complementarias'.³¹⁰

Another important point is that the analogical hermeneutics is related to ontology, the connection that the post-modernism tries to dissolve. According to Beuchot there are only interpreted facts; there are neither pure facts without interpretations, as the positivists wanted, nor pure interpretations as the Romanticists wanted.³¹¹ Moreover, there is something ontological when we make interpretations. Indeed, interpretation, interprets some 'thing'. Each time we make an analogical interpretation about Chaos, we grasp something about Chaos. Therefore a careful use of analogy will help us to understand the ontology of a particular object, such as Chaos.

Examples of analogies come out of a philological and etymological analysis. They can help us to determine the logical nature of that object by providing an interpretation of the referred object through a semantic

³¹⁰ Beuchot, *Puentes hermenéuticos*, 15-16.

³¹¹ *Ibid*, 20.

approach. For example, in the case of Chaos we are able to approach its ontology using the etymology of the word as we have done to arrive at a possible meaning of 'yawn'.

Other kinds of analogies are the models, particularly mathematical models, which are characterised by the use of the mathematical language. The use of a mathematical language has the advantage of clarifying the attempted description of the object that is modelled, because one of the characteristics of mathematical language is its unambiguity. In some cases we can use a natural language to describe mathematical objects without losing precision, even though an increase in the complexity of the expression in the natural language will be the price to be paid. Therefore, at some point of the discussion about a mathematical object it would be necessary to use mathematical language to express a mathematical concept.

With this in mind let us analyse the example of Chaos. Its main property, as can be deduced from Hesiod's texts is the property of being 'the very first'. This means that Chaos is the very first to come into being and that if an object is the very first to come into being, then that object is Chaos. How can I prove this? One side of the implication is true by definition, as Hesiod said that Chaos was 'the very first that came into being'. I need to prove that any object with the property 'the very first that came into being' is Chaos. It is clear that if there are two different objects

with the property of ‘the first to come into being’ then one is before the other, taking us into contradiction, because both have the property of being the very first.

In all cases, to establish an analogy, I need an object to be analysed, and another object to compare. This second object is called a model. The way to use a model of an object, to understand it, is comparing properties of the object and the model. The properties of the model are well known, and will help us to understand the properties of the object. The object could be a logical object; it means an object that is not abstraction of ‘reality’. Examples of logical objects are mathematical objects, like numbers.

Keeping this brief comment on models in mind we continue reading Hesiod. Again I will provide a model to help us understand the crucial concept of Chaos. The text of Hesiod, that we quoted several times, says:

ἦ τοι μὲν πρότιστα Χάος γένητ', αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα
Γαί' εὐρύστερνος, πάντων ἕδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεὶ
ἀθανάτων, οἳ ἔχουσι κάρη νιφόεντος Ὀλύμπου,
Τάρταρά τ' ἠερόεντα μυχῶ χθονὸς εὐρυοδείης,
ἠδ' Ἔρως, ὃς κάλλιστος ἐν ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι,
λυσιμελής, πάντων δὲ θεῶν πάντων τ' ἀνθρώπων
δάμναται ἐν στήθεσσι νόον καὶ ἐπίφρονα βουλήν.³¹²

³¹² *Th.* 116-122 (Edited by Most).

Certainly, Chaos was the first that came to be, but next broad-breasted Gaia, the ever firm foundation of all the immortals who hold the peaks of snowy Olympus, and murky Tartarus in the depth of the wide-pathed Earth, and Eros, the most beautiful among the immortal gods, who unnerves the limbs and overcomes the mind with wise and prudent counsels in the breasts of all gods and all human being.³¹³

Reading back line 116, ἡ τοι μὲν πρότιστα Χάος γένετ', Chaos was the first that came into being, as it is the first entity and it is clear that nothing was before, there was no divine intervention, no creation. Also Chaos, a primeval entity, is not a god. Never is it mentioned in the Hesiodic poems as a god. In Greek, as in some romance languages, we have the superlative of 'first', but in English it is necessary to construct it by adding an 'most' or 'very' to the word, for that reason we translate πρότιστα as 'the most first' or 'the very first', which approaches the meaning of πρότιστα quite well. Having that in mind, can we think about an object that is 'the real first'? An immediate answer is: the number '1'. It seems to be the natural choice and at first sight, it seems to be the right choice --once the ordinal number that corresponds to the cardinal '1' is '1st' -- nevertheless, if we make a finer analysis we will arrive at a different conclusion. The first observation is about the ontology of '1', in other words, what defines '1' as an object? Unity is a property of '1'; '1' is a

³¹³ Translation mine of the previous text based on Evelyn-White and Most translations.

representation of ‘the one’ and it is called ‘one’. Those are ontological properties of ‘1’. And here we start to meet a problem between this interpretation and the Hesiodic text. According to what we read in Hesiod’s cosmogony, Gaia is the entity that has as the property ‘unity’. Before the generation of Ouranos, there is Gaia as a whole, it is from her that all living creatures descend, because the lineage of Chaos is asexual, formed by Erebus and Dark Night and from there only Ether and Day came to be.³¹⁴

The idea of unity seems to be better represented by Gaia, before the separation of Ouranos. A struggle for the restoration of unity started immediately after the separation of Ouranos from Gaia, as Hesiod says in the beginning of the *Theogony*, where the importance of Zeus is mentioned together with the procreation of all the blessed gods from Gaia and Ouranos:

θεῶν γένος αἰδοῖον πρῶτον κλείουσιν ἀοιδῆ
ἐξ ἀρχῆς, οὓς Γαῖα καὶ Οὐρανὸς εὐρὺς ἔτικτεν,
οἳ τ’ ἐκ τῶν ἐγένοντο, θεοὶ δωτήρες ἑάων·
δεύτερον αὖτε Ζῆνα θεῶν πατέρ’ ἠδὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν,³¹⁵

...celebrate in song first of all the revered race of the gods from the beginning, those whom Gaia and wide Ouranos begot, and the gods sprung of these, givers of good things. Then next, the goddesses sing of Zeus, the father of gods and men,...³¹⁶

³¹⁴ *Th.* 123-5 (Edited by Most).

³¹⁵ *Th.* 44-7 (Edited by Most).

³¹⁶ *Th.* 44-7 (Translation mine, based on Evelyn-White).

We have no indication that Chaos has an ontology associated with unity. Moreover, as we saw, modern scholarship³¹⁷ tends to accept its association with vacuum or empty space. Numbers, however, might suggest a possible candidate for a model for Chaos. That number is '0'. The reason is that 0 comes before 1 in the sequence of natural numbers and 0 is equal to the empty set (by definition), and this has at least a resemblance with the idea of vacuum. Until now we have a sequence of numbers, '0, 1' which can be associated with the sequence of Hesiodic entities, Chaos, Gaia. The idea of an association of a sequence of numbers to a strict order of principles of the universe is as old as Pherekydes of Syros in the Greek thought. Indeed, for Pherekydes Zeus, Chronos and Chthonie are the three principles and they represent the order³¹⁸ one, two, three, etc. To confirm the strict order in which those principles are, he confirms that one is before two and two after one:

Φερεκύδης δὲ ὁ Σύριος Ζᾶντα μὲν εἶναι ἀεὶ καὶ Χρόνον καὶ
Χθονίαν τὰς τρεῖς πρώτας ἀρχάς, τὴν μίαν φημὶ πρὸ τῶν δυοῖν, καὶ
τὰς δύο μετὰ τὴν μίαν, τὸν δὲ Χρόνον ποιῆσαι ἐκ τοῦ γόνου
ἐαυτοῦ πῦρ καὶ πνεῦμα καὶ ὕδωρ, τὴν τριπλὴν, οἶμαι, φύσιν τοῦ
νοητοῦ, ἐξ ὧν ἐν πέντε μυχοῖς διηρημένων πολλὴν ἄλλην γενεὰν
συστήναι θεῶν, τὴν πεντέμυχον καλουμένην, ταῦτόν δὲ ἴσως εἰπεῖν,
πεντέκοσμον.³¹⁹

³¹⁷ Cf., Kirk et al., *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 37-9.

³¹⁸ I am using the word 'order' in the mathematical sense. An order is a relationship that satisfies certain properties but, for the use we are making of this term, it is enough to know that we are referring to the order in which natural numbers follow each other.

³¹⁹ Damascius, *De principiis*, 321, 2-9 (Edited by Ruelle).

There are still some difference between the sequence proposed by Pherekydes and the one that we can see in Hesiod's *Theogony*. It is obvious that Zeus and Cronos are not part of the Hesiodic sequence and also the remaining entity, Chthonie, is associated with number 3, not to number one. Observe that Chthonie is associated with Gaia: it is the structure that supports Gaia, the underlying cave,³²⁰ and in this sense it is a representation of Gaia.

However, the most relevant differences is that zero does not appear in the numerical sequence of Pherekydes, and the Hesiodic Chaos does not appear in the cosmogony of Pherekydes, at least as the 'very first one'. It is interesting to note that in the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* the author is also very concerned about the order in which the primeval entities of the cosmogony are sung, which we read in the following text:

...άχα δὲ λιγέως καθαρίζων
γηρύετ' ἀμβολάδην, ἐρατὴ δέ οἱ ἔσπετο φωνή,
κράινων ἀθανάτους τε θεοὺς καὶ γαίαν ἐρεμνὴν
ὡς τὰ πρῶτα γέγοντο καὶ ὡς λάχε μοῖραν ἕκαστος.

'Pherekydes of Syros said that Zas always existed and Chronos and Chthonie, the three first principles, the one I say before the two, and the two after the one, and that Chronos made from his own seed fire and air and water, the threefold nature, I suppose, of the intelligible, from which after they were distributed in five nooks arose another numerous generation of gods, called the five-nook, and this is probably the same as to say the five-cosmos'. (Translation mine).

³²⁰ See Kirk et al., *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 34; and Schibli, *Pherekydes of Syros*, 22.

Μνημοσύνην μὲν πρῶτα θεῶν ἐγέραιρεν ἀοιδῆ
μητέρα Μουσάων, ἣ γὰρ λάχε Μαιάδος υἱόν·
τοὺς δὲ κατὰ πρέσβιν τε καὶ ὡς γεγάασιν ἕκαστος
ἀθανάτους ἐγέραιρε θεοὺς Διὸς ἀγλαὸς υἱὸς
πάντ' ἐνέπων κατὰ κόσμον, ἐπωλένιον κιθαρίζων.
τὸν δ' ἔρος ἐν στήθεσσι ἀμήχανος αἴνυτο θυμόν,
καί μιν φωνήσας ἔπεα πτερόεντα προσηύδα

...and soon, while he played shrilly on his lyre, he lifted up his voice and sang, and lovely was the sound of his voice that followed. He sang the story of the deathless gods and of the dark earth, how at the first they came to be, and how each one received his portion. First among the gods he honoured Mnemosyne, mother of the Muses, in his song; for the son of Maia was of her following. And next the goodly son of Zeus hymned the rest of the immortals according to their order in age, and told how each was born, mentioning all in order as he struck the lyre upon his arm.³²¹

Having those comments in mind, I would like to continue with my model and how it is suitable for explaining Hesiodic cosmogony. First, the succession Chaos, Gaia and Ouranos is the Hesiodic cosmogony order. Second, Gaia is associated with unity in Hesiod, as in Pherekydes of Syros, bearing in mind that Gaia appears to be represented by Chthonie in the latter. I chose Pherekydes' cosmogony to compare, because he is one of the oldest, if not the oldest, Greek thinkers, immediately after Hesiod; therefore we may suppose an influence of Hesiod in Pherekydes,

³²¹*Hermes*, 425-33 (Edited and translated by Evelyn-White).

that his system would be similar to Hesiod's, and it is a representation of the influence of the Hesiodic system in a later author.

In set theory the sets belong to a structure called 'the universe of the set theory', this structure is organized in a hierarchy that has the empty set as first element. The empty set is the first element to be defined. On the other hand, Prier suggested a logical approach.³²² The parallel between the hierarchic cosmos of Hesiod and the set theory and the suggestion of Prier in his article, led me to explore the possibility of using a set theoretical model for explaining the Hesiodic Chaos. Using the empty set as a model for Chaos produces other consequences. A model is not only an analogy, but it should be predictive. Suppose that A and B are two objects, and we want to choose A as a model of B, because they have a property x in common. If A is a model for B, we expect that there will be other properties of B that are common to A. Then the next step is to see which other properties of Chaos are equivalent to the ones of the empty set. In fact, an interesting point of the cosmogony is the relevance given to the order in which the entities (gods or not) follow each other, in other words, it is relevant to the order of coming into being. The primeval entities, by which I mean Chaos, Gaia and Ouranos, appear in that strict order. The order they follow is the same as that of natural numbers. This parallel between the order of the emergence of the primeval entities and the order of the natural numbers leads me to the idea of associating Gaia

³²² Prier, 'Archaic Structuralism', 2.

with number 1 and Ouranos with number 2. Subsequently, I present an analogical model, where Chaos-Gaia-Ouranos are compared respectively to 0-1-2 (the sequence of the three first natural numbers), associating Chaos (the number 0) with the first entity that came into being, Gaia (the number 1) with internal otherness, so as to separate herself from Ouranos, who, like the number 2, is associated with multiplicity. This idea of a strict order of coming into being is a concern in other early Greek texts, such as Pherekydes of Syros and the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes*, agreeing with the model we have used for the Hesiodic cosmogony. Note that this logico-mathematical approach is not strange to Greek thought, but on the contrary is a very Greek way of thinking. For example, the shape of god for Xenophanes was a sphere.³²³

The empty set is a model for Chaos, because they have a common and unique property: 'to be the very first that came into being'. Note that, a mathematical object, like the empty set, come into being, when it is defined. I am not characterizing the kind of reality of Chaos or the kind of reality of the empty set. But, the properties defining the empty set and Chaos are analogous and they refer to the property of 'existence'. Two objects with the same property of existence should represent the same and one object, because the multiplicity of equal entities is contradictory. Then, Chaos has an existence as a logical entity, as the very first that came into being, defined in order to have a very first element, avoiding a

³²³ Simplicius, *Phys.* 23. 18.

creator or a never end go-back process. Finally, it is necessary to say that the choice of a particular model like '0' for Chaos supposes a particular position in the philosophy of mathematics. First, it is necessary to accept that the natural numbers, as proposed by Frege are objects, it means, they have existence and they are no abstractions. Second, an object is defined by its property, or its extension. For example, accepting that '2' is an object, could I say, Julius Caesar³²⁴ is 2, or 2 is a model for Julius Caesar? The answer is no. Why? The object '2' is defined by its extension, from the definition of the natural numbers two is the third natural number and the third natural number is '2'. It is possible to say that Julius Caesar is the third person in a particular order, but that is not the property that defines Julius Caesar.³²⁵ Chaos, however, is defined as to be the very first that came into being, and is something came into being as the very first is Chaos, what means that its ontology depends on that property, that is the same property that defines the empty set or zero.

But, the fact that Chaos is a logical entity does not mean that reveals or projects into the physical world. This is the case of all mathematical objects. For example, a squared pyramid, obtained by connecting its base (the square) to an apex, is a mathematical object similar the to the Egyptians pyramids. In that sense, the Egyptian pyramids are models of the mathematical pyramid and vice-versa. But

³²⁴ The example of Julius Caesar as an object to be compared with number '2' is taken from Frege, *Die Grundlagen der Arithmeti*, section 56.

³²⁵ Cf. Shapiro, *Philosophy of Mathematics* , 77-91.

things could be more complex, suppose that I have a fourth-dimensional sphere,³²⁶ because we live in a three-dimensional world, I cannot see a fourth-dimensional sphere, but if I project the sphere respect to an axis I will get a three dimensional sphere, that I can see. It means that, even though I cannot see the fourth-dimensional sphere, I can see a projection of that sphere into the physical world. That explains the glimpse of Chaos in *Th.* 700, where Chaos is affected by heat.³²⁷ Observe that considering Chaos, Gaia and Ouranos in ‘the beginning’, and Chaos modelled by ‘0’, it is perfectly consistent with that view:

$$\text{Chaos U Gaia U Ouranos} = \text{Gaia U Ouranos},$$

because Chaos is the empty set. That will make of Chaos the border between Gaia and Ouranos. Observe that that border is like the horizon, it seems not to have physical reality.

Therefore, is a logical entity that Hesiod needs to complete his cosmogony. It seems that the need for non-divine, non-created entity was required in Hesiod’s cosmogony. Chaos is a pure abstraction; it is atemporal and has no realization in the physical world. According to

³²⁶ A fourth-dimensional sphere has as standard equation $x^2 + y^2 + z^2 + w^2 = 1$.

³²⁷ Vianello de Córrova says that verses 700-10 seem to be odd in terms of their location and she identifies some linguistic problems: see her commentary in her edition and translation of Hesiod's *Theogony*, p. CCLXIII. West also finds problems in this passage: West, *Hesiod's Theogony*, 352-5.

Wright, the concept of pure abstraction is not reached in Greek thought until Plato in the *Timaeus*, where he talks about atemporality.³²⁸

We accepted that a model for Hesiodic Chaos is the number zero or the empty set. Hesiodic Chaos is an object as abstract as the number zero, without forget that it could have a physical realization as a dark place, as a border between Gaia and Ouranos in the horizon or showing itself as located in the upper-world or in the netherworld. The fact that we were able to show that Hesiod reached a degree of pure abstraction is in itself relevant; however, a very interesting consequence is that the seed of the number zero, seems to be present in this cosmogony. In addition to the existence of an entity like Chaos, we add the idea of structuring the cosmogonic entities as in Pherekydes.³²⁹ By using the formal sequence of natural numbers, we can speculate about the possibility that Hesiod was able to picture the existence of zero itself. I am not saying that Hesiod had a symbol to represent zero, or that zero was a number, but he put something that he called Chaos before other primeval entities in a strict order, and that object called Chaos has no physical representation, is atemporal, and is not eternal, because it had an origin and a function to supply the logical need for a very first object. I will not enter into details about the history of the number zero, but the idea of nothing, that is behind the idea of Chaos appears in Greek thought in Parmenides and Zeno of

³²⁸ Wright, *Cosmology in Antiquity*, 139.

³²⁹ Pherekydes fragment 14, Schibli's numbering.

Elea.³³⁰

Before we take a more formal approach, let us think in a very intuitive way as to what a set is. It is a collection of objects that ultimately have a common property. This idea of set could be used in an intuitive way, and should be enough for our construction of natural numbers, particularly to analyse the empty set.

‘The empty set, symbolized by \emptyset , is the set which elements x have the property $x \neq x$ ’

Let us prove that the set \emptyset is empty, i.e., it has no elements. Suppose that there is an element x belonging to \emptyset . Then $x \neq x$, which is a contradiction, because any object is always equal to itself. Therefore, there is no element belonging to \emptyset . This is the equivalent of saying that \emptyset is empty. Once we have the empty set defined, we can define another set which contains the empty set as element. As I have at least one defined object, what happens if I say that there is a set whose name is ‘1’, and it is defined as follows:

‘The 1 is the set whose element is \emptyset .’

We now know how to follow on from this. Let us call 2 the set whose elements are \emptyset and 1. Then 3 is the set whose elements are \emptyset , 1 and 2. By convention, \emptyset is also called 0.

³³⁰ Cf. Chapter 4 of this dissertation.

In this way we have a succession of sets (traditionally called natural numbers):

$$0$$

$$1 = \{0\}$$

$$2 = \{0, 1\}$$

$$3 = \{0, 1, 2\}$$

$$4 = \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$$

...

$$n = \{0, 1, 2, 3, \dots, i, i+1, \dots, n-1\}$$

It is necessary to make clear that empty space is not the same as an empty object, and an empty object is not the same as an empty set. The empty set is empty logically; it is not a vessel that has nothing inside.³³¹

The first part has importance of its own. In fact what we will prove is that 0 is unique, which means that there are no other sets with the same properties of 0. The proof goes as follows: suppose there is a natural number a , such that if x belongs to a , then x belongs to 0. If x belongs to 0, it means that $x \neq x$ (this is the property that defines 0); but there is no element x with that property; then $a=0$. For the second part, we use

³³¹ Cf. e.g., Algra, *Concepts of Space in Greek Thought*, 38-70.

reductio ad absurdum to prove that any a is greater than 0. Suppose that a is less than 0. Then there is an element x belonging to 0 that does not belong to x . But 0 is the empty set; then, there is no such element. This is a contradiction that comes from the supposition that x is lesser than 0, completing the argument by *reductio ad absurdum*.

The analogy between Chaos and the empty set³³² shows that the existence of an entity with properties like Chaos is perfectly reasonable and logically admissible. It is natural to question, why it is necessary to show that Chaos exist. The main problem to determine the existence of Chaos is the mythopoetic language of Hesiod. In fact, due to it, he has been denied the possibility to consider his work as containing philosophical thought. Other problems about Chaos, are related to the difficulty to trace the etymology of the word, with a huge degree of plausibility. For a scholar accepting those axioms, it could be possible to conclude that Chaos is a mythical entity, another god or the gap between Gaia and Ouranos after their separation. Then, I need to be sure that I am contrasted with an object that is not an unicorn. A way to do that is to show a model. Of course, I should repeat again, that the existence of Chaos does not need to be of the same kind as Gaia or Ouranos. It has an existence equivalent to the existence of the natural numbers in the Fregean theory of the arithmetic. It is also clear that to propose the

³³² We have constructed an object that is in fact the very first to come into existence, like the Hesiodic Chaos. When in science we construct a model, the main purpose is to use its predictive properties after determining how mimetic the model is with the object.

existence of Chaos, the author of the *Theogony* had in mind a problem to be solved: how to start an atheistic cosmogony? Three centuries later Aristotle would address a similar problem, proposing as a solution the existence of a *motus immobilis*.³³³ I do not know whether Hesiod had a clear intellectual process to reach this conclusion, but certainly he had the insight that an entity like Chaos was necessary in his cosmogony.

It seems that Chaos is a non-spatial and atemporal object, in which case, all the characteristics we can see from it are like projections into our world. When it is projected into our three-dimensional world we can see a gloomy place, where the Titans live, and when there was no time, 'in the beginning', perhaps when the god was not named and *moira* was not his wisdom, Chaos came into being *protista*.

The coming into being of Hesiodic Chaos is described by a verb that I would say is cosmogonic: γίγνομαι. It is worth dedicating some time to analysing the semantics of some verbal forms of this verb as they appear in Hesiod's *Theogony*. This analysis will provide us with another perspective for looking into Chaos and obtaining more information about the intentions of Hesiod in addressing problems related to the origin of the cosmos. Finally, I need to observe that 0 is a model for Chaos, but it is a different kind of model that 1 or 2 are for Gaia and Ouranos. Observe that Gaia and Ouranos have a pure physical existence, which is not the case of the natural numbers 1 and 2, still, they share the order of coming into

³³³ Mainly discussed in books V and VI of Aristotle's *Physics*.

being. Gaia and Ouranos have other properties that are not properties of 1 and 2, therefore they cannot be the same entities.

2.3. Time, Eternity and Temporality: A Semantic Interpretation.

After Chaos comes to be, it seems that time as a temporal category appears. What happened ‘before’ or ‘at the moment when the process took place’? Is the temporal characteristic of Chaos eternity or atemporality? The truth is that talking about time and eternity is not simple. Those notions appear clearly in Greek thought in a process that starts with Phrekydes of Syros, passing through Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and St Agustin, and continues through the whole mediaeval period arriving at Kant’s and Hegel’s philosophical systems, having a well-known role in Einstein’s and Hawkins’ theories in the late twentieth century. Here we are concerned with the notion of eternity and atemporality. The notion of eternity is associated in ancient Greek with terms such as αἰώνιος and αἰδίος. As Ilaria Rameli and David Konstan say, ‘Neither word, as it happens, is to be found in the Homeric epics or in the major poems of Hesiod (*Theogony* and *Works and Days*), although the noun *aïon* from which *aiônios* derives, is very common, mainly in the sense of a “life” or

“lifetime”³³⁴.

I am concerned with another kind of question about time and atemporality. First, let us note that the word χρόνος is used in Greek literature, to the extent of our knowledge, by Pherekydes of Syros, who is certainly later than Hesiod. Also it does not appear in the Derveni Papyrus. The first time we find it is in the following fragment of Pherekydes of Syros:

Φερεκύδησ δὲ Σύρος Ζάντα μὲν εἶναι ἀεὶ καὶ Χρόνον καὶ Χθονίαν
τὰς τρεῖς πρώτας ἀρχάς, τὴν μίας φημὶ πρὸ τῶν δυοῖν, καὶ τὰς δύο
μετὰ τὴν μίαν, τὸν δὲ Χρόνον ποιῆσαι ἐκ τοῦ γόνου ἑαυτοῦ πῦρ
καὶ πνεῦμα καὶ ὕδωρ, τὴν τριπλῆν, οἶμαι, φύσιν τοῦ νοητοῦ, ἐξ ὧν
ἐν πέντε μυχοῖς³³⁵ διηρημένων πολλὴν ἄλλην γενεὰν συστήναι
θεῶν, τὴν πεντέμυχον καλουμένην, ταῦτόν δὲ ἴσως εἰπεῖν,
πεντέκοσμον.³³⁶

Pherekydes of Syros said that Zas always existed and Chronos and Chthonie, the three first principles, the one I say before the two, and the two after the one, and that Chronos made from his own seed fire and air and water, the threefold nature, I suppose, of the intelligible, from which after they were distributed in five nooks arose another numerous generation of gods, called the five-nook, and this is probably the same as to say the five-cosmos.³³⁷

³³⁴ Rameli and Konstan, ‘Terms for Eternity’, 1-4.

³³⁵ About this word we come back later in this chapter.

³³⁶ Damascius, *De principiis*, 321, 2-9 (Edited by Ruelle).

³³⁷ Translation mine.

This idea of time is characterized by Pherekydes as follows:

- Time is a Demiurgic principle.
- Time exists αἰεὶ (since ever, infinitely into the past).
- Time is a cosmogonic ordering principle.

According to Probus, referring to Vergil's *Bucolica*, 65,

*...consentit et Pherecydes sed diversa adfert elementa:
Ζῆνα inquit καὶ Χθόνα καὶ Κρόνον, ignem ac terram et tempus
significans, et esse aithera qui regat, terram quae regatur, tempus
in quo universa pars moderetur.*³³⁸

Pherekydes also agrees but brings forward diverse elements: Zen, he says, and Chthon and Kronos, signifying fire and earth and time, and that it is the aither which rules, the earth which is ruled, and time in which the regions taken together are governed.³³⁹

Neither in Alkman's cosmogonic fragment, nor in Hesiod's *Theogony* we can find evidence of a philosophical concept of time. It is clear that a concept of time³⁴⁰ for use in working the land or navigation by

³³⁸ In *Vergilii Bucolica* 6. 31 (p. 343 Hagen) (A9 Shibli).

³³⁹ Translation mine.

³⁴⁰ Cf. Wright, *Cosmology in Antiquity*, 126-144.

sea was well known, examples of which can be found in the many pieces of advice given in the *Works and Days*.³⁴¹ Another way to analyse the concept of time in a particular author is looking into the way the author uses a specific tense. For example, the use of a particular tense in Hesiod's *Theogony*, based on certain evidence from Indo-European linguistics and analysis of another possible semantics for the verb γίγνομαι, put us onto the track for another meaning of the epic aorist, suggesting the idea that it is a tense used to talk about atemporality. If an author uses in a conscient way a particular verbal form, meaning atemporality, then, I can conclude that that author has, at least, an insight of the concept of atemporality. First we need to justify from the point of view of the linguistics about the possibility of an stative meaning for the particular tense called 'epic aorist'. As noted by Adrados,³⁴² Duhoux³⁴³ and Sánchez-Ruipérez,³⁴⁴ it is well known that in archaic Greek the past form of some verbs is not marked by the augment and sometimes an imperfective past tense could have a present meaning as in Thucydides II 13, 7. This phenomenon forms part of the evolution of the Indo-European verb, as Adrados has shown.³⁴⁵ New studies on the Hittite language have shed some light on this matter.³⁴⁶ This problem reveals how difficult it is to determine the structure of temporal opposition present-preterite.

³⁴¹ Particularly from *Op.* 383 to the end.

³⁴² Adrados, F. Rodríguez; *Evolución y estructura del verbo indoeuropeo*, 105-114.

³⁴³ Duhoux, *Le verb grec ancien*, 2000, 390-5.

³⁴⁴ Sánchez Ruipérez, *Estructura del sistema de aspectos y tiempos del verbo griego antiguo*, 149 ff.

³⁴⁵ Adrados, *Evolución y estructura del verbo indoeuropeo*, 534.

³⁴⁶ Jasanoff, *Hittite and the Indo-European Verb*, 91 ff.

We want to explore answers to the question of whether the lack of the augment in the aorist epic γένετο could indicate that the verb is in a tense other than the preterite. We will investigate the semantics of past verbal forms of the verb γίγνομαι as used in archaic Greek literature, particularly in epic literature.

Before we begin the investigation, let us make a short excursus about the problem of time and tense.

2.4. Time and Tense³⁴⁷

The first thing is to define what it is called tense in the grammatical context. It is relevant to distinguish tense from time and to keep in mind that tense is one of the implicit categories that define a verbal structure. Let us consider a logic with temporal operators.³⁴⁸ Let L be a language, v a verb and a an action. Any action a happens in a time t_1 . Let s be a

³⁴⁷ The purpose of this section is to remember some basic grammatical concepts and some basic operators used in Temporal Logic.

³⁴⁸ A 'logic' is defined by a set of constants, variables and logical symbols, plus a set of rules that tell us what a well-formed formula is. We can define also a truth-value function as that which connects a truth value to each formula, which in the case of a two-valued logic are 'true' and 'false'. It means that, for a two-valued logic, any sentence has a truth value, true or false. We can consider certain constants which, when added to the formulae, change their truth value. These constants are called operators.

sentence³⁴⁹ of the language L . The tense T of a verb v in a sentence s is defined as:

$$T = t - t_1$$

in which case $s = s(T)$, because the sentence s depends on T as a parameter. Because T is a real number, it could be positive, negative or zero.

If $T = 0$, we say that the tense of the sentence is the present. When $T < 0$, we say that the tense is preterite and when $T > 0$, we say that the tense is future.

We can define the tense as an operator over a sentence. Let us call *Pres* the operator that affirms that a sentence s is in the present tense, *Pret* an operator that tells us that a sentence is in the preterite tense and *Fut* when the sentence is in future, in logical symbology:

- *Pret* (s) if and only if $T < 0$.
- *Pres* (s) if and only if $T = 0$.
- *Fut* (s) if and only if $T > 0$.

Let us consider the sentence 'I write a thesis'. Let us consider the application of the operators defined above, then,

³⁴⁹ A formula is a well-formed sentence of a logic. 'Well-formed' means that it follows the rules that define a formula of that logic.

- *Pret* (I write a thesis) = 'I wrote a thesis'.
- *Pres* (I write a thesis) = 'I write a thesis'.
- *Fut* (I write a thesis) = 'I will write a thesis'.

The presentation of tenses as operators is borrowed from *Tense Logic*, a branch of logic developed, among others, by Prior³⁵⁰ and Bethem.³⁵¹ We accept here the concept of truth of Tarski³⁵², which is commonly used in logic. According to him, the sentence 'the snow is white' is true, if and only if, the snow is white. Following this idea the sentence 'I wrote a thesis', represented as *Pret* (I write a thesis) is true, if and only if, there is a time *t*, before the sentence is pronounced, at which 'I write a thesis'. Of course this indefinite semantics based on Tarski's definition of truth could not be adequate in natural languages.³⁵³ In general, when I think about 'I wrote a thesis', I am thinking about an action to which I can associate the action of writing a thesis, e.g., I am thinking of the time when I wrote the thesis after I finished a research period. It is not an abstract or logical past. However, when Chaos came into being in

³⁵⁰ Prior, *Past, Present and Future*, 1-4.

³⁵¹ van Benthem, *The Logic of Time*, xvii-xix.

³⁵² Tarski, 'The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages', 469-80.

³⁵³ When the study of logic includes tense as an operator, we call it tense logic. Tense logic has expanded itself and developed as exigency for artificial intelligence, isolated sentences without context. More recent work on tense has also focused on tense in context. See for example, Ludlow, *Semantics, Tense and Time*, 55-7.

Hesiod's cosmogony, there was no other action before; but it is a logical past, and moreover it is a tense where t is indefinite or does not exist:

$$(T < 0) \& (T = 0) \& (T > 0).^{354}$$

I will say that a verb v is in the stative tense if and only if

$$(T < 0) \& (T = 0) \& (T > 0).$$

2.5. Greek and Indo-European Verbs³⁵⁵

The paradigmatic atemporality in a verb could be interpreted in semantic or syntactic terms. A verb could represent an atemporal tense according to its own structure or regarding its interpretation in a specific text. The stative tense represents a non-changing state. At first sight it looks like a contradiction. However, we will see how this can fit into our model for Chaos.

The stative is a voice that disappeared very early from the Indo-European language, but assumed to be part of the verbal system of Proto-Indo-European. Jasanoff argues that in the Proto-Indo-European the ancestor of the perfect had a stative meaning, representing at the same

³⁵⁴ The timelessness tense is used if an action occurs in past, present and future.

³⁵⁵ This section and the next one are based on my paper given at the *Actas del Cuarto Coloquio Internacional: de Grecia a la Modernidad* (La Plata) and published in CD-ROM. See de Freitas, 'An Injunctive form in Greek'.

time present and past.³⁵⁶ He bases his argument on his analysis of the aorists of the h₂e-conjugation in Hittite. According to Jasanoff the existence of the stative as a voice forming part of the Proto-Indo-European verbal system is supposed to disappear very early, who also argues that the verbal form of perfect in the Proto-Indo-European system, was a tense with a double semantic value, past and present, stative meaning.³⁵⁷ A natural question arises about the aorist. Has had the aorist tense a 'form' with a stative semantics? The answer could be found if we dig into the Hittite verbal system, particularly into the hi-verbs and compare then to the h₂e-conjugation. Jasanoff says:

‘The only branch of the family with a significant attestation of root aorists is Greek. Here, to judge from the case of λέκτο < *logh-* / *legh-* and ἐγένετο < *ǵonh-* / *ǵenh-* there was complete medialization of the stative-intransitive paradigm’³⁵⁸

In fact, following that affirmation we can conclude that the h₂e-conjugation shows presents and imperfects tenses derived from protomiddles that will preserve a stative semantics. But, when we say that a verb carries present or past stative meaning, we are saying that it has an atemporal semantics.

³⁵⁶ Jasanoff, *o.c.*, 91 ff.

³⁵⁷ Jasanoff, *o.c.*, 91 ff.

³⁵⁸ *Ib.* p.168.

On the other hand, Kiparsky³⁵⁹ and Rix³⁶⁰ proposed that remains of the Greek injunctive are found in parts of the imperative system and the use in narrative of unaugmented preterites. West³⁶¹ has added that they are vestiges of injunctive forms in Greek, using present stems in describing atemporally situated activities of gods or other supernatural beings, showing an old hymnic tradition in the IE languages. My proposal is that the 'epic aorist' has a stative semantic and it is another vestige of injunctive form.

2.6. Hesiod and the Epic Aorist of the Verb γίγνομαι.

The only instances of the unaugmented aorist of γίγνομαι in Hesiod's works appear in the passage *Th.* 104-39 (lines 115, 116 and 137) and in *Th.* 199:

a.

ἐξ ἀρχῆς, καὶ εἶπαθ', ὅ τι πρῶτον γένετ' αὐτῶν.

ἦ τοι μὲν πρότιστα Χάος γένετ', αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα

³⁵⁹ Kiparsky, 'Tense and mood...', 39-41.

³⁶⁰ Rix, *Historische Grammatik des Griechischen*, 228 ff.

³⁶¹ West, 'An Unrecognized Injunctive Usage in Greek', 135-8.

Γαί' εὐρύστερνος, πάντων ἔδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεὶ³⁶²

b.

τοὺς δὲ μέθ' ὀπλότατος γένετο Κρόνος ἀγκυλομήτης,

δεινότατος παίδων: θαλερὸν δ' ἤχθηρε τοκῆα.³⁶³

c.

Κυπρογενέα δ', ὅτι γέντο πολυκλύστῳ ἐνὶ Κύπρῳ³⁶⁴

Why is Hesiod using this unaugmented aorist, γένετο alongside other augmented forms of the verb γίγνομαι? It is clear that due to metrical reasons the verb is presented in its unaugmented form. However, I propose, based on the evidence from Indo-European linguistics and other archaic cosmogonies from non-Indo-European languages, that its semantic value is stative and formally is an injunctive form in Archaic Greek.

As an example of cosmogonies outside the Indo-European scope where a stative is used, we can mention the first nine lines of the *Enûma Eliš*,³⁶⁵ which transliterate as follows:

1. e-nû-ma e-liš la na-bu-ú šá-ma-m

³⁶² *Th.* 115-7 (Edited by Most).

³⁶³ *Th.* 137-8 (Edited by Most).

³⁶⁴ *Th.* 199 (Edited by Most).

³⁶⁵ Translation and transliteration from the cuneiform text from Lambert mine. I used as a base for my English translation Speiser 'Akkadian Myths and Epics'.

when on high heaven was not named

2. šap-liš am-ma-tu₄ šu-ma la zak-rat

below earth was not called by a name

3. ABZU-ma reš-tu-ú za-ru-šu-um

primordial Apsû, their progenitor

4. mu-um-mu ti-amat mu-al-li-da-at gim-ri-šú-um

creatress (bearer of) Ti'amat bearer of them all.

5. A^{MEŠ}-šú-nu iš-te-niš i-ḫi-qu-ú-ma

They mixed their waters together.

6. gi-pa-ra la ki-iš-šu-ru šu-ša-a la še-'u-ú

Meadow land was not bound together,

canebrakes were not to be found.

7. e-nu-ma DINGIR.DINGIR la wa-pum šu-pu-ú ma-na-na.

when none of the gods were made visible

8. šu-ma la zuk-ku-ru ši-ma-tú la ši-i-mu

they were not called by name, destinies were not decreed.

9. ib-ba-nu-ú-ma DINGIR.DINGIR qé-reb-šú-um

the gods were created in their midst.

In lines 1 to 4 and 6 to 8, the verbs used are in a stative form. Line 5 and 9 use the preterite. The verb *zakaru(m)* means 'to name' or 'to speak', and the verb *nabûm*, in Old Akkadian, 'to call' or 'to invoke'. Those verbs are in a stative form and in the context of Babylonian theology, they mean 'call-into-being'. Thus, they are 'cosmogonic' verbs as γίγνομαι is in Hesiod. But these forms, again, as in Hesiod's *Theogony* are used alongside preterite forms.

In Hebrew, Qal-Perfect stems appear in the myth of creation in *Genesis*, e.g., when God creates the luminaries,³⁶⁶ the verbs used are in the stative. Stative forms in Akkadian and Hebrew have disappeared having been absorbed into preterite forms. The Akkadian stative functions as a verbal adjective.

The stative makes no reference to time. It simply expresses the existence of the state (*damiq*, 'it is good'); coming into the state at some point in time (inchoative/ingressive) is expressed by the present/future or preterite. In intransitive action verbs, the function of the stative becomes blurred; it often expresses an action that was going on or a state that existed when some other action took place or an action that took place over a certain period of time (often translated by a past or present progressive tense).

³⁶⁶ Joüon, Paul and T. Muraoka, *A grammar of biblical Hebrew*, 42.

Within Indo-European languages we have injunctive forms in Vedic,³⁶⁷ in Greek and in Latin. The biblical sentence *Fiat lux* in the vulgate has its verb in the injunctive, even though it is translated and explained as a subjunctive with the meaning of imperative.

In Vedic, injunctive forms are very frequent, as we can see in the *Rigveda*, where nearly a quarter of present stem verbs with secondary endings³⁶⁸ are augmentless.³⁶⁹ The following are some examples from the *Rigveda*³⁷⁰:

yáj jāyathā [jāyathās, = ájāyathās] apūrvya [...] tát prithivīm aprathayaḥ

when you were born, O incomparable one ... then you spread out the earth

(VIII, LXXXIX, 9-10)

árcanta éke máhi sāma manvata [= amanvata], téna sūryam arocayan

some, praising, conceived the great harmony, with which they caused the sun to shine

(VIII, XXIX, 10)

³⁶⁷ See in this respect Kiparsky, 'The Vedic Injunctive', 1-12.

³⁶⁸ Endings or desinences consist of the signs of mood and tense and the personal ending. The secondary endings are the mark for the past in verbal systems. They are also the mark of the subjunctive and the optative. Cf. Adrados et al., *Manual de Linüística Indoeuropea*, II, 291-314. See also Szemerényi, *Introduction to Indo-European Linguistics*, 230-337.

³⁶⁹ See for example: Hoffmann. *Der Injunktiv im Veda*, 55-6, 190, 260.

³⁷⁰ *Rigveda*, VIII, LXXXIX, 9-10 and VIII, XXIX, 10.

The verb *ja* is presented augmentless; we would expect it to be *ája*. The same happens to the verb *man* that in Vedic means, 'to conceive', 'to offer', or 'to create' in idea or in thought. It is natural to think that those verbs have a stative meaning, as they describe unique processes occurring in an atemporal category.

Stative and injunctive forms have been used in different languages, such as Akkadian, Greek, Hebrew and Vedic, to describe cosmogonies or atemporal states in cosmogonic texts.

The unaugmented aorist γένετο is used in Hesiod four times to describe processes, such as the coming-into-being of Chaos which is an atemporal entity. Sixteen other occurrences of the verb γίγνομαι are found in Hesiod's works, including one in *Scutum*. The use of γένετο only in a small number of instances suggests an intentional use of it. This argument is reinforced by linguistic parallels in other literary texts such as, *Rigveda* in the Indo-European context, the *Epic of Creation* in Akkadian or the *Genesis*.

An idea of atemporality is not stated in Hesiod, because he has verbal forms to express it. However, the selective way in which verbal forms are used seems to reveal the author's intention. It shows an aim to present the vision of the world from the point of view of the deities. As we have seen, the injunctive has been used in different sacred texts, particularly related their cosmogonies. The atemporality of the gods, that

could be eternal or not, allows them to act outside the time, therefore in order to utter correctly actions that had happened outside of time it is necessary to use verbal tenses with an stative semantic, like is the case of the injunctive forms.

Coming back to the terminology we described in the previous section, the verbal form γένετο has tense T such that

$$(T < 0) \ \& \ (T = 0) \ \& \ (T > 0)$$

In other words, ontologically Chaos exists in the past, the present and the future. That statement is in fact equivalent to an atemporality of Chaos, which, as we saw, is the essential point of its definition. Observe that from the way the operators *Pret*, *Pres* and *Fut* are defined, their simultaneity define a contradiction, logically equivalent to the statement $x \neq x$, which is the property that defines the empty set, showing again that another property of Chaos identifies it with the empty set.

2.7. Chaos, Gaia and Ouranos

Accepting the use of atemporal meaning for the verbal form γένετο, we can conclude that Chaos has the atemporal characteristic that we predict will agree with the proposed model of an empty set.

The set-theoretical model we proposed can also be used to model another step of the Hesiodic cosmogony: the separation of Gaia and Ouranos, Γαῖα δέ τοι πρῶτον μὲν ἐγείνατο ἴσον ἑαυτῇ Οὐρανὸν ἀστερόενθ'.

As it is well known, the separation of earth and heaven is not particular to Hesiod's *Theogony*. It appears in many cosmogonic myths³⁷¹, like in the Babylonian *Enûma Eliš*,³⁷² where, for example, earth and sky are not first distinguished, and nothing exists except the primeval waters. Marduk is a hero that by the will of the gods fights against Tiamat in a battle. After Marduk defeats and kills her, he divides her in two pieces, which will form the earth and the sky. The sky keeps the sweet waters and the earth the salted waters.³⁷³

Cosmogony, understood as the establishment of order, in the sense of equilibrium, is opposed to indeterminateness. Usually the constituent elements, cosmic order and disorder, are personified by gods. In the Babylonian cosmogony, Marduk and his companions represent the force of order that has to triumph against the force of disorder represented by Tiamat and her companions. This story is parallel to Zeus and the Titans in Hesiod's *Theogony*, as has been noted by many scholars.³⁷⁴

What the cosmogonies try to solve is the problems of the origins, and

³⁷¹ Cf. n. 206 in this Chapter.

³⁷² *Enûma –Eliš*, Lambert-Parker.

³⁷³ See next section about the hesiodic Gaia.

³⁷⁴ Cf. e.g., West, *The East Face of Helicon*, 282.

they also attempt to explain the continuum between the origins and the state of the cosmos as we can understand it at some point in history, that explanation could be linked to the gods and their stories, which make part of the traditionally called mythic thought. Mythic thought expects a divine presence in the whole cosmos, since the gods constitute the very structure of the cosmos. However, in Hesiod, the spine and order of the universe seems to be another element, with a metaphysical character, such as justice and *moira*, and a primordial non-divine entity called Chaos.

In the main cosmogonic myths there exists a process of differentiation from an initial state, where a main being is present in a passive or active way. But, what does it mean to differentiate a whole? This is exactly the problem solved by Hesiod with Chaos, but solved by other cosmogonists with the use of theistic cosmogony. The reason for this is because in order to differentiate a whole, we need to use implicitly the idea of absolute complement, that as we know will lead us to a paradox.

Mircea Eliade has remarked on the prime importance of the cosmogonic myths, that 'La cosmogonie sert de modèle exemplaire à toute 'création', à toute espèce de "faire".³⁷⁵ In other words, a cosmogony fixes the understanding of the cosmos for the author. Based on this view, we can be sure that the divinities in Hesiod's theogony and cosmogony are

³⁷⁵ Eliade, *Le Sacré et le Profane*, 71.

rhetorical elements in his discourse. I am not saying that cosmic forces, as capabilities of divinities, or even divinities themselves, are not present in Hesiod's works. They are, and in general the ways those cosmic forces link to each other are outlined in the cosmogony, the cosmic cycles, and the structure of the cosmos.

In the book of *Genesis*, too (in a creation myth based upon a common Near-Eastern tradition to which the *Enûma Eliš* belongs),³⁷⁶ the earth is at first 'without form and void; and darkness was upon the face of the waters.' But God 'divided the waters which were below the firmament from the waters which were above the firmament' to create heaven and earth. There is a common point to note that in the beginning there was no distinction between heaven and earth: they were 'one'. Let us now see what Hesiod says about that point.

2.8. Who is Hesiod's Gaia?

Gaia is the first goddess and she is associated with otherness. We should point out that after Gaia came into being, Ouranos came into being from Gaia. Gaia shows otherness, breaks the initial unity, and will help Zeus to restore it. She has a very important prophetic role throughout the

³⁷⁶Heidel, *The Babylonian Genesis*, 1-60.

Theogony. Prophecy is also associated with atemporality. The prophet is temporal, but his/her mind which joins all the events of history together is atemporal. To be a prophet is to know the past, the present and the future. Gaia as a primeval deity is a prophet and she came into being after Chaos, the atemporal entity.

Gaia is the keeper of Zeus's powerful weapons, thunder, the thunderbolt and lightning. When Zeus freed the brothers of his father, they gave him '[the weapons that] were hidden by Gaia in her innermost parts'³⁷⁷, τὸ πρῶν δὲ πελώρη Γαῖα κεκρύθει,³⁷⁸ and 'he rules over mortals and immortals'³⁷⁹, τοῖς πῖσυνος θνητοῖσι καὶ ἀθάνατοισιν ἀνάσσει.³⁸⁰ However, Gaia not only protects Zeus' weapons, she also hides him in Crete when he is a child, to be nourished and to grow up safely.³⁸¹ On the other hand, Gaia is mother of Typhoeus, who was born from her and Tartarus.³⁸² That monster, one of the most terrible represented in the *Theogony*, is defeated by Zeus with his weapons, thunder, the thunderbolt and lightning. After this battle Zeus is recognized as the king of men and gods. Furthermore, Gaia prophesied that Zeus would rule over mortals and immortals; as soon as the Titanomachy finishes, they urge Zeus to

³⁷⁷ *Th.* 505, (Translation mine).

³⁷⁸ *Th.* 505 (Edited by Most).

³⁷⁹ *Th.* 506 (Translation mine).

³⁸⁰ *Th.* 506 (Edited by Most).

³⁸¹ τὸν μὲν οἱ ἐδέξατο Γαῖα πελώρη Κρήτη ἐν εὐρείῃ τραφέμεν ἀτιταλλέμεναί τε (*Th.* 479-80, Edited by Most).

³⁸² αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ Τιτῆνας ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ ἐξέλασεν Ζεὺς, ὀπλότατον τέκε παῖδα Τυφωέα Γαῖα πελώρη Ταρτάρου ἐν φιλότῃ διὰ χρυσέην Ἄφροδίτην (*Th.* 820-2, Edited by Most).

take his place and fulfil Gaia's prophecy.³⁸³ Also, Gaia, together with Ouranos, prophesises to Zeus that one of his children will usurp his throne, and that child will be clever and wise. For that reason, when Zeus married Metis, he swallowed her to avoid the prophecy, but precisely from this process Athena was born.³⁸⁴ We can read in the *Theogony*:

πρώτην μὲν κούρην γλαυκώπιδα Τριτογένειαν,
ἴσον ἔχουσαν πατρὶ μένος καὶ ἐπίφρονα βουλήν,
αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ' ἄρα παῖδα θεῶν βασιλῆα καὶ ἀνδρῶν
ἤμελλεν τέξεσθαι, ὑπέρβιον ἦτορ ἔχοντα·
ἀλλ' ἄρα μιν Ζεὺς πρόσθεν ἔην ἐσκάτθετο νηδύν,
ὥς οἱ συμφράσσαιτο θεὰ ἀγαθὸν τε κακὸν τε.³⁸⁵

In line 900, the verb συμφράσσαιτο is Chryssippus' reading, according to West³⁸⁶, followed by Vianello³⁸⁷, but contrary to Evelyn-White³⁸⁸ is essential to the interpretation of the function of Metis and Zeus. Following west edition, and Vianello³⁸⁹, if we read ὥς οἱ φράσσαιτο, then Zeus' will is related to what is evil and what is good, and as consequence his ability to deliver justice, is totally dependent on Metis' will, therefore

³⁸³ *Th.* 881-5 (Edited by Most).

³⁸⁴ *Th.* 885-94 (Edited by Most).

³⁸⁵ *Th.* 885-900 (Edited by Most)

...first the maiden bright-eyed Tritogeneia, equal to her father in strength and in wise understanding; but afterwards she was to bear a son of overbearing spirit king of gods and men. But Zeus put her into his own belly first, that the goddess might devise with him both good and evil. (Evelyn-White translation).

³⁸⁶ West, *Hesiod's Theogony*, 405.

³⁸⁷ Vianello, *Theogonia*, 287.

³⁸⁸ *Th.* 900 (Edited by Evelyn-White).

³⁸⁹ Vianello, *Teogonia*, 287.

Zeus will be like a puppet. If we read ὡς οἱ συμφράσσαιτο, it implies to devise with him, what makes more sense, Metis will help Zeus. Also, the use of the verb that is in optative is also in middle voice, what is more adequate to an action that affects both, Zeus and Metis. Finally we can see that the act of swallowing ends in a real fusion. All this agrees with our discussion on Metis and Zeus in the Derveni Papyrus, in the correspondent section of Chapter 3.

Coming back to Gaia as prophetic adviser of Zeus, as a primeval deity, Gaia is venerated as mother of all the gods. She is the one from whom most immortals have descended. Gaia is the goddess who tells with her prophecies the stories of the immortals, including the Titanomachy and the victory of the Titans and the consequences.

ἀλλά σφεας Κρονίδης τε καὶ ἀθάνατοι θεοὶ ἄλλοι,
οὓς τέκεν ἠύκομος Ῥεΐη Κρόνου ἐν φιλότῃτι,
Γαίης φραδομοσύνησιν ἀνήγαγον ἐς φάος αὐτίς: αὐτὴ γάρ σφιν
ἅπαντα διηνεκέως κατέλεξε,
σὺν κείνοις νίκην τε καὶ ἀγλαὸν εὐχος ἀρέσθαι.³⁹⁰

Therefore, Gaia is for Hesiod a primeval and prophetic deity who plays a central role in the process of Zeus' becoming the ruler of the gods.

This account of Gaia as a primeval deity agree with that of Pherekydes of

³⁹⁰ *Th.* 624-8 (Edited by Most).

‘These did the offspring of Cronos as well as the other immortal Gods whom Rhea the well-coiffed bore in conjunction with Cronos Bring up again again into daylight at the advisement of Earth, for She explained everything throughly to them, how with the help of Uranus' sons they would win bright victory such as they prayed for.’
(Translated by Hine).

Syros, according to Diogenes Laertios, I. 119 (DK 7B1):

σώζεται δὲ τοῦ Σύριου τό τε βιβλίον ὃ συνέγραψεν, οὗ ἡ ἀρχή·
'Ζᾶς μὲν καὶ Χρόνος ἦσαν ἀεὶ καὶ Χθονίη· Χθονίη δὲ ὄνομα
ἐγένετο Γῆ, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῇ Ζᾶς γῆν γέρας διδοί'.

The book preserved from the man from Syros, which he wrote, has its beginning like this: 'Zas and Chronos always were and Chthonie; and Chthonie became named Ge when Zas gives her the earth as gift of honour'.³⁹¹

It is interesting that for Pherekydes of Syros, Chthonie will be named Ge; this supposes a previous stage when Chthonie was not named. In the *Enûma Eliš* we are told that there was a time in which earth was not named, which is also very close to the Hebrew tradition, where the power of the word is the efficient cause of the creation. Time is a primeval deity in Pherekydes, but it is absent from Hesiod's cosmogony. As we said before, time as an entity and as an abstract concept seems to appear for the first time in Pherekydes.

Coming back to Gaia, another function of Gaia as primeval deity in Hesiod is to be the first in the cosmogony to show otherness, as we can read in the *Theogony*:

Γαῖα δέ τοι πρότων μὲν ἐγένετο ἴσον ἑαυτῇ
Οὐρανὸν ἀστερόενθ³⁹²

³⁹¹ Pherekydes fr. 14, in Schibli numeration (DK Edition and translation mine).

³⁹² *Th.* 126-7 (Edited by Most).

And Gaia first bore starry Ouranos, *equal to herself*³⁹³

Before we continue, it is necessary to explain what I mean by 'otherness'. Otherness stands for several concepts. The meaning of otherness refers to the relationship between a being and what is not that being. The difference in concept will depend on how 'other' is defined. This concept of 'other' originates itself from the concept of 'inner other' of a person responding to 'what I am not'. Using set-theory terminology, 'inner other' is the minimum extension that the concept can have, and could be defined as the other that does not need space to be. That is the case with the Freudian structure of the human psyche, *id*, *ego* and *super-ego*, or the three states of the ego for the Transactional Analysis (TA) of Eric Berne, *child*, *adult* and *parent*, or the three persons of the Holy Trinity.³⁹⁴ This could be understood as alterity, in the sense of different social beings. I will explore first of all the minimal extension of otherness, the inner otherness. There are two distinguishable stages³⁹⁵ of Ouranos' coming-into-being. First Gaia bore Ouranos and for this reason Ouranos came into being. This single action with double effect is depicted in the Greek system by the aorist indicative middle ἐγένετο, called causal aorist. It is clear that there was no necessity of space in the act of coming-into-being of Ouranos, because Gaia immediately realizes that Ouranos is equal to

³⁹³ Italics are mine. Translation mine.

³⁹⁴ The Trinity dogma that is part of the creed of most Christian Churches accepts that God has three persons in one nature.

³⁹⁵ It is useful to remember that those stages, first or second, do not mean a temporal sequence, but a logical sequence.

herself.³⁹⁶ The second step is when Ouranos covers her and serves as abode forever to the blessed gods: Γαῖα δέ τοι πρόωτον μὲν ἐγείνατο ἴσον ἑαυτῇ Οὐρανὸν ἀστερόενθ', ἵνα μιν περὶ πάντα καλύπτοι, ὄφρ' εἴη μακάρεσσι θεοῖς ἔδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεί.³⁹⁷ In that act of covering her, the otherness is again present, but it is not an inner otherness, but now is a social otherness: Ouranos is different from Gaia, he is not she. From this moment of realization of the otherness, the theogony, i.e., the birth of the gods, other than the primeval deities and forces, starts. Other gods are created, Gaia recognizes the other, but now as a social other. The importance of this step of the cosmogony is that, without the recognition of the other, it is not possible to complete the cosmos.

Coming back to our mathematical model, Gaia could be identified with the number 1; 'she is defined' from Chaos, but still there is no other. If Gaia has associated with the number 1, then Ouranos, who came into being from Gaia, should be identified with the number 2. Thus we have 0, that is the very first in the succession of natural numbers and which we have related to Chaos, 1 that is the unity represented by Gaia, and 2 which represents multiplicity; we can continue the construction of the subsequent natural numbers, like in the *Theogony*, where the existence of Chaos, Gaia and Ouranos allows the procreation and multiplicity of the gods. Gaia, like 1, represents unity; that unity is broken when Ouranos is called into

³⁹⁶ Observe that that observation is supported by the fragment from the Euripides' *Melanippe Sophé*, where we can read that Οὐρανός τε γαῖα τ' ἢ μορφή μία.

³⁹⁷ *Th.* 126-8 (Edited by Most), for a translation cf. n. 20.

existence, like when 2 is defined from 1 and 0. Another point is that as Gaia represents unity, Chaos represents non-unity, and non-unity does not mean multiplicity, but still unity is not broken with its existence.

Before ending this chapter I would like to say something about the maximum extension of otherness. When 'the other' is not myself, we are talking about the absolute complement. The absolute complement induces a contradiction and for that reason it is not possible to have a being that is exactly everything that I am not. This will take us to the Russell's paradox.³⁹⁸

When I began to talk about otherness, I mentioned the case where the 'other' is the absolute complement, but I did not address this idea completely. I would also like to come back to Chaos. It is clear that we can have that kind of otherness where the other is the absolute complement. In addition, I should mention an attempt to give a kind of mathematical approach to Hesiod's thought. R. A. Prier says:

In logical terms, Chaos is the necessary polar opposite, in a negative sense, to the positive genealogical forces of the cosmos as Hesiod describes them. In particular it is the opposite to Earth...an unlimited 'other' whose only known boundary rests against its opposite.³⁹⁹

There is a problem in Prier's approach. He is supposing again an

³⁹⁸ Cf. our discussion on previous section of this chapter.

³⁹⁹ Prier, 'Archaic Structuralism', 2.

absolute complement, which is not logically allowed. Also, he refers to the fact that Chaos is the 'very first one' as a relevant characteristic and the use of the 'other' to define Gaia. His problem in defining otherness stand on opposing Gaia and Chaos, instead of opposing Gaia and Ouranos.

Gaia conceived Tartarus asexually, who we know came into being in a *μύχος*, as we can read in *Th.* 119, Τάρταρά τ' ἠερόεντα μυχῶ⁴⁰⁰ χθονὸς εὐρυοδείης.⁴⁰¹ The word *μύχος* appears only twice in Hesiod. The usual translation for this word is 'cave', 'inmost place', or 'inner place' and could have a meaning parallel to the Latin *penetrare*. Even in the next passage it probably refers to a cave which has the generic meaning of inner place. The second occurrence is in *Op.* 520-5, where it seems to have the meaning of an inner, almost secret, room, to guard and protect a virgin,

ἢ τε δόμων ἔντοσθε φίλη παρὰ μητέρι μίμνει
οὐ πω ἔργα ἰδυῖα πολυχρύσου Ἀφροδίτης:
εὐ τε λοεσσαμένη τέρενα χροά καὶ λίπ' ἐλαίῳ
χρῖσαμένη μυχίη καταλέξεται ἔνδοθι οἴκου
ἤματι χειμερίῳ, ὅτ' ἀνόστεος ὄν πόδα τένδει.⁴⁰²

...who stays indoors with her dear mother, unlearned as yet in the works of golden Aphrodite, and who washes her soft body and anoints herself with oil and lies down in an inner room within the

⁴⁰⁰ As West, *Theogony*, p. 195, says that *μυχῶ* is the epic form of the word as it appears, e. g., in *Il.* 6.152, *Od.* 3.263, *Aphrodite*, 263.

⁴⁰¹ *Th.* 119, (Edited by Most).

⁴⁰² *Op.* 520-5 (Edited by Most).

house, on a winter's day when the boneless one gnaws its foot in its fireless house and wretched home.⁴⁰³

However, it is in Pherekydes of Syros where we have the immediate problem of determining the meaning of *μύχος*, which appears in its plural form *μυχίη*. As we know, Pherekydes of Syros is considered to be a forerunner of the pre-Socratic philosophy, but his cosmogony is also very close in time to Hesiod's works, the reason for which I believe that the way to understand the meaning of the word in Hesiod could be found by looking into Pherekydes's fragment.

The idea of *μύχος* in Pherekydes seems to approach a kind of frame or structure for the universe, like a vase⁴⁰⁴ that has a certain shape and 'liquid' matter takes its shape when poured into it. Matter will be deposited into such vases and, once this is done, the 'creation' has begun.

Chthonie is the word used by Hesiod in *Th.* 119 in association with *μύχος*. In a strict sense, Chthonie is the generatrix of Tartarus, not Gaia. However, according to Pherekydes, Gaia is the name Chthonie receives

⁴⁰³ *Op.* 520-5 (Translated by Evelyn-White).

⁴⁰⁴ Could those vases be like dimensions in the sense of modern physics? Dimensions can have a mathematical or a physical meaning. Here I am referring to physical dimensions. Traditionally a dimension is associated with the ability of an object to move up and down, backwards and forwards, or left and right. Those three directions are called the three-spatial dimensions. A fourth dimension was introduced in 19th century in order to solve some mathematical problems, and later it became interpreted as 'time' in early 20th century. Nowadays, physicists deal with ten or eleven dimensions, based on the String Theory. According to this mathematical theory, the universe has a certain number of dimensions (more than four), that we are unable to capture or comprehend by the use of the senses, and therefore what we can see is a projection of an eleven-dimensional world projected in a four-dimensional world. The literature about this matter is abundant, as it is still a developing area for modern physics.

when Zeus (or Zas) gives her the realm of earth. Pherekydes goes further in his account of the primeval deities, identifying Zas, Chronos and Chthonie with the three principles. From Chronos came fire, air and water, but the first generation of gods are born after these elements appear.

Coming back to Pherekydes, in 65 Probus, *In Vergilii Bucolica* 6, we read:

*...consentit et Pherecydes sed diversa adfert elementa: Ζῆνα inquit καί Χθόνα καί Κρόνον, ignem ac terram et tempus significans, et esse aithera qui regat, terram quae regatur, tempus in quo universa pars moderetur.*⁴⁰⁵

Pherekydes also agrees but brings forward diverse elements: Zen, he says, and Chthon and Kronos, signifying fire and earth and time, and that it is the aither which rules, the earth which is ruled, and time in which the regions taken together are governed.⁴⁰⁶

Time is the moderator or governor of the whole universe. This plurality of parts could just be a reminiscence of the Hesiodic five-ages myth. There even remains doubt about the use of the Latin word *universa* and the use of the Greek word κόσμος in Damascius, *De principiis*, 321, 2-9:

...Φερεκύδης δὲ ὁ Σύριος Ζάντα μὲν εἶναι αἰὲ καὶ Χρόνον καὶ Χθονίαν τὰς τρεῖς πρώτας ἀρχάς ... τὸν δὲ Χρόνον ποιῆσαι ἐκ τοῦ γόνου ἑαυτοῦ πῦρ καὶ πνεῦμα καὶ ὕδωρ..., ἐξ ὧν ἐν πέντε μυχοῖς

⁴⁰⁵ DK 31A9.

⁴⁰⁶ Translation mine.

διηρημένων πολλήν ἄλλην γενεὰν συστήναι θεῶν, τὴν πεντέμυχον
καλουμένην, ταῦτόν δὲ ἴσως εἰπεῖν, πεντέκοσμον.⁴⁰⁷

Pherekydes of Syros said that Zas, Chronos and Chthonie always existed and, the three first principles, the one I say before the two, and the two after the one, and that Chronos made from his own seed fire and air and water, the threefold nature, I suppose, of the intelligible, from which after they were distributed in five nooks arose another numerous generation of gods, called de five-nook, and this is probably the same as to say the five-cosmos.⁴⁰⁸

We have the idea that behind the Hesiodic cosmos there is a design, and that the cosmos of Pherekydes of Syros which has been influenced by Hesiod also shows a design behind it. That design cannot be understood as an intelligent plan. What I mean by ‘intelligent plan’ is the supposition that there was a sketch of the universe before and after it was realized. It seems to me that the plan is coming into being at the same time that the universe comes into being; in other words, the plan is implicit in the developing of the universe. Notice that the word ‘developing’ here is not used in the sense of improvement in time, but in the sense of the change from one stage into another, without time.

⁴⁰⁷ DK 31A8.

⁴⁰⁸ Translation mine.

Chapter 3

Μοῖρα

3.1. Generalities

The aim of this chapter is to conduct an analysis of another pillar of the Hesiodic cosmos: *moira*. As the concept of Chaos has been of most relevance to the Hesiodic cosmogony, the concept of *moira* will also play a role in it. In this chapter, I will analyse the conception of the idea of *moira* in Hesiod using all the instances of the word according to its appearance in the *Theogony and the Work and Days*. As we will see, *moira* has been translated as 'fate', 'destiny', 'each one lot', etc. Those definitions provide an idea of *moira* as unchangeable, permanent and fixed. We have found that the Hesiodic cosmos is dynamic, to the point that the '*moira*' of a particular being can change, that is the case of Prometheus, as we will explain later. My proposal is that we have misinterpreted the conception of *moira* in the Hesiodic texts and without changing its meaning, it is necessary to re-think its nature. *Moira* would continue to mean 'fate' but is a fate that can change. In this sense *moira* is a paradigm, that should be respected, but as paradigm it could admit different instances that are manifestations of the will of Zeus. Prometheus was condemned for his

crime, as described by Hesiod, Prometheus will be bound to a rock and an eagle will eat his liver during the day. The liver will grow during night, to re-start the process again.⁴⁰⁹ The paradigm is that Prometheus should be punished, but due to the will of Zeus, because Zeus wanted to honour his son Herakles, the eagle is killed by Herakles, remaining as punishment for Prometheus, to be bound to a rock. Also, it is Herakles' *moira* to be honoured, therefore Zeus decided to change the syntagmatic structure of Prometheus' *moira*. I am offering a model, where *moira* is the paradigmatic structure or axis of the Hesiodic cosmos and the will of Zeus is the syntagmatic axis or structure of the Hesiodic cosmos. In order to understand the conception of *moira* in Hesiod I used Hesiod's works. We know that Hesiod had a great relevance in the Greek culture and is the eldest cosmogony to our knowledge, reason why it is expected that other cosmogony or theogony would be influenced by Hesiod.⁴¹⁰ At same time, cosmogonies like the one described in the Derveni Papyrus or Alkman's cosmogonic fragment belongs to the same tradition among the Orphic theogonies. Putting together those elements, it is expected that deities or beings treated in one cosmogony or another would respect the same paradigm, allowing us to understand a cosmogony by using another one, without saying that they are extension one from the other. That is the reason why I will include an analysis of the Derveni Papyrus and Alkman's

⁴⁰⁹ *Th.* 521-70 (Edited by Most).

⁴¹⁰ Kahn, 'Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmogony', 200.

cosmogonic fragment. Finally I will give an answer in a diachronic way to the question: who spins?

Let us explain in detail what means paradigmatic and syntagmatic structures. To identify the paradigmatic and syntagmatic structures and establish their difference is one of the most useful tools in linguistics, semiotics and in general, the study of natural languages. The difference is based on the meaning of the elements that constitute a sentence or unit of natural language. When the changes are due to place or position, we call them syntagmatic and when those changes refer to a substitution we call them paradigmatic.

A syntagmatic structure refers only to the position that each piece (a piece of information, a being, a word, etc.) plays in the structure. For example, a sentence in English having a syntagmatic structure takes the form:

Subject Verb Object.

A syntagma or 'a syntagmatic unit' is formed by elements, such as subject, verb and object in the right position. Those elements are objects that belong to the same linguistic category and can be compared with a third object which value will be determined. Paradigma refers to the

structure that should follow and that structure could be called 'Paradigmatic unit'. The structure could be 'filled' with different object that can be put in place of another, which has a determined value.⁴¹¹

Every event happens in the cosmos because it is 'part of *Moira*' and is regulated by the justice of Zeus. Limited by the justice of Zeus means that a possible event A can occur if it is not against the justice of Zeus.

I will provide a model for *Moira* that reflects its concept in Hesiodic texts, as the Hesiodic texts have influenced later Greek literature and later cosmogonies. From those cosmogonies I have selected the one described in the Derveni Papyrus and Alkman's Cosmogonic Fragment, where, after showing some of elements related to *Moira* that reveal Hesiodic influence, it becomes clear that the model I have created for Hesiod, works in those cosmogonies. The Derveni Papyrus links the concept of *Moira* to the verb ἐπικλώθω. I will trace the use of this verb through known Greek literature and establish elements for a pattern of change of the concept of *Moira*.

⁴¹¹ The study of syntagmatic and paradigmatic structures and analysis had a first treatment during the Middle Ages, with the logicians such as Petrus Hispanus, John Buridan and William of Ockham, among many others. The 20th century saw a huge development for its use in processing natural languages and artificial intelligence. The distinction started with Ferdinand de Saussure in his *Cours de linguistique générale*. For contemporary uses and definitions, see: Martin, *English Text*, 4.

3.2. *Moir*: A Brief Contemporary Approach

The scholarship related specifically to *moira* in the Hesiodic context has not received as much attention as we expected. Reasons for that could be from diverse origin. In Hesiod the presence of *moira* is not too much evident as it is in Homer and in later Greek texts. This is the main reason why I am resending a very brief account of secondary sources on this particular subject. For this I have chosen Cornford, Greene and Yamagata. The main meaning of the word *Moir*, and cognate words such as μόρος and μείρομαι, IE <* smor-, according to Krause, are associated with 'a divided portion'.⁴¹² In Homer, as Naoko Yamagata observes, it is sometimes identified with Διὸς βουλή.⁴¹³

Cornford discusses the origin of *Moir* in *From Religion to Philosophy*⁴¹⁴ after an analysis of the cosmology of Anaximander, where he discusses the existence of religious elements in Anaximander philosophy. For him Anaximander eliminated the gods from his thought and restored the original reign of *Moir*, as we can read in this passage:

One obvious difference is that Anaximander has expurgated the supernatural, with a boldness and completeness to which many of his successors failed to attain. To be more precise, he has expurgated

⁴¹² Cf. Krause, 'Die Ausdruecke für das Schicksal bei Homer', 146-7.

⁴¹³ For an extensive analysis of the sense of *moira* and cognate words, mainly in Homer, see Yamagata, *Homeric Morality*, 25-6.

⁴¹⁴ Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy*.

those features and factors, the supernatural or mythical character of which he was able to detect. He has eliminated Zeus and his fellow Olympians, and in so doing, has struck out of his scheme of things the objects on which the religious consciousness of his time was, whether in name or reality, focussed. The effect, as we have seen, is that he restores the more ancient reign of *Moirā*. The primary order is still said to be 'according to what is ordained'; it is still a moral order in which Justice prevails; but the will of the personal God has disappeared, and its place is partly taken by a natural cause, the eternal motion.⁴¹⁵

This is a very important point. In any religious knowledge, there is an unrecognised substratum for the members of this cultural group, shared without objection, not as a creed or formal set of beliefs, but as a unique heritage. Anaximander moved it one step back. The main problem is to determine the concept of *moira* for the Greeks during Hesiod's time. According to Cornford's analysis, the problem is to determine to which heritage *Moirā* belongs.⁴¹⁶ Is *Moirā* cognizable? How can it be defined precisely? Alternatively, should a partial answer be accepted? Cornford uses the analogy of translation to understand this point. When a translation is required, the translator needs to know about the context in which the text was written. This is an interesting position, as it suggests a semantic interpretation of a theory. After this he offers an explanation of *Moirā* from a social point of view. After a long argument about the social

⁴¹⁵ Ibid, 41.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid, 46.

origin of the cosmic structure, he arrives at the conclusion that *moira* is a social construction that underlies all other cultural knowledge. Consequently, it would rule over the gods and other cosmic forces. Even the distribution of realms of the cosmos to different deities can be a projection of the micro-cosmos into the macro-cosmos. Here are his final remarks in this discussion:

At a very early stage, the whole of the visible world was parcelled out into an ordered structure, or cosmos, reflecting, or continuous with, the tribal microcosm, and so informed with types of representation which are of social origin. To this fact the order of nature owes its sacred or moral character. It is regarded as not only necessary but right or just, because it is a projection of the social constraint imposed by the group upon the individual, and in that constraint 'must' and 'ought' are identical. Such we believe to have been the process by which *Moirai* came to rule supreme over the Gods, and Justice to ordain the boundaries of the elements in Anaximander's philosophy.⁴¹⁷

Cornford's proposal reflects his own time, when the positivism of Comte and the sociological structuralism of Levi-Strauss satisfied the scientific mind. I agree with some of his conclusions, but some of the arguments seem to fail in their support. For instance, a social structure is contingent and changeable, and therefore unable to support a permanent and apparently eternal structure, as Cornford suggests it would. For

⁴¹⁷ Ibid, 71.

Greene 'Homer's world is complete'.⁴¹⁸ According to Greene, the Homeric world is unchangeable and the Hesiodic world is fluid. In the Homeric world, there are things that are not explained; *moira* '...preserves stubborn inconsistencies, of Nature and Law, of Fate and Free Will, of the things that are and the things that should be, of pessimism and courage, they are inconsistencies naively or frankly accepted, as eternal mysteries'.⁴¹⁹ In contrast, Hesiod's universe is in constant change, and the inconsistencies, the contradictions, and even *Moirai* should be explained. Sometimes it is unsuccessful, but there is nevertheless an attempt to explain the universe. For example, the past in Homer is accepted. If the Homeric poems describe past times, it is not his function to explain the past or even its consequences in the present; his function is rather to sing the established order and the heroic past. Also, Greene says that the Hesiodic poems are based on a progressive movement of history, 'from anarchy and violence to order, with a climax in the triumph of Zeus over the Titans and the establishment of his reign (881-885)'. For Greene, *moira* has a double origin:

We note in particular the double pedigree of *Moirai*: first the *Moîrai* are described as daughters of Night, along with *Moros*, the *Keres*, and *Nemesis* and other powers (*Th.* 211-225); they are birth-goddesses, 'Klotho, Lachesis, and Atropos, who give men at their birth both evil and good to have,' though they also punish the transgressions of men and of gods (*Th.* 217-222). Later, in the

⁴¹⁸ Greene, *Moira: Fate, Good and Evil in Greek Thought*, 28.

⁴¹⁹ *Ibid.* 9.

new regime, the *Moîrai* appear, along with the *Horai* (*Eunomia* and *Dike* and *Eirene*), as the honored daughters of Zeus and Themis, dispensing evil and good.⁴²⁰

Greene casts Hesiod as a prophet. His function is to announce and communicate the new order that would be established after the kingdom of Zeus. The main characteristic of Zeus' reign is justice, which is not spread in the world, as it should be. As a prophet, he has a social sensibility, and the *Works and Days* sings of justice, but also the sense of social and personal injustices and the whole poem is, among other things, a protest against ὕβρις and a plea for δίκη. In general, according to Greene, the *moirai* has a double meaning, on one hand as forces associated with fate and destiny, and on the other those associated with the new kingdom of Zeus as daughters of Zeus and Themis. On this second appearance of *moirai* he proposes that these goddesses – he insists that they are a group of goddesses⁴²¹ – are associated with the distinction between good and evil, i.e., they have a moral function. This moral function is discussed and explained by Yamagata in her book *Homeric Morality*, where she dedicates a chapter and many other sections to analysing the concept of *moira*. Her purpose is to analyse the moral character of *moira* in Homer. This led her to analyse the word αἶσα that is linked to the concept of *moira*.

⁴²⁰ Ibid. 29.

⁴²¹ A discussion on this point with bibliographical references can be found in Yamagata *Homeric Morality*, 110, n. 9.

She finds that the main relationship of *moira* with the gods, is specifically with Zeus. She summarises four main opinions on this relationship:

At least four opinions have been proposed and re-proposed (1) fate is identical with the will of the gods or of Zeus; (2) the gods are only the instruments of fate; (3) the gods and fate belong to two separate spheres of religious principles, which the poet failed to co-ordinate into a coherent system; (4) fate is only the poet's plan or what the legend says, i.e. the plot of the poem.⁴²²

Yamagata continues her analysis of *Moirai* by looking for its relationship with morality. This is a natural question that arises when dealing with subjects such as destiny or fate. She describes the objective of her analysis:

If *moira* controls every event, and every step of divine and human conduct, it is impossible to talk seriously about moral responsibility based on the conscious control of behaviour by men or gods. In this chapter, we examine the use of the words *moira*, αἶσα and their cognate words, in order to see the relation between fate and the divine and human characters of the epics.⁴²³

Giving details of different approaches to *moira* and αἶσα, she concludes that they determine the behaviour of men and gods, and that everyone acts according to his given portion. It is required that all

⁴²² Ibid, 105.

⁴²³ Ibid, 105.

elements of the cosmos receive their portion. This fate could be moral or amoral. It is amoral in the act of birth or death, the fact of being a god or a man, etc. It is moral in the case of the common sense to respect the portions of others. All this prevents a disturbance in the order of the cosmos. That cosmos is the Homeric cosmos. What will Hesiod say about *Moirai*? Let us start with his cosmogony.

3.3. *Moirai* in Hesiod

As described above in Chapter 2, Hesiod's *Theogony* starts with the cosmogony followed by the theogony of the first generation of gods.

Γαῖα δέ τοι πρῶτον μὲν ἐγένετο ἴσον ἑαυτῇ
Οὐρανὸν ἀστερόενθ', ἵνα μιν περὶ πάντα καλύπτοι,
ὄφρ' εἴη μακάρεσσι θεοῖς ἔδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεὶ.⁴²⁴

After the cosmogony, the first generation of gods are born from Gaia and Ouranos. This generation is involved in the most important battles among the gods, the Titanomachy. The main purpose of this battle is to establish the kingdom of Zeus. At the same time, this battle is signalled by the prophecy that a son of Kronos will take over from him on the throne of the eternal gods. The prophecy is fulfilled and a new era for the gods starts with the castration of Kronos by Zeus. The next passage

⁴²⁴*Th.* 126-128 (Edited by Most) for a translation cf. n. 20.

shows a polarity between a violent deadly act, like the castration of Ouranos⁴²⁵ followed by the birth of Aphrodite from foam formed by the drops of Ouranos's blood and the sea. What we see is an act of violence and strife having as a consequence the birth of the goddess of love:

Κυπρογενέα δ' ὅτι γέντο πολυκλύστῳ ἐνὶ Κύπρῳ:
ἠδὲ φιλομμηδέα, ὅτι μηδέων ἐξεφάνθη.
τῇ δ' Ἔρως ὠμάρτησε καὶ Ἴμερος ἔσπετο καλὸς
γεινομένη τὰ πρῶτα θεῶν τ' ἐς φύλον ἰούση.
ταύτην δ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς τιμὴν ἔχει ἠδὲ λέλογχε
μοῖραν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι καὶ ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι,
παρθενίους τ' ὄαρους μειδήματά τ' ἐξαπάτας τε
τέρψιν τε γλυκερὴν φιλότητά τε μελιχίην τε.

Aphrodite's allotted role amongst immortal gods and men – her assigned portion of the general functions of the gods – is to bring virginal whisperings, smiles and deceit, love, sweetness and graciousness. That lot, μοῖραν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι καὶ ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι,⁴²⁶ is indirectly made by Zeus, as her birth is a consequence of his prophesied action. Each god has a function assigned by Zeus, as part of his plan. *Moirai*, then, can be interpreted as the lot, part, share or destiny that is clearly associated with the will of Zeus. It is also Zeus who gives his *moira* to Apollo. Zeus gives

⁴²⁵ Polarity is a characteristic of Greek thought that makes a difference in respect to its Near-Eastern counterpart. Cf. Kirk, 'Greek Mythology', 74-85.

⁴²⁶ *Th.* 204 (Edited by Most).

him the company of the Nymphs, daughters of Tethys, who together with the rivers have the task of raising boys:

τίκτε δὲ θυγατέρων ἱερὸν γένος, αἶ κατὰ γαίαν
ἄνδρας κουρίζουσι σὺν Ἀπόλλωνι ἄνακτι
καὶ Ποταμοῖς, ταύτην δὲ Διὸς πάρα μοῖραν ἔχουσι.⁴²⁷

Apollo is named as ἄναξ, which means that he is the Lord of the Nymphs, and always due to Zeus, δὲ Διὸς πάρα μοῖραν ἔχουσι.

Zeus allots to the gods their honours, establishing a new order and allowing them to dwell near him, τῶν οὐκ ἔστ' ἀπάνευθε Διὸς δόμος,⁴²⁸ particularly the gods associated with war, victory, force and strength. Styx joined Pallas and bore Zelus (Rivalry) and Nike (Victory), Cratos (Supremacy) and Bia (Force).⁴²⁹ Hesiod reminds us with this association that the new order of Zeus was born from war, from battles where many gods participated, supporting Zeus. Hesiod notes specifically that they have home not far from that of Zeus, τῶν οὐκ ἔστ' ἀπάνευθε Διὸς δόμος,⁴³⁰ there is no path where we find them other than that indicated by Zeus, οὐδέ τις ἔδρη, οὐδ' ὁδός, ὅππη μὴ κείνοις θεὸς ἡγεμονεύη,⁴³¹ and, in any case, they are always where Zeus the loud-thunderer is ἀλλ' αἰεὶ παρὰ Ζηνὶ

⁴²⁷ *Th.* 346-8 (Edited by Most).

‘And she [Thetis] gave birth to as well a holy generation of daughters who on the earth together with the Lord Apollo and the rivers the children of men raise up, such was their lot by Zeus appointed’ (Translation mine).

⁴²⁸ *Th.* 386 (Edited by Most).

‘... whose home was not other than Zeus’s’ (Translated by Hine).

⁴²⁹ *Th.* 383-5 (Edited by Most).

⁴³⁰ *Th.* 386 (Edited by Most and translation mine).

⁴³¹ *Th.* 387 (Edited by Most and translation mine).

βαρυκτύπῳ ἐδριόωνται.⁴³² The epithet ‘loud-thunderer’ recalls that Zeus received thunder and lightning during the battles that promoted him to his kingship.

None of the deities is far from the father of the gods, who has promised to those who fought with him against the Titans that they will have their honour, as it is just:

τὸν δ' ἔφαθ', ὅστις ἄτιμος ὑπὸ Κρόνου ἠδ' ἀγέραστος,
τιμῆς καὶ γεράων ἐπιβησέμεν, ἧ θέμις ἐστίν.⁴³³

It is just, because it is Zeus' will, and they deserve it after taking Zeus' side in this war, with the purpose of creating a new cosmos. According to Hesiod, there were some immortals, who received their honours from Zeus, as the part they deserve, because they fought with Zeus against Kronos. It seems that Kronos took away honours from some immortals and Zeus returns those honours to them. It is not only their allotted role but also their honour that will be restored by Zeus, and that is what Hesiod says in the next key passage:

ὣς γὰρ ἐβούλευσεν Στυξ ἄφθιτος Ὠκεανίη

⁴³² *Th.* 388 (Edited by Most and translation mine).

⁴³³ *Th.* 395-6 (Edited by Most).

‘Further he said that whoever had gone without honour or office, under old Cronos would come into honours and offices justly.’
(Translated by Hine).

ἤματι τῷ, ὅτε πάντας Ὀλύμπιος ἀστεροπητῆς
ἀθανάτους ἐκάλεσσε θεοὺς ἐς μακρὸν Ὀλυμπον,
εἶπε δ', ὃς ἂν μετὰ εἶο θεῶν Τιτῆσι μάχοιτο,
μή τιν' ἀπορραΐσειν γεράων, τιμὴν δὲ ἕκαστον
ἐξέμεν, ἦν τὸ πάρος γε μετ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν
τὸν δ' ἔφαθ', ὅστις ἄτιμος ὑπὸ Κρόνου ἠδ' ἀγέραστος,
τιμῆς καὶ γεράων ἐπιβησέμεν, ἣ θέμις ἐστίν.
ἦλθε δ' ἄρα πρώτη Στύξ ἄφθιτος Οὐλυμπόνδε
σὺν σφοῖσιν παίδεσσι φίλου διὰ μήδεα πατρός.
τὴν δὲ Ζεὺς τίμησε, περισσὰ δὲ δῶρα δέδωκεν.
αὐτὴν μὲν γὰρ ἔθηκε θεῶν μέγαν ἔμμεναι ὄρκον,
παίδας δ' ἤματα πάντα ἐοῦ μεταναιέτας εἶναι.
ὥς δ' αὐτως πάντεσσι διαμπερές, ὥς περ ὑπέστη,
ἐξετέλεσσ': αὐτὸς δὲ μέγα κρατεῖ ἠδὲ ἀνάσσει.⁴³⁴

For so did Styx the deathless daughter of Ocean plan on that day when the Olympian Lightning god called all the deathless gods to great Olympus, and said that whosoever of the gods would fight with him against the Titans, he would not cast him out from his rights, but each should have the office which he had before amongst the deathless gods. And he declared that he who was without office or right under Cronos, should be raised to both office and rights as is just. So deathless Styx came first to Olympus with her children through the wit of her dear father. And Zeus honored her, and gave her very great gifts, for he appointed her to be the great oath of the gods, and her children to live with him always. And as he promised, so he performed fully unto them all. But he himself mightily reigns and rules.⁴³⁵

Zeus appears, pronouncing his judgement, telling us himself about his action.

⁴³⁴ *Th.* 389-403 (Edited by Most).

⁴³⁵ *Th.* 389-403 (Translation of Evelyn-White).

εἶπε δ', ὃς ἂν μετὰ εἶο θεῶν Τιτῆσι μάχοιτο,
μή τιν' ἀπορραΐσειν γεράων, τιμὴν δὲ ἕκαστον
ἐξέμεν, ἦν τὸ πάρος γε μετ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν·
τὸν δ' ἔφαθ', ὅστις ἄτιμος ὑπὸ Κρόνου ἠδ' ἀγέραστος,
τιμῆς καὶ γεράων ἐπιβησέμεν, ἧ̂ θέμις ἐστίν.⁴³⁶

The gods should be honoured by taking part in this cosmos, a cosmos that is dependent on *moira*, dependent on the honours that each one deserves. Zeus administers all elements in order to keep the structure or harmony of the universe.

Zeus' accession is surrounded from the beginning by prophecies. He is helped by Gaia, then by Hekate, and when he delivers justice he is helped by Nereus and the Muses.⁴³⁷ Those facts tell something about an established plan that Zeus should execute. Why? A prophecy implies the existence of a prophet who reveals a plan that is in future, or reveals hidden things from the past or knows hidden things from the present. A prophecy reveals what is non-evident, in general because it is something that will happen but it is known by the prophet, who is a deity or to whom a deity has revealed something. The prophet sings the cosmos without time,

⁴³⁶ *Th.* 392-6 (Edited by Most). Italicized mines
'Saying if one of the gods were to fight at his side with the Titans
he would not cast him aside from his rights but that everyone should
all of his previous honours and offices with the immortals.
Further he said that whoever had gone without honour or office
under old Cronos would come into honours and offices justly.'
(Translated by Hine).

⁴³⁷ Cf. Chapter 1 of this thesis., sections 1.3 and 1.7.

sings the past, the present and the future, as it is said by Hesiod in the *Th.*

32-4,

ἵνα κλείοιμι τὰ τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα.
καί μ' ἐκέλονθ' ὑμνεῖν μακάρων γένος αἰὲν ἐόντων,
σφᾶς δ' αὐτὰς πρώτον τε καὶ ὕστατον αἰὲν ἀείδειν.⁴³⁸

Also used by Homer to refer to Calchas, who is a prophet.

ἦτοι ὃ γ' ὡς εἰπὼν κατ' ἄρ' ἔξετο: τοῖσι δ' ἀνέστη
Κάλχας Θεστορίδης οἰωνοπόλων ὄχ' ἄριστος,
ὃς ἤδη τὰ τ' ἐόντα τὰ τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα,⁴³⁹

When he had thus spoken he sat down, and among them arose
Calchas son of Thestor, far the best of bird-diviners, who knew the
things that were, and that were to be, and that had been
before...⁴⁴⁰

The identification of Hesiod as poet and prophet has been
discussed, e.g., by Cornford⁴⁴¹ and Bowra.⁴⁴² However, it is not the
prophet himself who sees what is revealed, but the Muses, in their
omniscience, a divine attribute, as Homer says, giving revelation to the

⁴³⁸ *Th.* 32-35 (Edited by Most).

‘Song, to enunciate matters to come and others that have been.
Me they commanded to sing of the race of the blessed immortals,
hymning themselves at beginning and end of every poem.’
(Translated by Hine).

⁴³⁹ *Il.* 1.70 (Edited by Munro and Allen).

⁴⁴⁰ *Il.* 1.70 (Translated by Allen).

⁴⁴¹ Cornford, *Pricipium Sapientia*, 102.

⁴⁴² Bowra, *Heroic Poetry*, 40-1.

prophet, that in the case of Hesiod is a poet. Nevertheless, omniscience is only possible if there is a structure underlying the cosmos, which we see represented here by Zeus' will and moira.⁴⁴³ The structure is paradigmatic and syntagmatic. Moira is a paradigmatic structure and Zeus' will a syntagmatic structure.

Hekate, who helps Zeus with judgements, receives her lot from Zeus. *Theogony* 404-412 describes the line from where Hekate descends. Phoebe gives birth to Leto and Asteria, the latter of whom becomes the wife of Perses and mother of Hekate. Hekate's lot is to be the nurse of children and as we have mentioned before in our discussion about δίκη, Hekate receives as her realm diverse parts of the cosmos. Once more her portion is allotted by Zeus, μοῖραν ἔχειν γαίης τε καὶ ἀτρυγέτοιο θαλάσσης. ἦ δὲ καὶ ἀστερόεντος ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ ἔμμορε τιμῆς.⁴⁴⁴ Zeus is restoring the honour of the gods. In this process, he is delivering justice by allotting their parts to them. The process of restoring the cosmos requires that Zeus' justice and *moira* work together. In fact, there is a close relationship between both, as we can deduce from the passage describing the condemnation of Prometheus.⁴⁴⁵

In lines 507 to 532 Hesiod tells us about the births of Atlas, Menoetius, Epimetheus and Prometheus, children of Lapetus and

⁴⁴³ *Il.* 2.485 (Edited by Munro and Allen).

⁴⁴⁴ 'He gave her splendid gifts, to have a share of the earth and the unfruitful sea, and she received honour also in starry heaven.' *Th.* 413-414 (Edited by Most and translated by Evelyn-White).

⁴⁴⁵ About the myth of Prometheus, due to its relevance on the understanding of the model will propose for *moira* we will analyse it in the section 3.5 of this Chapter.

Clymene. Zeus, 'the far-seeing', gave to each their *moira*. Menoetius was presumptuous and full of pride, so Zeus sent him down into Erebus.⁴⁴⁶

To Atlas was given the task of holding the wide heaven with his head and hands, Ἄτλας δ' οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἔχει κρατερῆς ὑπ' ἀνάγκηςπέρασιν ἐν γαίῃς, ...ταύτην γὰρ οἱ μοῖραν ἐδάσσατο μητίετα Ζεῦς.⁴⁴⁷ , In this passage, Hesiod applies to Zeus the epithet μητίετα, which has an echo of his fusion with Metis.⁴⁴⁸

I will explore other early Greek cosmogonies, such as the one commented on in the Derveni papyrus and those in Alkman's cosmogonic fragment and Pherekydes of Syros. The reason why I will follow this track is that those early cosmogonies demonstrate some influence of Hesiod's poems. If, then, I can find Hesiodic elements there and isolate them, they might be of help for my analysis. I believe Hesiod's poems were paradigmatic for Archaic Greek cosmogonies. As we saw in Chapter 1, according to the Greeks, Hesiod was the one who gave them the gods and their genealogy, and established the theogony. I will start this analysis with the Derveni Papyrus.

⁴⁴⁶ *Th.* 514-6.

⁴⁴⁷ *Th.* 517 and 520 (Edited by Most).

Atlas upholds the broad heavens by force of necessity at the ends of the earth ... such was the destiny that wise Zeus decided for Atlas. (Translated by Hine).

⁴⁴⁸ *Th.* 899.

3.4. The Derveni Papyrus

The Derveni papyrus was found in Thessaloniki in 1962. This papyrus was written in the 4th century BC.⁴⁴⁹ It has been the subject of many studies,⁴⁵⁰ and after 44 years the official edition was published in 2006 by Theokritos Kouremenos, George Parássoglou and Kyriakos Tsantsanoglou.⁴⁵¹ It had been published earlier anonymously and in a very preliminary form in 1982.⁴⁵² Another unofficial edition prepared by Betegh was published in 2004.

The discovery of the Derveni Papyrus has had a relevant role for many reasons. First for its parallel to other Orphic theogonies from different traditions, which seem to follow each other chronologically.⁴⁵³ It has increased our knowledge of the well-known Near Eastern influence, particularly with the role of Protogonos, Phanes or Eros.

As we know most scholars⁴⁵⁴ agree that there are at least two different ancient traditions of Orphic cosmogonies, which could be separate from or overlapping with each other, including traces of other

⁴⁴⁹ Tsantsanoglou, 'Heraclitus in the Derveni Papyrus', 125.

⁴⁵⁰ For background on the Derveni Papyrus, see Laks-Most, *Studies on the Derveni Papyrus*; Janko, 'The Derveni Papyrus'; his 'The Derveni Papyrus'; his 'The Physicist as Hierophant'; his 'God, Science and Socrates'; Lacks, 'Between Religion and Philosophy'; and Brisson, 'Les théogonies orphiques et le papyrus de Derveni'.

⁴⁵¹ Tsantsanoglou et al., *The Derveni Papyrus*.

⁴⁵² Anon. 'Der orphische Papyrus von Derveni', 300ff.

⁴⁵³ West, *The Orphic Poems*, 82-115.

⁴⁵⁴ West; *The Orphic Poems*, 259-61. See also, Bernabé, *Hieros Logos*, 19-26.

cosmogonies. The two main orphic cosmogonic traditions are characterized as follows:

1. The first is a cosmogonic tradition that presents night as the origin, where the generation of other elements of the cosmos occurs by a consecutive dissociation of the original unity, followed by a phase of sexual reproduction by a primordial divine couple. Time is not present on those cosmogonies and the primordial egg is not present.

2. The second cosmogonic tradition is characterized by the introduction of a cosmic egg⁴⁵⁵ as original entity, from where the first being is born. That first being will give birth to the other beings.

Both traditions converge on the last version of Orphic cosmogonies, called the Rhapsodic theogony.

The Derveni papyrus belongs to the tradition of the Protogonos theogonies.⁴⁵⁶ However, several themes point to the Hesiodic texts. Among those we find the theme of kingship in heaven, with the succession Ouranos-Kronos-Zeus, including the castration of Ouranos.⁴⁵⁷ It seems that the role of Gaia in Hesiod's *Theogony* is taken over by Night, who is the generatrix of Ouranos and has similar prophetic attributes, advising

⁴⁵⁵ The idea of a Cosmic Egg has a parallel in the Chinese cosmogony of Phan Ku. In this creation myth, in the beginning there was a primordial egg containing *an empty space* and a mixture of yin-yang. Phan Ku came out of the egg and split the cosmos into the two principle female and male, giving origin to the sky and the earth. .Cf. e.g., Werner, *Myths*, 77.

⁴⁵⁶ On this point see West, *The Orphic Poems*, 68-115.

⁴⁵⁷ This theme is received from Near-Eastern literature as stated before. It could be a direct influence from Hittite mythology into Orphism or the influence of Hesiod into Orphism.

Zeus to secure his power.⁴⁵⁸ Another common theme is the wisdom of Zeus. The Derveni Papyrus identifies the wisdom of Zeus – in the form of φρόνησις – with *Moira*. As we will see there is a description of total fusion between the two entities, analogous to that which occurs in the *Theogony* between Zeus and Metis after he swallows her.⁴⁵⁹

Due to the importance of Hesiod to the Greeks, we can expect an influence of the Hesiodic themes on other archaic cosmogonies. On the other hand, that influence is valuable when we try to understand the meaning of certain passages from Hesiod. Those are my reasons for choosing the Derveni papyrus as a cosmogonic text for comparison.

As has been said, the Derveni papyrus belongs to the Protogonos tradition. According to Janko⁴⁶⁰ it contains a treatise by a follower of Anaxagoras, Diagoras of Melos. Betegh is opposed to this position, and follows Laks and Most,⁴⁶¹ and Obbink,⁴⁶² proposing that the commentator may be a priest of Orphism, though Betegh prefers not to take a final position. The cosmogonic part of this papyrus is relevant to the study of Hesiodic thought either to trace possible influences of Hesiod on the author of the text or to show a different tradition.

⁴⁵⁸ In this respect see West, *The Orphic Poems*, 101-11.

⁴⁵⁹ *Th.* 899-901 (Edited by Most).

⁴⁶⁰ Janko, 'The Derveni Papyrus', 2, 6-15 .

⁴⁶¹ Laks-Most, 'A Provisional Translation of the Derveni Papyrus', 5.

⁴⁶² Obbink, 'Cosmology as Initiation vs. the Critique of Orphic Mysteries', 43.

What is the first to come into being? How is the theme of the kingship in heaven dealt with? What is the role of Gaia in the cosmogony? Let us start with the cosmogony. According to Betegh,⁴⁶³ Ouranos is the 'first-born king', so there is no place for a different Protogonos as in the Orphic Rhapsodies. Janko, who originally thought differently, has accepted this interpretation.⁴⁶⁴ However, a 'first-born king' is not the same as the first being and it is not the same as the first god. Thus the creator-like Protogonos could exist even when there is another god or being who is the 'first-born king'. Another point to note is the change in the primeval couple, which is Night and Aither, different from the Hesiodic Gaia-Ouranos. Still, there remains the question of the first being, which is not necessarily equal to the first-born king, because the use of the phrase πρωτογόνου βασιλέως raises the question as to whether he has or has not been an unborn king. As we will see, the 'Dervenian Zeus' has always existed, not as Zeus, but as a god who, after several events, takes that name.

Following this fact and other elements, Janko concludes that the theology of the Derveni papyrus is monotheist, identifying all gods with only one god.⁴⁶⁵ Betegh reaches similar conclusions, without being able to fully identify the triads *Moiral/pneuma/phronesis* and *Zeus/air/nous*;

⁴⁶³ This affirmation was previously hypothesised by Bernabé in Bernabé, 'Generaciones de dioses y sucesión interrumpida'. 189, and Bernabé, 'La theogonie orphique du papyrus de Derveni', 17-8.

⁴⁶⁴ Janko, Review of Betegh, *The Derveni Papyrus*.

⁴⁶⁵ Janko, *The Derveni papyrus*, 2-6.

according to him, *Moira/pneuma/phronesis* is not the same as Zeus/air/nous, but an aspect or function of it'.⁴⁶⁶ In my view, the conclusion that the author of the Derveni Papyrus suggests monotheism is too strong; I prefer to take that there is fusion of different deities. The only way to see a monotheistic position in it is to accept a deity who shows different faces or persons, as we discussed about otherness of Gaia and Ouranos.

I understand Betegh's hesitation and disagree with Janko's position. Those triads, i.e. Zeus/air/nous, and *Moira/pneuma/phronesis* are in the paradigmatic axis of the structure of the cosmos.⁴⁶⁷ This can be done with exactly the same analysis I applied to the Hesiodic cosmogony in respect to *Moira*, where the will of Zeus appears as an aspect of *Moira*, linked to the application of justice and to the distribution of due honours among the gods. Let us now examine the text.

First of all, *Moira* is mentioned in two columns of the Derveni Papyrus, columns XVIII and XIX which I transcribe from Tsantsanoglou et al.⁴⁶⁸ and give the translation of Betegh.⁴⁶⁹ Let us start analysing column XVIII:

Col. XVIII of the Derveni Papyrus reads as follows:

⁴⁶⁶ Betegh, *The Derveni Papyrus*, 200-2.

⁴⁶⁷ See before, in this chapter my discussion about Paradigmatic and Syntagmatic structure.

⁴⁶⁸ Tsantsanoglou et al., *The Derveni papyrus*.

⁴⁶⁹ Betegh, *The Derveni Papyrus*.

καὶ τὰ κατα[φερό]μενα ᾿[τὴν δὲ “Μοῖρα]ν” φάμενος [δηλοῖ]’
 τήνδ[ἐ γῆν] καὶ τὰλλα πάν[τ]α εἶναι
 ἐν τῷ ἀέρι [πνε]ῦμα ἐόν. τοῦτ’ οὖν τὸ πνεῦμα Ὀρφεὺς
 ὠνόμασεμ Μοῖραν. οἱ δ’ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι κατὰ φάτιμ Μοῖραν
 ἐπικλῶσαι’ φασὶν ‘σφίσιν’ καὶ ‘ἔσεσθαι ταῦθ’ ἄσσα Μοῖρα
 ἐπέκλωσεν’, λεγοντες μὲν ὀρθῶς οὐκ εἰδότες δὲ
 οὔτε τῆμ μοῖραν ὅ τί ἐστὶν οὔτε τὸ ἐπικλῶσαι. Ὀρφεὺς γὰρ
 τῆμ φρόνησ[ι]ν Μοῖραν ἐκάλεσεν· ἐφαίνετο γὰρ αὐτῷ
 τοῦτο προσφερέστατον εἶ[ν]αι ἐξ ὧν ἅπαντες ἄνθρωποι
 ὠνόμασαν· πρὶμ μὲγ γὰρ κληθῆναι Ζῆνα, ἦν Μοῖρα
 φρόνησις τοῦ θεοῦ αἰετὸ καὶ [δ]ιὰ παντός· ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐκλήθη
 Ζεὺς, γενέσθαι αὐτὸν ἐ[νομ]ί[σθη], ὄντα μὲν καὶ πρόσθεν,
 [ὀ]νομαζόμε[ν]ον δ’ οἴ[σθη]. διὰ τοῦτο λέ[γει] “Ζεὺς πρῶτος
 [γέν]ετο”, πρ[ὶ]ν γὰρ ἦν Μοῖρα φρόνησις], ἔπειτ[α] δι[ε]ρεῦθη
 [Ζεὺ]ς ὧν. οἱ δ’ ἄνθρω[ποι] οὐ γινώσκοντ[ες] τὰ λεγόμενα
 [ὡ]ς πρ[ω]τόγονο[ν] ὄντα [θεὸν νομίζουσι] τὸν Ζῆνα [
]...[.]....[]..[]

and those moving downwards. But speaking about [...] he means
 that earth and all the other things are in the air, it being breath.
 Now Orpheus named this breath *Moira*. But all other men according to
 the common usage say that *Moira* spun for them and that those things
 which the *Moira* has spun will be, on the one hand speaking correctly, but
 on the other hand not knowing either what *Moira* is or what spinning is -- .
 For Orpheus called wisdom *Moira*. This seemed to him to be the most

suitable out of the names that all men have given. For before Zeus received

his name, *Moirā* was the wisdom of the god always and through everything.

But since Zeus received his name, they think that he was born, even though he existed even before, but was not named. For this reason he says 'Zeus was born first', as he was first...then...men [?not understand]ing what is said [τά λεγόμενα] ... Zeus...

Moirā is the breath, and *Moirā* spun, and therefore, *Moirā* is associated with the destiny of men. Moreover, *Moirā* is the wisdom of Zeus, ...ἦν Μοῖρα φρόνησις τοῦ θεοῦ..., Zeus is called 'the god', and there is a time when he took the name 'Zeus'. We know that *Moirā* is the wisdom of Zeus and that *Moirā* pre-existed the named Zeus. It seems that Zeus and *Moirā* always existed, but *Moirā* came into being before Zeus, so is prior in essence. However, is it possible to establish an order of existence for two objects that always existed? The answer is yes, as we discussed it in Chapter 2, section 2. The order of those two objects is logical, not temporal. *Moirā* is the structure formed by all paradigms of possible lots or destinies. In that sense it is the paradigmatic structure and Zeus, represented by his will, is the syntagmatic structure, i.e., Zeus' will is the structure formed by all possible syntagms. An example of a possible paradigm is 'Prometheus is punished', as a syntagm 'Prometheus is condemned to be bound to a rock and have his liver eaten every day by an eagle. The liver grows during the night to allow the eagle to continue its

action'. Another possible syntagm is, 'Prometheus is condemned to be bound'. The paradigm, that is Prometheus' lot, does not change; the syntagm that expresses Zeus' will has different realizations; given the way the paradigm is limited or determined by justice, it could be θέμις or δίκη. The paradigm cannot change. Prometheus committed a crime against the gods, so he should be punished. It is just for Prometheus to be punished. Note that there is no evidence in Hesiod that Prometheus has been released.

Coming back to the Papyrus, *Moirā* was earlier than 'the god'. It means that the paradigms are prior to the god. Then the god come into being, took the name Zeus, then *Moirā* became his wisdom (φρόνησις). When we talk here about wisdom we need to bear in mind that this word translates as φρόνησις, which means a 'wise discernment with an acting purpose',⁴⁷⁰ it means that all acts of Zeus are wise because *Moirā* advises him. But more than that, Zeus can discern what to do, such as to find an alternative punishment for Prometheus' crime and at the same time honour Herakles, without going against *Moirā* and justice.

As we know from Hesiod, Zeus allots to the other gods their honours and indirectly distributes justice, using, e.g. the princes, and other helpers. The Hesiodic Zeus is also wise. Zeus swallows Metis, which is wisdom, yet another sense of φρόνησις. According to Hesiod, Metis was

⁴⁷⁰ Cf. *LfgE*, - for the etymology and meaning.

Zeus' first wife,⁴⁷¹ and after he swallowed her she could advise him about good and evil. Why does Zeus need Metis' help? Zeus needs to be wise to rule the cosmos. The wisdom of Zeus comes from Metis, in the form of her advice, according to Hesiod, and according to the Derveni Papyrus, Zeus' wisdom, in the form of φρόνησις comes from his union with *Moirai*. Thus in both sources Zeus needs the help of another entity to be wise. The parallel between *Moirai* and Metis leads me to think that the Derveni *Moirai* corresponds to the Hesiodic Metis.

Before continuing through this line of thinking, I would like to consider a general and related issue. Is that fusion/marriage with Metis/*Moirai* the only case in which Zeus obtains an extension of his powers? To answer this question, we should remember that, according to Homer, the cosmos was divided into three realms, making Zeus lord of one of those realms. We read that: τρεῖς γάρ τ' ἐκ Κρόνου εἰμὲν ἀδελφεοὶ οὓς τέκετο Ἴρεα Ζεὺς καὶ ἐγώ, τρίτατος δ' Αἴδησιν ἐνέροισιν ἀνάσσω. τριχθὰ δὲ πάντα δέδασται, ἕκαστος δ' ἔμμορε τιμῆς.⁴⁷² Homer tells us that the cosmos is divided among Kronos' sons. He tells us that to Zeus is granted the heavens, to Poseidon the seas and to Hades the netherworld. The earth and Olympus will remain as realms common to all the gods.

⁴⁷¹ Cf. Kirk, *The Nature of Greek Myth*, 120 ff. See also Burkert, *Greek Religion*, especially section III.ii.1.

⁴⁷² *Il.* 15 187-9 (Edited by Munro-Allen).

This division implies that Zeus' power is limited in other realms beyond the heavens. To comply with his promises and to fulfil his cosmological role, he could take advantage of his influence over the earth, through Gaia, who has advised him since the Titanomachy. He also needs the wisdom of Metis to distinguish between good and evil. From his marriage with Themis Dike was born, who will remain a virgin,⁴⁷³ meaning that Dike, the justice applied to human beings, comes from the cosmic justice represented by Themis. Also, the virginity of Dike is a symbol of her incorruptibility. As we have seen in Chapter 1, judgements can be twisted by corrupted judgements, but Dike cannot be corrupted as she is an immortal virgin. Therefore from the marriage with Metis and Themis Zeus becomes wise and just, making wisdom and justice the main characteristics of Zeus' kingdom.

According to the *Theogony*, Metis, the first wife of Zeus was the wisest among the immortals.⁴⁷⁴ We have noted that the fusion of Zeus and Metis in Hesiod's *Theogony* is parallel to the fusion between *Moirai* and the god (who will be Zeus) in the Derveni Papyrus. Furthermore, since *Moirai* is the wisdom of Zeus, Zeus' discernment will agree with *Moirai's*. As we said, Gaia and Ouranos advise Zeus prophetically that a son stronger than he will usurp his throne, and as a consequence he decides to swallow

⁴⁷³ See Chapter 1, sections 1, for a discussion about justice.

⁴⁷⁴ *Th.* 886-7 (Edited by Most).

Metis,⁴⁷⁵ thinking that Metis' son is the child meant in the prophecy. With the ability of discernment that Metis gives him, Zeus avoids the risk that a son stronger than he will be born and overthrow him.⁴⁷⁶ In addition he obtained the help of Metis to discern between good and evil: ἀλλ' ἄρα μιν Ζεὺς πρόσθεν ἔην ἐσκάτθετο νηδύν, ὡς δὴ οἱ φράσσαιτο θεὰ ἀγαθὸν τε κακὸν τε.⁴⁷⁷ Note that Zeus' cosmological function is to rule and establish the new order of the cosmos. According to Apollodorus,⁴⁷⁸ Zeus asked Metis to help dethrone Kronos. Metis gave Kronos a drug which made him vomit up first the stone that he swallowed, thinking it was Zeus, and then all the children he had swallowed: Hestia, Demeter, Hera, Hades and Poseidon. Note that for Hesiod, Gaia is the one who administered an emetic to Kronos.⁴⁷⁹

It should be mentioned that some scholars consider the passage *Th.* 886-901 to be spurious. West, in his edition of the *Theogony*, did no decided either way. Jacoby assumes that these lines are an interpolation;⁴⁸⁰ Solmsem observes that in Pindar Themis is the first wife of Zeus, and argues that it is inconsistent to accept that Zeus gave birth to Athena and that Metis is Athena's mother. Solmsen's argument is difficult to follow: we have it that Metis was pregnant with Athena when Zeus

⁴⁷⁵ *Th.* 888-94 (Edited by Most).

⁴⁷⁶ *Th.* 898-9 (Edited by Most).

⁴⁷⁷ *Th.* 900-1 (Edited by Most).

⁴⁷⁸ *Apoll.* 1.2.2. (Edited by Mooney)

⁴⁷⁹ *Th.* 493ff (Edited by Most).

⁴⁸⁰ Jacoby, *Hesiodi Carmina*, 41-2.

swallowed her, an act involving a fusion.⁴⁸¹ Zeus gave birth to Athena like a 'rented womb' mother of our time. The story of Zeus' fusion with Metis is described in similar ways in one of the *Fragmenta Dubia*.⁴⁸² This fragment has been a matter of discussion. It is a quotation by Chrysippus, apparently from some lost epic, as Kauer explains.⁴⁸³ The textual evidence suggests that the fusion of Metis with Zeus is a Hesiodic theme.

This Hesiodic theme is taken up in the Derveni Papyrus.⁴⁸⁴ According to Betegh⁴⁸⁵ the fusion of Metis and Zeus occurs along with the swallowing of Phanes (a penis). The identification of Phanes with Metis is complicated and Betegh prefers to take that the Hesiodic fusion occurs in parallel with Phanes' swallowing. A novelty, if compared with Hesiod, is that Zeus vomits what he swallowed and the cosmos is re-created. Here it is not Kronos who regurgitates, but Zeus; however, in both cases there is a re-creation of the cosmos. According to the Derveni Papyrus, the cosmos is immediately re-created, and according to Hesiod, after Kronos vomits the Titans, Zeus dethrones him.

This process of swallowing has been done before by Kronos, who swallowed his children as soon as they came out of the womb, in order to avoid the fulfilment of the prophecy that one of them would dethrone

⁴⁸¹ Solmsen, *Hesiod and Aeschylus*, 67-8.

⁴⁸² Merkelbach-West, *Fragmenta Hesiodica*, fr. 343, p. 171-2.

⁴⁸³ Kauer, *Die Geburt der Athena im altgriechischen Epos*, 42-3.

⁴⁸⁴ See Chapter 3 in this thesis for a discussion of this matter.

⁴⁸⁵ Betegh, *The Derveni papyrus*, 113-5.

him.⁴⁸⁶ It seems that Metis is involved in this process. In some way, Kronos' children are re-born, as when Athena is born from Zeus' head and the cosmos is re-created, according to the Derveni Papyrus, after Zeus swallows Metis or Phanes or both. The swallowing of a penis is older than Hesiod and as is well known goes back to Hurrian-Hittite mythology, where Kumarbi is pregnant with nine gods after swallowing Anu's penis or his semen. We know that among Kumarbi and Anu's children were Teššub and the rivers Tigris and Euphrates. The Hurrian-Hittite Teššub is equated to Zeus.⁴⁸⁷ This act of castration of Anu is also an act of generation of new gods, as in the Hesiodic Ouranos castration. This act also implies that a male divinity can generate a divinity inside him.

The fusion between Zeus and Metis started with the act of Zeus swallowing Metis, to avoid the fulfilling of a prophecy where a son of Zeus with power and knowledge will de-throne him. Let us go to an unresolved aspect of this problem: Zeus' unborn son. Can we know who that son would be? Would it have any importance in the cosmogony or cosmology? Who might be the mother of that son who is said to be stronger than thunder and capable of dethroning Zeus?

⁴⁸⁶ *Th.* 453-465 (Edited by Most).

⁴⁸⁷ On Hittite Mythology see: Bernabé, *Textos litrarios hetitas*; Bernabé, 'The Hittite Version of the Hurrian Kumarbi Myths,'; and Bernabé, *The Song of Ullikummi*. On the relationship between Greek and Hittite/Anatolian mythology see: West, *The East Face of Helicon*, 272-8; Mora, 'Sulla mitologia ittita di origine anatolica'; Walcot, *Hesiod and the Near East*, *passim*.

A possible answer to the first question could be found in Plato's *Symposium*. According to Plato, in the *Symposium*, Metis is the mother of Poros (ἡσιτώντο οἱ θεοὶ οἳ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Μήτιδος υἱὸς Πόρος.)⁴⁸⁸ But who is Poros? In Alkman's cosmogonic fragment,⁴⁸⁹ which appears in *Ox. P. 2390 col. I, ii – iii*,⁴⁹⁰ Thetis is the main cosmogonic deity:

... [θέ]τις

ἐκ δὲ τῶν π[ρέσγυς Πόρος Τέκμων τε· τέ]κμων ἐγένετο
 τ[ῶι πόρωι ἀκόλουθον] μο[.] ἐντεῦθεν εἰ. [] πόρον ἀπὸ τῆς
 πορί[μο]υ [πάντων ἀρχῆς]. ὡς γὰρ ἠρξαστο ἡ ὕλη κατασκευα [σθῆναι],
 ἐγένετο πόρος τις οἰονεὶ ἀρχή.⁴⁹¹

As Martin West says,⁴⁹² the presence of elements such as Poros and Tekmor shows the presence of abstract thought in a system where water is considered an essential element linked to the origin of the cosmos. West⁴⁹³ also points out that Thetis can be perhaps compared with Tiamat⁴⁹⁴ and most recently argues that it is possible to derive etymologically Thetis from Tiamat. But his argument is not strong enough

⁴⁸⁸ Plato, *Symposium*, 203b 2-3.

⁴⁸⁹ Note that Alkman was a Laconian poet who flourished in Sparta in the first half of the 7th century BC. It was a surprise to find a commentary to a cosmogony, found in Oxyrynchus Papyrus No. 2390, in 1957, which is from the 2nd century A.D. This papyrus contains parts of a comment written in prose, according to which Alkman describes a cosmogony. Even though a great portion of the text is a comment on Alkman's cosmogony there are some fragments of the text that seem to be Alkman's lemmas. Cf. e.g., Most, 'Alkman's "Cosmogonic" Fragment (Fr. 5 Page, 81 Calame)'.
⁴⁹⁰ Lobel et al., *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri XXIV*, 52-5.

⁴⁹¹ *Ox. P. 2390 col. iii, 1-5.*

⁴⁹² West, *Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient*, 206-7.

⁴⁹³ *Ibidem*, 207.

⁴⁹⁴ West, *The East Face of Helicon*, 147.

to support the conclusion. West's argument relies on a phonological approximation that could hardly confirm his assertion. On one hand, it is clear that the presence of Thetis as main deity implies a primeval relevance of water, on the other hand, it is no less important to consider the presence of Poros. Poros seems to represent a primeval 'hole', which is nevertheless full of primeval matter that is invisible and seems to be a concept out of time and space. Those characteristics of Poros are similar to the ones that we have seen to belong to Hesiodic Chaos.⁴⁹⁵ The commentator on Alkman's cosmogonic fragment says that the pore (Poros) is associated with darkness and can be identified with Hesiod's Chaos. There is no proof for it, but as Kirk, Raven and Schofield say this shows that most archaic cosmogonies are in debt to the Hesiodic cosmogony.⁴⁹⁶ This argument fails because Hesiodic chaos has other essential properties, such as being the first that came into being. Kirk, Raven and Schofield also reject the identification of Chaos with Poros on the basis of a temporal order; according to them, Poros should succeed darkness and Chaos.⁴⁹⁷ I cannot see how to deduce from the text a temporal existence. It seems more likely that Poros-Tekmor-Darkness form a triad that coexist, having a common property, but without a sequential temporal order, i.e., Poros-Tekmor-Darkness a valid temporal order, as is Tekmor-Darkness-Poros or any other order we can show.

⁴⁹⁵ See Chapter 2 of this thesis.

⁴⁹⁶ Kirk et al., *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 48.

⁴⁹⁷ *Ibid*, 48.

Nevertheless, the parallel between Poros and Chaos does not end here; indeed after⁴⁹⁸ Poros came into being, Thetis as a demiurgic deity appears and, like Gaia in Hesiod, she will be the support for everything.⁴⁹⁹

Keeping in mind this discussion on Poros, let us come back to the initial point of how to characterize the unborn son of Zeus and Metis. If we identify Poros with Chaos, which is not a deity, Poros should be the primeval entity; i.e., it is a being that has the property of being the first that came into being, in which case it is not possible to be the son of Metis. Still, let us suppose that Poros can take over the throne of Zeus. As we know, the kingship of Zeus is characterized by justice, *moira*, fair distribution of honours and realms, and an established order. To dethrone Zeus means to change that order. If this son of Zeus comes into being, we can imagine that the kingdom of Zeus, as we have described, marked by justice, following *moira's* designs with a fair distribution of honours, will disappear. That would explain the fear of the gods: even Gaia and Ouranos, primeval deities, showed fear for the loss of their honours that they recovered from Zeus. 'Poros' means pathway, channel or hollow; this could suggest that everything that was gained by the gods, including *moira's* designs and Zeus' justice, will pass. It seems that the cosmos will disappear, the gods will lose their lots, and an uncertain cosmos could emerge.

⁴⁹⁸ This 'after' is just a logical adverb and not a temporal determinant.

⁴⁹⁹ *Th.* 117 (Edited by Most).

Continuing the analysis of what we called the triad, Poros-Tekmor-Darkness, we can now question the role of Tekmor. First of all, it is clear that the word is not found in the *Theogony*, but it has the sense of boundary, mark or limit.⁵⁰⁰ It is possible to think of it as a paradigm in the structure of the cosmos, like a frame that matter will take as its shape. It could be similar to certain characteristics of *Moira* that we have identified in Hesiod. It is also related to a meaning of δίκη.⁵⁰¹

Coming back to my comments on the Derveni papyrus, the wisdom of *Moira* and Zeus seems to be the same. Moreover, it seems that *Moira* and Zeus are ontologically the same, after the god takes the name of Zeus. *Moira* becomes in this way a teleological reason for the cosmos. The existence of a teleological cause in the cosmos is clearly present in Anaxagoras' concept of the world. This idea coincides with the position of Janko that the author of the Derveni Papyrus was Diagoras of Melos.⁵⁰² On the other hand Betegh⁵⁰³ thinks that there is not enough evidence to accept that the author of the Derveni papyrus was Anaxagoras' disciple. Independently of the position assumed, there is a clear link between Hesiod and Anaxagoras.

⁵⁰⁰ τέκμων according to West, 'Three Presocratic Cosmologies', 156, was a leading mark inside the pore. According to Kirk et al., *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 48-9, τέκμων as a boundary can be probably identified with the notion of infinity given by Anaximander. See also the discussion offered by Pereira, *Pa. Oxy. 2390: the Cosmogony*, 89-93.

⁵⁰¹ According to *Lfgre*, the etymology of δίκη is related to 'δείκνυμι', which has the basic meaning of 'to show'. Palmer leads us to an original meaning of δείκνυμι as 'marker', the kind used to delineate borders between estates.

⁵⁰² Janko, 'The Derveni Papyrus', 6-15

⁵⁰³ Betegh, *The Derveni Papyrus*, 312-7.

What more can the author of the Derveni Papyrus tell us about *Moirai* and whether they support the model I proposed for the Hesiodic *Moirai*? Indeed, the author of the papyrus gives us other definitions of *Moirai*. He tells us that *Moirai* for Orpheus is breath⁵⁰⁴ τοῦτ' οὖν τὸ πνεῦμα Ὀρφεὺς ὠνόμασεμ Μοῖραν.⁵⁰⁵ However he explains why wisdom is a better name for *Moirai*. According to him (the author), the name *Moirai* was for Orpheus the most suitable of the names given by men to wisdom,⁵⁰⁶ ἐφαίνετο γὰρ αὐτῶι τοῦτο προσφερέστατον εἶναι ἐξ ὧν ἅπαντες ἄνθρωποι ὠνόμασαμ.⁵⁰⁷ 'All other men' have seen as an attribute of *Moirai* that she spins our destinies and what *Moirai* has spun will be ἄσσα Μοῖρα ἐπέκλωσεν.⁵⁰⁸ These things are correct, but they do not help us to know what *Moirai* is or what 'to spin' means⁵⁰⁹, λέγοντες μὲν ὀρθῶς οὐκ εἰδότες δὲ οὔτε τῆμ μοῖραν ὅ τί ἐστιν οὔτε τὸ ἐπικλώσαι.⁵¹⁰ They (the human beings) also think that Zeus was born, because he was given a name, which is not correct as Zeus existed before being named,⁵¹¹ ἐπεὶ δ' ἐκλήθη Ζεὺς, γενέσθαι αὐτὸν ἐ[νομ]ί[σθη], ὄντα μὲν καὶ πρόσθεν, [ὀ]νομαζόμε[ν]ον δ' ο[ὔ].⁵¹² According to these elements from col. XVIII, there is no contradiction with the idea of *Moirai* as a paradigmatic structure.

⁵⁰⁴ Translation mine.

⁵⁰⁵ Col. XVIII, 3.

⁵⁰⁶ Translation mine.

⁵⁰⁷ Col. XVIII, 8.

⁵⁰⁸ Col. XVIII, 5.

⁵⁰⁹ Translation mine.

⁵¹⁰ Col. XVIII, 6.

⁵¹¹ Betegh, *The Derveni Papyrus*, Translation Col. XVIII, 10-2

⁵¹² Tsantsanoglou, *The Derveni Papyrus*, Col. XVIII, 10-2.

Moreover, in col. XIX the author presents another characteristic that supports our argument, making it stronger. Let us read col. XIX:

Col. XIX.

εκ[το'θ δ]ὲ τὰ ἐόντα ἐν [ἔκ]αστον κέκ[λητ]αι ἀπὸ τοῦ
ἐπικρατοῦντος, Ζεὺ[ς] πάντα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν
λόγον ἐκλήθη· πάντων γὰρ ὁ ἀήρ ἐπικρατεῖ
τοσοῦτον ὅσον βούλεται. ‘Μοῖραν’ δ’ ἐπικλώσαι
λέγοντες τοῦ Διὸς τὴν φρόνησιν ἐπικυρώσαι
λέγουσιν τὰ ἐόντα καὶ τὰ γινόμενα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα,
ὅπως χρῆ γενεσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι κα[ὶ] παύσασθαι.
βασιλεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν εἰκάζει (τοῦτο γὰρ οἱ προσφέρειν
ἐφα[ί]νετο ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων ὀνομάτων) λέγων ὧδε·
“Ζεὺς βασιλεὺς, Ζεὺς δ’ ἀρχὸς ἀπάντων ἀργικέραυνος”.
[βασιλέ]α ἔφη εἶναι ὅτι πολλῶ[ν τῶν ἀρ]χων μία
[πασῶν κ]ρατεῖ καὶ πάντα τελεῖ [ἄπερ θνη]τῶν ο’θδενὶ
[ἄλλῃ] ἔξεσ[τιν τε]λέσαι· ..[] .v.[.]εθ[
[] ἀρχὸν δὲ [ἀπάντων] ἔφη εἶναι α]ὐτὸν
[ὅτι πάντα ἄρχεται δια[] .δε⁵¹³

...existing things have been called each single name by reason of what
dominates (them); all things were called Zeus according to the same
principle. For the air dominates all as far as it wishes. And when they say
that
the *Moirai* spun they say that the wisdom of Zeus ordains how the things
that are and the things that come to be and the things that are going to be

⁵¹³ Tsantsanoglou, *The Derveni Papyrus*, Col. XIX.

must come to be and be and cease. And he likens him to a king (for this seemed to him the most fitting of all the names that are said) saying as follows:

Zeus the king, Zeus who rules all with the bright bolt

He said that he is king because many... one rule prevails and accomplishes all... no more...to accomplish...ruler...is ruled (?)⁵¹⁴

From this column we can discern two significant comments by the author. The first is a pantheistic vision of the origin of the cosmos: in the beginning there was no difference, and everything was Zeus (Ζεὺς[ς] πάντα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ἐκλήθη).⁵¹⁵ Zeus is unity. He appears here as the first thing; however we do not know whether Zeus came into being or has always existed. That ambiguity is a novelty compared with Hesiod's Chaos as Hesiod's Chaos is not a deity. However both entities, the Derveniian Zeus and Hesiodic Chaos, have in common a lack of eternity, unless we assume an existence out of time for the Derveniian Zeus. Still, that atemporality is more characteristic of *Moirai*, Μοῖραν' δ' ἐπικλώσαι λέγοντες τοῦ Διὸς τὴν φρόνησιν ἐπικυρῶσαι λέγουσιν τὰ ἔοντα καὶ τὰ γινόμενα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα, ὅπως χρὴ γενεσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι κα[ι] παύσασθαι.⁵¹⁶

Also *Moirai* is identified with 'air' and with Zeus' mind. We are reminded by the author that the act of spinning for *Moirai* is the same as

⁵¹⁴ Betegh, *The Derveni Papyrus*, Translation Col. XIX.

⁵¹⁵ Col. XIX, 2-3.

⁵¹⁶ Col. XIX, 4-7.

the application of the wisdom of Zeus. It means spinning by *Moira* is the same as ordaining by the wisdom for Zeus: Μοῖραν δ' ἐπικλώσαι λέγοντες τοῦ Διὸς τὴμ φρόνησιν ἐπικυρώσαι λέγουσιν τὰ ἐόντα καὶ τὰ γινόμενα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα, ὅπως χρῆ γενεσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι κα[ι] παύσασθαι.⁵¹⁷ The author asserts that Zeus is the one who orders the cosmos according to *Moira* -- that is, Zeus' mind -- but *Moira* appears to be an entity different from Zeus. This entity, *Moira*, is associated in the papyrus with the mind of Zeus. Some authors like Burkert⁵¹⁸ and Boyancé⁵¹⁹ identify *Moira* and Zeus.

Betegh does not take a clear position, as he says that the ambiguity of the language in the text could offer two possible readings: an identity between Zeus and *Moira*, or the existence of *Moira* before Zeus as we can see in the following text:

...Ὀρφεὺς γὰρ
 τὴμ φρόνησ[ι]μ Μοῖραν ἐκάλεσεν· ἐφαίνετο γὰρ αὐτῶι
 τοῦτο προσφερέστατον ε[ἶ]ναι ἐξ ὧν ἅπαντες ἄνθρωποι
 ὠνόμασαμ. πρὶμ μὲγ γὰρ κληθῆναι Ζῆνα, ἦμ Μοῖρα
 φρόνησις τοῦ θεοῦ ἀεὶ τε καὶ [δ]ιὰ παντός· ἐπεὶ δ' ἐκλήθη
 Ζεὺς, γενέσθαι αὐτὸν ἐ[νομ]ί[σθ]η, ὄντα μὲγ καὶ πρόσθεν,
 [ὀ]νομαζόμε[ν]ον δ' ο[ὔ]....⁵²⁰

⁵¹⁷ Col. XIX, 4-7.

⁵¹⁸ Burkert, 'La genèse des choses et des mots', 445. See also, Burkert, 'Star Wars or One Stable World?', 172.

⁵¹⁹ Boyancé, 'Remarques sur le Papyrus de Derveni', 96.

⁵²⁰ Tsantsanoglou, *The Derveni papyrus*, Col. XVIII, 7-13.

That ambiguity derives, according to Betegh, because:

As the double accusative with καλέω makes the sentence inherently ambiguous, the difficulty lies in deciding whether or not the subject of the subordinate clause πρίμ μέγ γάρ κληθῆναι Ζῆνα is the same as *Moira*, that is the subject of the main clause ἡμ Μοῖρα φρόνησις τοῦ θεοῦ ἀεί τε καὶ [δ]ιὰ παντός. Depending on our answer to this question, the subordinate clause can be rendered either as ‘For before (*Moira*) received the name “Zeus” etc.’ or ‘For before Zeus received his name etc.’⁵²¹

What is clear is that *Moira* is out of time, because she represents a paradigmatic structure, and it is not conceivable for such a structure to exist dependent on time. It seems that Betegh is reading that Zeus and *Moira* are different entities at least from an ontological point of view. This analysis brings into consideration another characteristic of *Moira* in the Derveni Papyrus. That is the verb ‘to spin’, that we will analyse in the next section.

3.5. Ἐπικλώθω

In col. 19, of the Derveni papyrus, *Moira* is equated to the wisdom of Zeus, and in col. 18 it is equated to the wisdom of ‘the god’. No other part of the text identifies the wisdom of Zeus and Zeus as the same entity. Moreover, a recurrent attribute of *Moira* is spinning. For this reason our

⁵²¹ Betegh, *The Derveni papyrus*, 201.

next step is to trace the verb ἐπικλώθω through texts of Greek literature to see who the subject of that verb is. This verb is associated with *Moirai*; therefore, if A is associated with that verb, that entity is *Moirai* or associated with *Moirai*, or at least they have *Moirai* in common.

The verb ἐπικλώθω is used in known Greek literature in association with:

- A goddess, whom we might understand as one of the *Moirai*,
- The gods, not specifically one of them,
- *Moirai*, and
- *Moirai*.

In Hesiod that verb is not used at all, except when mentioned in its nominal form as part of the names of the *Moirai* (Clotho, Lachesis and Atropos)⁵²² and in Homer the word *Moirai* is not associated with the verb ἐπικλώθω. For Homer, the gods spin, ὡς γὰρ ἐπεκλώσαντο θεοὶ δειλοῖσι βροτοῖσι ζῶειν ἀχνημένοις,⁵²³ making the mortals to live with pain. The gods are causes of happiness, or lack of it, when they spin (ἀλλ' οὐ

⁵²² *Th.* 218 (Edited by Most).

⁵²³ *Il.* 24, 525-6, also in *Od. 11*, 139, *Od. 20*, 195-196 and *Od. 8*, 579-80 (The *Iliad*, edited by Munro and Allen, and the *Odyssey* edited by Mühl).)

μοι τοιοῦτον ἐπέκλωσαν θεοὶ ὄλβον, πατρί τ' ἐμῷ καὶ ἐμοί.)⁵²⁴ The return of Odysseus to Ithaca is a decision of the gods which they spin.⁵²⁵ Still, we find in Homer a rare exception in Greek literature where 'to spin' is associated with Zeus:

τοίου γὰρ καὶ πατρός, ὃ καὶ πεπνυμένα βάζεις,
ῥεῖα δ' ἀρίγνωτος γόνος ἀνέρος ᾧ τε Κρονίων
ὄλβον ἐπικλώσῃ γαμέοντί τε γεινομένῳ τε,
ὡς νῦν Νέστορι δῶκε διαμπερὲς ἡματα πάντα
αὐτὸν μὲν λιπαρῶς γηρασκέμεν ἐν μεγάροισιν,
υἱέας αὖ πινυτούς τε καὶ ἔγχεσιν εἶναι ἀρίστους.⁵²⁶

...for from such a father art thou sprung, wherefore thou dost even speak wisely. Easily known is the seed of that man for whom the son of Cronos spins the thread of good fortune at marriage and at birth, even as now he has granted to Nestor throughout all his days continually that he should himself reach a sleek old age in his halls, and that his sons in their turn should be wise and most valiant with the spear.⁵²⁷

The verb ἐπικλώθω is used several other times in known Greek literature. We find one instance in Aeschylus, one in Epictetus, one in Euripides, one in Bacchylides, one in Callinus and three in Plato. Note that we are not interested in what is spun but who spins.

⁵²⁴ *Od.* 3, 208-9 (Edited by Mühl).
⁵²⁵ *Od.* 1, 16-18 (Edited by Mühl).
⁵²⁶ *Od.* 4, 206-10 (Edited by Mühl).
⁵²⁷ *Od.* 4, 206-10 (Translated by Murray).

At Aeschylus' *Eumenides*⁵²⁸ 334-9 *Moirai* spins. Also in Callinus i.9, Μοῖραι ἐπικλώσωσ. Also in Epictetus' *Discourses*, 1.12.25-6, the *Moirai* spin accompanied by Zeus (ἀγανακτήσεις δὲ καὶ δυσαρεστήσεις τοῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ Διὸς διατεταγμένοις, ἃ ἐκείνος μετὰ τῶν Μοιρῶν παρουσῶν καὶ ἐπικλωθουσῶν σου τὴν γένεσιν ὥρισεν καὶ διέταξεν.)⁵²⁹ In Euripides,⁵³⁰ there is a goddess who spins. This is a novelty. Even though we can suppose that *Moirai* is that goddess, there is no way to confirm this. Bacchylides, in *Epinicia* 5, 140-4, defines *Moirai* as the one whose spinning

⁵²⁸ **Χορός** τοῦτο γὰρ λάχος διανταία
Μοῖρ' ἐπέκλωσεν ἐμπέδως ἔχειν,
θνατῶν τοῖσιν αὐτουργίαι
ξυμπέσωσιν μάταιοι,
τοῖς ὀμαρτεῖν, ὄφρ' ἄν
γᾶν ὑπέλθῃ
(334-339)

‘For this is the office that relentless *Moirai* spun for us to hold securely: when rash murders of kin come upon mortals, we pursue them until they go under the earth; and after death, they have no great freedom.’
(Edited and translated by Smyth).

⁵²⁹ Epictetus *Works disc*, 1.12.25-6 (Edited by Schenkl),
‘Will you not gladly part with it to him who gave it? And will you be vexed and discontented with the things established by Zeus, which he with the *Moirai* (fates) who were present and spinning the thread of your generation, defined and put in order?’
(Translated by Long)

⁵³⁰ *Orestes*, 11:

Ἥλέκτρα οὗτος φυτεύει Πέλοπα, τοῦ δ' Ἄτρεὺς ἔφυ,
ᾧ στέμματα ζήνασ' ἐπέκλωσεν θεὰ
ἔριν, Θυέστη πόλεμον ὄντι συγγόνῳ
θέσθαι.

(Edited by Murray)

‘He begot Pelops, the father of Atreus, for whom the goddess, when she had carded her wool, spun a web of strife—to make war with his own brother Thyestes.’
(Translated by Coleridge).

determines the boundary of life.⁵³¹ Finally, Plato uses the verb as epitomizing the making of destiny. In the *Theaetetus* we read:

Θεόδωρος πάντως τὴν περὶ ταῦτα εἰμαρμένην ἦν <ἄν> σὺ ἐπικλώσης
δεῖ ἀνατλήναι ἐλεγχόμενον.⁵³²

Theodorus

I say no more. Lead on as you like. Most assuredly I must endure whatsoever fate you spin for me, and submit to interrogation. However, I shall not be able to leave myself in your hands beyond the point you propose.⁵³³

The same happens in the *Republic*, 10.620e:

ταύτης δ' ἐφαψάμενον αὐθις ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς Ἀτροπού ἄγειν νῆσιν,
ἀμετάστροφα τὰ ἐπικλωσθέντα ποιοῦντα⁵³⁴

... after contact with her the genius again led the soul to the spinning of Athropos to make the web of its destiny irreversible⁵³⁵

The act of spinning is realized by a deity, whose realm became more specialized since Homer to the beginning of the Classical period. As we saw in Homer, the gods -- especially Zeus -- is the one that

⁵³¹ *Epinicia* 5, 140-4 (Edited by Irigoin)

καίε τε δαιδαλέας
ἐκ λάρνακος ὠκύμορον
φιτρὸν ἀγκλαύσασα, τὸν δὴ
μοῖρ' ἐπέκλωσεν τότε
ζωᾶς ὄρον ἀμετέρας ἔμμεν.

'She took the log of my swift doom out of the ornate chest, and burned it. *Moirā* spun that this should be the boundary of my life.'

(Translated by Campbell).

⁵³² Plato, *Theaetetus* 169c 4-6 (Edited by Burnet).

⁵³³ Plato, *Theaetetus* 169c 4-6 (Translated by Shorey).

⁵³⁴ Plato, *Republic*, 10.620e (Edited by Burnet).

⁵³⁵ Plato, *Republic*, 10.620e (Translated by Shorey).

spins. In Hesiod there is no mention of Zeus or other gods having this attribute of spinning. *Moirai* is the one that spins in Hesiod and later on appears a specific goddess, like *Athopos* who spins human destiny. Table number 3 provides a summary. In Hesiod no mention of the attribute of spinning is made; *Moirai* and Zeus appear without that attribute. From the table we see that in Homer the gods are responsible for fate; they are the ones who spin. As we come through time, the deification of *Moirai* takes place in one or several deities, with or without name(s), and the attribute of spinning becomes more specialized. From spinning as an attribute of the gods in general we pass to specialized deities (or deity) and finally to an abstract or human attribute. Finally, in Plato destiny is a more abstract concept and even a human being can spin it. The exception is the case of Epictetus, who, like most of his contemporaries, recovered Archaic concepts for re-interpreting his philosophy. The Derveni Papyrus uses a phraseology similar to Aeschylus. Therefore, there is no lexical evidence to consider that Zeus and *Moirai* are the same deity, as it is clear that Zeus is not the one who spins.

	Zeus	Gods	Moirai	Moirai	Goddess/ Athropos
Homer (c. 8 th C.)	1	6			
Callinus (fl. C. 650 BC)			1		
Bacchylides (520-450 BC)				1	
Aeschylus (525-456 BC)				1	
Euripides (480-406 BC)					1
Plato (428-c.347 BC)					1
Epictetus (55-135 AD)			1		

Table 3

3.6. Different Approaches to *Moirai*

We have found different approaches to *moira* in Hesiod, some of which we have discussed in previous sections, when analysing different words in Hesiod's works. Also we have presented three analyses of *moira* from different scholars. In this short section I am presenting some ideas that characterize *moira*.

1. Eternity: *moira*, is eternal. The gods are immortal and un-aging. It has been proposed that *moira* is superior or anterior to the gods. It seems that in fact they are incomparable from a temporal point of view. The gods were born and *moira*⁵³⁶ is un-born. 'Eternal' is equivalent to 'atemporal'. The gods are immortal, but not eternal.⁵³⁷

2. Determiner of space: In *Il.*15.189, when Zeus has sent Iris to demand that Poseidon stop assisting the Achaeans in the war against Troy, the immediate reaction of Poseidon is to remind Iris that the universe was divided in three equal parts among the sons of Kronos, each one having the same prerogative, *τριχθὰ δὲ πάντα δέδασται, ἕκαστος δ' ἔμμορε τιμῆς*,⁵³⁸ and he describes each of the three regions into which the world was divided. This process of allotment occurred in a random way. In

⁵³⁶ This is not a reference to *μοιραὶ*, daughters of Zeus, and mentioned as a set of goddesses, who seem to belong to another tradition.

⁵³⁷ For a discussion of these issues, cf., Stump, *Aquinas*, 131-158. See also Sorabji, *Time, Creation and the Continuum*, 131-6.

⁵³⁸ *Il.*15.189 (Edited by Munro and Allen).

Hesiod this process of division of the world occurs before the birth of the gods. Let us remember that, according to Hesiod, the cosmogony is before the theogony.⁵³⁹ In the beginning were Chaos, Gaia and Eros. From Chaos came Darkness and Night, in an asexual conception. From Gaia came into being one that is equal to her, Ouranus that surrounded her all around, and afterwards she lay with Ouranus and bore Ocean. In this way, the three provinces appear as distinct from one another. Note that this process was not an act of marriage, but just an act of division. The poet is clear that there was no desire or love, ἄτερ φιλότητος ἐφιμέρου.⁵⁴⁰ This gives an idea of the atemporality of the act, done before the birth of the gods. After this division of the universe, Gaia, having lain with Ouranus gives birth to the first generation of gods. This again makes *moira* before time.

3. *Moira* is impersonal. It is clear that having been before the gods, atemporal and non-spatial, *moira* has no will. It is a primary structure, as we will show in the next section, that divides the cosmos and allots to each of its elements a particular function and relationship to the rest of the cosmos.

4. *Moira* as a repressive limit. If we agree that *moira* is the structure of the cosmos, it is because it imposes limits, determining the field of activity of

⁵³⁹ Cf. Section 1, in this Chapter.

⁵⁴⁰ *Th.* 132 (Edited by Most)

‘...without the assistance of love or desire.’ (Translated by Hine).

each element of the universe. In this sense, it could be understood as a repressive force.

5. *Moir*a is also individual fate. Determining the limits of the behaviour of each individual, it could be interpreted as fate or destiny. Nevertheless, it does not mean that the individual is a puppet who has no proper power of decision.

3.7. *Moir*a and the Idea of the Jigsaw Puzzle

Continuing with our analysis in Hesiod's way to understand *moira*, I find the idea of a jigsaw puzzle useful. When we are putting together pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, there are several things that tell us whether one piece fits with another. Those attributes could be shape, colour, the picture itself, etc. It would be necessary to look at all different characteristics or variables that define the elements of our puzzle. It is possible, for example, that two pieces fit together, but the colours or the drawings do not match. Then the action of each piece is limited and previously determined by information which is not external, but internal, which defines the piece. The concept of *moira* seems to be analogous. This jigsaw puzzle could have various different properties associated with each piece, such as time, space and relationship to other pieces. The way

that those pieces fit together is told by the piece in a passive way. It is not possible to fit a certain piece totally in another place. There is no ambiguity. *Moirai* is the structure of each piece of the cosmos, but it is a paradigmatic structure, once those pieces have been interpreted; i.e., they have been put in a space and time, like the case of the god that became Zeus, according to the Derveni papyrus. It is not possible to know the structure by itself but through its actions. I can only describe *moirai's* action, but not *moirai* itself. Even the $\mu\omicron\iota\rho\alpha\iota$, daughters of Zeus, are just aspects of *moirai*, manifestations of *moirai*. As a deity, she appears a few times, but she is or they are not a cult deity, at least not in the Early period. It is indefinable. It is not Zeus' will, as it has been present even before Zeus.

3.8. A Paradigmatic-Syntagmatic Model for *Moirai* and the Will of Zeus: A Dynamic Model.

Before we start to see how our model works using the example of the fate of Prometheus, let us come back to the previous section. Suppose that there exist two pieces that fit in the same place, but the picture you get with one is different from the picture you get with the other. The cosmos depicted by the jig-saw puzzle containing, let us say, piece A and the one with piece, let us say B, they will represent the same cosmos

with a little variation. That little divergence between the piece A and the piece B depict a different cosmos, but *moira*, which is the main structure that induces the paradigm of each piece is respected. Also the limits of each piece represent the limits of the justice and injustice, they are respected. The free variable, the divergences between the two pieces represent the will of Zeus. This degree of freedom added by the will of Zeus gives a dynamic character to cosmos.

Coming back to the Prometheus myth, let us see how this myth help us to construct the promised model. Prometheus who has close relationship with humans and was condemned for tricking Zeus, due to its relevance showing how *moira*, the wil of Zeus and justice are related according to the model I will propose, we will come back to its analysis later on. Hesiod tells us that gods and men gathered at Mekone to determine the division of sacrificial offerings, and Prometheus matched wits with Zeus and tried to deceive the mind of Zeus.⁵⁴¹ Prometheus divided a sacrificial ox, giving the bones and the fat as man's offering to Zeus. He set flesh and inner parts thick with fat in the hide, covering them with the stomach of the ox for men; and asked Zeus to choose a portion.⁵⁴² Zeus perceived the trick⁵⁴³ but, planning evils to come for men, chose the bones covered by fat. Hesiod has Zeus reply to Prometheus: Ἴαπετιονίδη,

⁵⁴¹ *Th.* 536-7 (Edited by Most).

⁵⁴² *Th.* 550 (Edited by Most).

⁵⁴³ *Th.* 551 (Edited by Most).

πάντων ἀριδείκετ' ἀνάκτων, ὦ πέπον, ὡς ἑτεροζήλως διεδάσσαο μοῖρας.⁵⁴⁴

In this case Prometheus is the one who allots the parts, but he does it 'ἑτεροζήλως', a translation of which might be 'unbalanced', 'unfair', just as the Italian translation gives '*ingiustizia*'.⁵⁴⁵ 'Unbalanced' seems to me an adequate translation, if we understand it as a kind of injustice, a reading that agrees with the interpretation of ἐκρίνοντο as a legal dispute, as West sees it⁵⁴⁶. Arrighetti translates the line as follows: '*con quanta ingiustizia facesti le parti*'.⁵⁴⁷ Hesiod wants to put in evidence that Zeus is the only one to make allotments fair and with justice, the only one who makes right divisions; Hesiod tells us ὡς φάτο κερτομέων Ζεὺς ἄφθιτα μῆδεα εἰδώς.⁵⁴⁸ Observe that Zeus is called 'μητίετα Ζεύς'.⁵⁴⁹ Several times the poet reminds us that Zeus 'knows eternal counsels',⁵⁵⁰ Here he is said to have ἄφθιτα μῆδεα εἰδώς.⁵⁵¹ Zeus is the only god wise enough to apply *moira* with justice, without changing the balance of the universe. Zeus, angered by Prometheus' crafty trick,⁵⁵² never forgets this deceit.⁵⁵³ Zeus did not give men fire of ash trees,⁵⁵⁴ but Prometheus deceived

⁵⁴⁴ *Th.* 543-4 (Edited by Most)

'Son of Iapetus, most magnificent of all the princes
See how invidiously, old son, you divided the servings.'
(Edited by Hine).

⁵⁴⁵ Arrighetti, *Teogonia, Introduzione e Note*, 544.

⁵⁴⁶ West, *Hesiod's Theogony*, 305-8.

⁵⁴⁷ Arrighetti, *Teogonia, Introduzione e Note*, comment on verse 544.

⁵⁴⁸ *Th.* 545 (Edited by Most).

⁵⁴⁹ *Th.* 520 (Edited by Most).

⁵⁵⁰ *Th.* 545, 550 and 561 (Translated by Most).

⁵⁵¹ *Th.* 545, 550 and 561 (Edited by Most).

⁵⁵² *Th.* 560 (Edited by Most).

⁵⁵³ *Th.* 562 (Edited by Most).

⁵⁵⁴ *Th.* 563-4 (Edited by Most).

Zeus⁵⁵⁵ stealing fire in a fennel stalk.⁵⁵⁶ Finally Zeus, angered when he saw fire among men, decided to make an evil for men,⁵⁵⁷ that evil would be the woman.

As a consequence of his actions, Prometheus was condemned. For Zeus himself, Prometheus' condemnation is no more than a consequence of Prometheus' actions. Prometheus was bound and condemned to the torture of having his liver eaten every day by an eagle, growing a new liver during the night. The text tells us that Herakles killed the eagle and freed him from his sentence,⁵⁵⁸ but it is clear that, οὐκ ἀέκητι Ζηνὸς Ὀλυμπίου ὑψιμέδοντος,⁵⁵⁹ with Zeus' agreement. Is this a contradiction? Yes, but it is not difficult to see it as a change of Zeus' mind or will, which implies re-interpretation of the syntagmatic structure of *moira*. This change is a consequence of Herakles's action in Zeus' mind, because Zeus' will is to honour his own child.⁵⁶⁰ Zeus' will has changed, but the paradigm of *Moira* is preserved and justice is done. Although Prometheus was freed from the eagle, nothing is said about his being unbound. His punishment is partially modified, his *moira* has changed in practice, but the

⁵⁵⁵ *Th.* 565 (Edited by Most).

⁵⁵⁶ *Th.* 566 (Edited by Most).

⁵⁵⁷ *Th.* 570 (Edited by Most).

⁵⁵⁸ In later literature Herakles not only killed the eagle and freed Prometheus of his torment, but also unbound him, cf. Aeschylus, *PV* 872, 1020 ff., Paus. 5.11.6. Another version of the story is Pherekydes 3 F 17, where Herakles only kills the eagle. This interpretation is consistent with *Th.* 616, where we are told that Prometheus is still bound.

⁵⁵⁹ *Th.* 530 (Edited by Most).

⁵⁶⁰ We will return to this topic in section 3.

paradigm is the same: Zeus has done justice because Prometheus still is punished by remaining bound. This is what happens according to Hesiod.

*Moir*a is definitively linked to Zeus' justice. The purpose of justice is to establish the plan of Zeus, giving to each god or human being his or her part. Zeus is protecting the structure of the cosmos. It is impossible to cheat or surpass the mind of Zeus.⁵⁶¹

The polarity that we mentioned before as part of Greek thought once again is present in an apparent dichotomy.⁵⁶² For example in *Th.* 600-10 we can see that women and marriage are both good and bad things. Zeus gave men a second gift in order to balance the good they received, ἕτερον δὲ πόρην κακὸν ἀντ' ἀγαθοῖο,⁵⁶³ and whoever avoids marriage and the sorrows that women cause will reach old age without anyone to tend to him.⁵⁶⁴ On the other hand, evil will always be countered by the good of the man who chooses to wed and takes a good wife who suits him.⁵⁶⁵ His evil cannot be healed: ἰ ἀνήκεστον κακὸν ἐστίν.⁵⁶⁶ Therefore, both good and evil are part of the life of men in order to keep a balance. If we agree that the lot that belongs to each person is *moira*, then this balance is implicit in *moira*.

⁵⁶¹ *Th.* 613 (Edited by Most).

⁵⁶² See Chapter 1, n. 26.

⁵⁶³ *Th.* 602 (Edited by Most).

⁵⁶⁴ *Th.* 603-5 (Edited by Most).

⁵⁶⁵ *Th.* 607-10 (Edited by Most).

⁵⁶⁶ *Th.* 612 (Edited by Most).

From the examples above we can conclude that *moira* is linked to Zeus' justice, to the will of Zeus and to the mind of Zeus. However, Hesiod gives us little room to speculate about an explicit ontology of *moira*, therefore we can conclude that it is necessary to interpret it in a Hesiodic context in an implicit way, defined by and related to other entities.

The relationship of *moira* with other entities and the way it behaves allows us to propose a model in which it is represented by a paradigmatic axis. The link with 'the will of Zeus' is the same that the axis Y has with the axis X in the Cartesian plane.

In the Cartesian plane and a point with coordinates (2,3) is represented in figure 2:




Figure 2

Coming back to the definition of paradigmatic, we can analyse a text, or a structure from the external point of view, in which case we will analyse the 'paradigm' and to that process we will call 'paradigmatic analysis'. The structure that emerges from a paradigmatic analysis is called a paradigmatic structure⁵⁶⁷.

As we remember, syntagms are defined the basic units that can be added to a paradigmatic structure in a coherent way. For example in the sentence:

'The maiden gives water to the pigeon'

each word has a function and they can be in a coherent way in that structure. However in the sentence

'The maiden gives water to the **eats**'

there is an element, the third person singular present active of the verb 'to eat' does not make sense, it is not coherent with that paradigm.

Paradigmatic analysis establishes which class of syntagms are adequate to a 'paradigm'.

Note that the syntagms have a 'syntagmatic relation' among them inside the adequate 'paradigmatic structure'.

⁵⁶⁷ To discussion and concepts related to Paradigmatic and Syntagmatic analysis, I refer again to Barthes, *Éléments de sémiologie*.

Having said that, let us have a look to the concept of Moira in Hesiod, looking into diagram 1:

Prometheus enchained (*Moira*)

<u>Being</u>	<u>Verb</u>	<u>Condemnation</u>
Prometheus	to punish	enchained and liver eaten by eagle.
Prometheus	to punish	enchained.

Diagram 1

How can I represent this example using the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic axis?

First we need to agree in some abbreviations:

P₁ : Prometheus enchained and his liver is eaten by an eagle.

P₂ : Prometheus enchained.

H: Herakle honored by killing the eagle.

Z₁: Zeus punishes Prometheus by P₁.

Z₂: Zeus wills that Herakles kill the eagle.

Z₃: Zeus punishes Prometheus by P₂.




Figure 3

Observe that in this example I put 'Chaos' as the origin of my Cartesian system in figure 3, as it should be, because it was the first that came into being. Following the common sense in the systems like this one, Chaos corresponds with no-will of Zeus and no-*moira*, with is consisten with the fact that Chaos was the first that came into being.

Following this reasoning, the cosmos is depicted by the relation

determined by *moira* and the will of Zeus. *Moira* is the set of all the second-coordinates in that relation as shown in formula 1⁵⁶⁸.

$$M = \{ b \text{ for which exist an } a \text{ that } a \text{ is will of Zeus and } (a, b) \}$$

Formula 1

Coming back to Chaos, the representation of Chaos with the ordered pair (0, 0) is consistent with the models we offered for *moira* and for Chaos. The representation of Chaos as (0, 0) means that ‘the *moira*’ of Chaos is 0, i.e., the empty set and the will of Zeus for Chaos is 0. Also it has a unique representation, there is no change in the will of Zeus for Chaos, as it is expected, because Chaos has as unique function to complete an atheistic cosmogony.

Let us see another example. As we said before⁵⁶⁹ Hekate has as her lot to be the nurse of the young. Also she has by the will of Zeus power of many different realms.

It is true that most of cases where *moira* is mentioned a static structure will be enough to accommodate those cases, but a model should

⁵⁶⁸ In Mathematics a relation is a set of ordered pairs. An ordered pair is an object (a, b) where a is called the first coordinate and b is called the second coordinate, and we say that a is related to b. For example, if the relation is ‘to be greater than’, an ordered pair (a, b) is read as a is greater than b. A relation does not necessarily have a name and can not necessarily be read in a specific way; in such a case we only can say that the relation is defined implicitly and that the ordered pair (a, b) belongs to the relation. This is an intuitive, not formal, definition of relation. For a less informal definition of these terms, cf. e.g., Paul Richard Halmos, *Naive set theory*, 26-34.

⁵⁶⁹ See section 3.1 this chapter.

explain the maximum if not all, cases possible, therefore, if we suppose that there is only one case, let us say, Prometheus myth, that needs a dynamical model, it is necessary to use this model, to be able to explain as much as we can.

The paradigmatic function refers to the position of that piece in the structure. *Moirai* is a paradigmatic structure and Zeus' will is the syntagmatic structure.

Chapter 4

Some Examples of the pre-Socratics and Hesiod

First, it is necessary to leave clear that this is not a Chapter about the pre-Socratics. I will make neither an analysis of all the pre-Socratics nor an analysis of all their philosophy. It is not exhaustive in all senses⁵⁷⁰. The purposes of this chapter are two, on one hand, to show a few examples where some elements of the philosophy developed by the pre-Socratics are interpretations of Hesiodic concepts, and on the other hand, that sometimes those ideas are less complex than the Hesiodic ideas that originated them, as Kahn affirms Hesiod is the eldest speculation to answer questions about the origin of the cosmos, therefore he became the primary source for all future thinkers.⁵⁷¹ Arriving to this point, if a pre-Socratic A is called a philosopher, having used an idea from Hesiod, but with a degree of complexity inferior or equal, then I should recognize that Hesiod himself as a philosopher.

As we have seen, Hesiod shows his cosmos like an object that has a beginning, and which consisted of a coming-to-be of Chaos followed by generations of gods, sometimes guided by Eros and other times by

⁵⁷⁰ As it is well known there are many exhaustive works on the History of Ancient Philosophy, and particularly on the pre-Socratics. The main general work that I am following here is Kirk *et al.* *The Presocratic Philosophers*.

⁵⁷¹ Kahn, 'Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmogony', 200.

intergenerational conflicts. The result is a universe inhabited by deities and cosmic forces. This cosmos is depicted following *Moira* and the will of Zeus. Hesiod offers a beginning of the universe with the firstly necessary coming-to-be of Chaos, presented in an atheistic model, showing the origin of the deities from the Greek pantheon. As we have said, Hesiod's poems have been set aside from what is understood as philosophical texts because he uses mythological language, he allows the gods to exist in his cosmos and his authority comes from the Muses. If this argument holds, at least Parmenides, Empedocles and Heraclitus could be accused of the same 'crime'. In fact, those three pre-Socratic philosophers affirm that their authority comes from gods, perhaps non-Olympians, but certainly divine beings. Hesiod's assertion that he received his song from the Muses⁵⁷² is reproduced by Parmenides's attribution of his poem to an unnamed goddess.⁵⁷³ Empedocles⁵⁷⁴ and Heraclitus⁵⁷⁵ also claim divine authority for their philosophy.

After the cosmogony Hesiod uses a series of myths to show how the cosmos grow up in complexity from the single atomic Chaos. That story talk about many relevant problems. Hesiod answered some of them, while others would be answered by subsequent thinkers. Questions like, what *ύλή* or matter of being is? What is the nature of Chaos?⁵⁷⁶ How can

⁵⁷² *Th.* 22-34 (Edited by Most).

⁵⁷³ DK 11B1, 24-32.

⁵⁷⁴ DK 14B61, 14B64 and 14B80.

⁵⁷⁵ DK 10B30, 10B40, 10B47 and 10B1.

⁵⁷⁶ Lloyd, *Early Greek Science*, 16-23.

the initial unity of Gaia and Ouranos be explained? Hesiod offers the idea of necessity of a first being that, he preferred to be uncreated and non-divine. From that first entity that came into being started a process of differentiation, progressing from the initial unity of Gaia and Ouranos. I say progress because for the Greeks there is an order to observe. The cosmos is structured in a paradigmatic way, as we saw in the last chapter, referring to *moira*. This was the point where the Ionian philosophers took over and continued to look for the answers.

Hesiod composed in a mythological language and the myths he used laid foundation for the mythology of the Greeks. The Milesians follow the great achievement that Hesiod started, his ability to transcend nature and show answers that transcend physical world abstraction. For example, the Hesiodic Chaos answers the question: what was the first entity? To the same question, the Babylonian tradition has answered with the mingling of primeval waters (salted and sweet) to generate other beings. The Biblical tradition replies with the spirit of God over the waters.⁵⁷⁷ According to Kirk, Raven and Schofield the principal difference between the school of Miletus and their predecessors is the change in their language.⁵⁷⁸ However, as we mentioned before, this is not so clear, as several of them used the gods and a mythological way of expressing their ideas.

⁵⁷⁷ Gen. 1.2.

⁵⁷⁸ Kirk et al., *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 72 ff.

The Milesians were followed by another group of philosophers, who developed other theories, perhaps following different patterns, like Pythagoras, Xenophanes, Parmenides and Heraclitus. Those four thinkers are sometimes called, ‘mystic philosophers’,⁵⁷⁹ due to their language. A common pattern in their way of composing their philosophy is the influence of the Orphic beliefs.⁵⁸⁰ For Pythagoras the soul cannot find rest in Tartarus, the place where they go after the death of the body.⁵⁸¹ It is known that the Pythagorean School was later interested in political⁵⁸² and social actions, trying to interfere even in governmental matters, considered by themselves as an obligation by their destiny.⁵⁸³

As was said before, Aristotle considers Thales as the first philosopher.⁵⁸⁴ Thales founded his cosmos under the supposition that there exists of a first principle from which all existing objects derive. Scholars like Langdom⁵⁸⁵ have noted a possible influence from the Near-Eastern theological thought on Thales choice and also some influence of the Egyptian cosmogonical conception as affirmed by Kirk *et al.*⁵⁸⁶ Aristotle explains Thales’ position saying that water is essential to life, arguing that

⁵⁷⁹ Aristotle says that Pythagoras used ‘mystic and symbolic language’, cf. DK58C2.

⁵⁸⁰ Kirk et al., *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 236 ff.

⁵⁸¹ Cf. for example, Edmonds, *Myths of the Underworld Journey*, 208.

⁵⁸² On the political actions of the Pythagorean School, see for example, Minar, *Early Pythagorean politics*.

⁵⁸³ Cf. Kirk et al., *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 235-8.

⁵⁸⁴ *De Caelo*, 294a28-30 (Edited by Moraux).

⁵⁸⁵ Cf. Langdom, ‘The Babylonian Conception of the Logos’, 433-49.

⁵⁸⁶ Kirk et al., *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 79.

that was the reason that made Thales declare that water was the substratum of the cosmos.⁵⁸⁷

The idea of a first principle as the origin of the matter of everything in the cosmos was not only present in Thales's thought. It was also common to several of the pre-Socratic philosophers. According to KRS, each of the first principles, depending on whether it is considered one or several at the same time, existed without becoming in its or their various changing forms and all things depended on it or them. It has been accepted that a characteristic of the Ionian or Milesian philosophy was the uniqueness of the primeval element.⁵⁸⁸ However, as Graham⁵⁸⁹ has observed Aristotle, when talking about the pre-Socratics, made a distinction between element and principle (τοῦτο στοιχείον καὶ ταύτην ἀρχήν φασιν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων.⁵⁹⁰) Also, as in Hesiod, the gods take a natural part in the cosmos. Changes in the universe are a consequence of life, they can be a consequence of divine actions or desires, like the new order established by Zeus⁵⁹¹ or by forces like Eros⁵⁹². Kirk, Raven and Schofield followed the genealogical approach of Hesiod.⁵⁹³ The first principle of Thales, water, has begun to lose the anthropomorphic quality of some Hesiodic deities, but remains a divine principle. Some scholars,

⁵⁸⁷ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 983b20-984a11 (Edited by Ross).

⁵⁸⁸ Kirk et al., *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 75

⁵⁸⁹ Graham, *Explaining the Cosmos*, Chapter 8.

⁵⁹⁰ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 983b10-11 (Edited by Ross).

⁵⁹¹ *Th.* 617-820 (Edited by Most).

⁵⁹² *Th.* 120 (Edited by Most).

⁵⁹³ Kirk et al., *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 79.

such as Patricia Curd and Daniel Graham have challenged the accepted view that the pre-Socratics are talking about a unique substance,⁵⁹⁴ still the work of Patricia Curd concentrates on Parmenides.⁵⁹⁵

As mentioned in Chapter 1, Aristotle's texts on the pre-Socratics⁵⁹⁶ have been interpreted as holding that the Milesians were what we can call material monists.⁵⁹⁷ Material monism could be understood as the supposition that every object in the cosmos is formed by one material element, like water for Thales or air for Anaximenes. Graham opposes that position⁵⁹⁸, as we will see later. After Thales, Anaximander affirmed that all things come from the *apeiron*, but also, he proposes an eternal return, they will return to the *apeiron* that is eternal, infinite, and indeterminate origin, the boundless,⁵⁹⁹ in a process that is permanent. This *apeiron* of Anaximander plays the role of the first principle, from which all matter is made and has the property of being eternal. Indeed, if there is something that characterizes Anaximander's *apeiron* it is eternity.⁶⁰⁰

⁵⁹⁴ Graham; *Explaining the Cosmos*, . 18-28.

⁵⁹⁵ Curd, *The Legacy of Parmenides*, 64-97.

⁵⁹⁶ For example: *De Caelo*, 294a28-30; *Met.* A 983b10-11.

⁵⁹⁷ Kirk et al., *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 80 ff.

⁵⁹⁸ On the definition and discussion of Material Monism , see Graham, *Explaining the Cosmos*, 48-66.

⁵⁹⁹ Bicknell, 'τό ἄπειρον, ἄπειρος ἀήρ and τὸ περιέχον', . See also: Finkelberg, 'Anaximander's Conception of the Apeiron', 229-31 and 244 ff.; and for a different view, see Asmis, 'What is Anaximander's Apeiron?', where she argues that the *apeiron* is the infinity succession of creation and destruction of the cosmos..

⁶⁰⁰ About the different characteristics that Anaximander's *apeiron* can have, cf., Nadaff, *The Greek Concept of Nature*, 67-70.

Ἄ. ... ἀρχὴν εἴρηκε
τῶν ὄντων τὸ ἄπειρον ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσις ἐστὶ τοῖς
οὔσι, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ
χρεῶν· διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς
ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν.⁶⁰¹

It is also, ἀθάνατον ... καὶ ἀνώλεθρον (τὸ ἄπειρον = τὸ θεῖον).⁶⁰²

Immortality, as we said in Chapter 2, is not the same as eternity. Eternity is living since forever and for forever, but immortality is to live forever into the future after coming into being. The process of formation of the cosmos from the *apeiron* and all relationships among those entities is governed, according to Simplicius, by a retributive system that makes each pay for injustices or receive honours for just acts. These are, certainly, echoes that remind us of the justice so important to Hesiod's cosmos. The word associated with justice in Anaximander's fragment is τίσις,⁶⁰³ which is not used by Hesiod. Justice and payment for unjust acts are present in Hesiod's moral system.⁶⁰⁴

⁶⁰¹ DK 12B1.

'The Non- Limited is the original material of existeing things; further, the source from which existing things derive their existence is also that to which they return at their destruction, according to necessity; for they give justice and make reparation to one another for their injustice, according to the arrangement of Time.'

(Translated by Freeman).

⁶⁰² DK 12B3.

'...is immortal...and indestructible.'

(Translated by Freeman).

⁶⁰³ In Homer this word plays an important role in the attributes of the heroes. Cf. e.g., the recent work of Wilson, *Ransom, Revenge and Heroic Identity in the Iliad*, esp. 72 ff.

⁶⁰⁴ Cf. Engmann, 'Cosmic Justice in Anaximander', particularly 3-4.

According to the fragments we have, Anaximander was the first to use the word ἀρχή to speak about the material cause.⁶⁰⁵ This principle is opposed to the Hesiodic primeval entities, because they are not active principles in the coming into being of the cosmos. Some of them, such as Gaia, conceive other gods, but she is not conceived by an active principle. As we remember from the discussion on Hesiod's cosmogony, the gods are not the principle or cause of the universe. A characteristic of the Hesiodic cosmos is that it has divine origin. The ἀρχή of Anaximander has no origin, contrary to Chaos, which come into being. Anaximander, as Aristotle says, is the first to associate 'divinity' to the ἀρχή or first principle; he called it, the divine, τὸ θεῖον, as Aristotle says:

τοῦ δὲ ἀπείρου οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρχή· εἴη γὰρ ἂν αὐτοῦ πέρας· ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἀγέννητον καὶ ἄφθαρτον ὡς ἀρχή τις οὐσα· τό τε γὰρ γενόμενον ἀνάγκη τέλος λαβεῖν, καὶ τελευτὴ πάσης ἔστιν φθορᾶς. διὸ, καθάπερ λέγομεν, οὐ ταύτης ἀρχή, ἀλλ' αὕτη τῶν ἄλλων εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ περιέχειν ἅπαντα καὶ πάντα κυβερνᾶν, ὡς φασιν ὅσοι μὴ ποιούσι παρὰ τὸ ἀπείρον ἄλλας αἰτίας, οἷον νοῦν ἢ φιλίαν· καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ θεῖον· ἀθάνατον γὰρ καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, ὥσπερ φησὶν Ἀναξίμανδρος καὶ οἱ πλείστοι τῶν φυσιολόγων.⁶⁰⁶

⁶⁰⁵ DK 12A9.

⁶⁰⁶ Aristotle, *Physics*, 203b7-15 (Edited by Ross).

...of the boundless there is no beginning...but this seems to be the beginning of the other things, and enfold all things and steer all, as all those say who do not postulate other causes, such as mind or love, above and beyond the infinite. And this is the divine; for it is immortal and indestructible, as Anaximander says and most of the physical speculators.⁶⁰⁷

Still, what else can we say about *apeiron*? As usual it is necessary to consider its etymology, its common and philosophical usage. We find this word, first in Homer⁶⁰⁸ where it is associated with the impossibility of going beyond the limits of the earth (Gaia) or the sea (Pontos). It suggests the idea that it is not possible to go further, a conclusion supported by Kirk, Raven and Schofield,⁶⁰⁹ Barnes,⁶¹⁰ and Kahn.⁶¹¹

The idea of an indefinite and first principle has some resemblance with the Hesiodic idea of Chaos, particularly, if we think of the indefiniteness or boundlessness of Anaximander's substance, that is neither water nor other elements,⁶¹² in the origin of the universe.⁶¹³ There is a key difference from the Hesiodic Chaos: their temporal quality. Since Chaos came into being and there is no indication that it is immortal, therefore it cannot be eternal, then it must be atemporal. On the other hand, '*apeiron*'

⁶⁰⁷ Aristotle, *Physics*, 203b7-15 (Translated by Hardy and Gaye).

⁶⁰⁸ Cf. *Il.* 1.350, 7.446, 24.342, *Od.* 1.98, 4.510, 5.46.

⁶⁰⁹ Kirk et al., *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 117-8.

⁶¹⁰ Barnes, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 132-4.

⁶¹¹ Kahn; *Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmogony*, xi and 199-230.

⁶¹² DK 12A1.

⁶¹³ Cf. Kirk et al., *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 111-113.

is eternal, ταύτην (sc. φύσιν τινὰ τοῦ ἀπείρου) αἰδίων εἶναι καὶ ἀγήρω,⁶¹⁴ which means that it has no beginning in time and will not have an end. It seems that the *apeiron* of Anaximander has in common with the Hesiodic Chaos the condition of being the first thing to exist in the beginning. It is different, however, because contrary to what Chaos is, *apeiron* is the origin of all things, matter and worlds. Chaos generates some entities, but it is not the substance with which all things were made, and if that substance or element initial existed it is not Chaos because Chaos is not the generator of all things. Then we can conclude that Chaos cannot be related to that substance or element. As an entity Chaos has a level of abstraction higher than Anaximander's *apeiron*. We can say that eternity has at least two main interpretations. The first one is to suppose that an eternal entity flows with time from the past to the future or that eternity is characterized by timelessness.⁶¹⁵ In the first case we are in the presence of a concept that presupposes a double infinity, from past to present and from present to future. In the second case, the concept of eternity is dependent on the concept of absolute. Timelessness is an absolute state of present.⁶¹⁶ That is a complex idea. But the idea of an entity that came into being, like Chaos, which is the very first, requires another kind of construction. It is not only infinity that is related to its conception, but it is

⁶¹⁴ DK 12A2.

‘This (essential nature, whatever it is, of the Non-Limited) is everlasting and ageless.’
(Translated by Freeman).

⁶¹⁵ Richard Sorabji, *Time, Creation and the Continuum*, 98-108.

⁶¹⁶ Sorabji, *Time, Creation and the Continuum*, 105.

also the concept of zero. As we have said in Chapter 2, zero, or the empty set, is a logical construction that has as the property of being timeless.⁶¹⁷ Therefore we need three concepts to conceive the idea of Chaos: emptiness (in the sense of the set theory), timeless and infinity. It makes it more complex than the concept of eternity, so it is more complex than the concept of *apeiron*.

Anaximenes continued with Anaximander's development, but he replaced *apeiron* with air, *ἀέρ*. As Aristotle explains, ...Ἀναξिमένης δὲ ἀέρα καὶ Διογένης πρότερον ὕδατος καὶ μάλιστ' ἀρχὴν τιθέασι τῶν ἀπλῶν σωμάτων. (Anaximenes and Diogenes make air, rather than water, the material principle above the other simple bodies.)⁶¹⁸ From Diogenes Laertius⁶¹⁹ we know that Anaximenes of Miletus was a pupil of Anaximander. For him the first principle of the cosmos were air because the soul is air: οἶον ἢ ψυχὴ, φησὶν, ἢ ἡμετέρα ἀήρ οὐσα συγκρατεῖ ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὅλον τὸν κόσμον πνεῦμα καὶ ἀήρ περιέχει.⁶²⁰

It is likely that for Anaximenes the first principle should remain eternal just transforming itself into another substance and becoming a new object, because it has no origin from another principle. This reveals that he noted the changes that occur in the cosmos, describing for example

⁶¹⁷ Cf. Ibid, 130 ff., esp. 131.

⁶¹⁸ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 984a5-7 (Edited by Ross). (Translated by Kirk et al.).

⁶¹⁹ Diogenes Laertius, II, 3.

⁶²⁰ DK 13B2. The translation provided by Freeman: 'As our soul, being air, holds us together, so do breath and air surround the whole universe'.

processes like the evaporation of water.⁶²¹ His air has divine characteristics: air is unborn, immortal and immutable,⁶²² and -- also according to Cicero⁶²³ and Augustine⁶²⁴-- has the property of controlling things. What we have said for Thales and Anaximander in relation to Hesiod is also valid for the case of Anaximenes.

The interest of these pre-Socratics in explaining the origin of the cosmos was taken over by another group of thinkers, interested in explaining the world and its developing.

The first of them was Xenophanes who composed his works in hexameter and elegiacs, following the tradition of the epic poets, like Hesiod.⁶²⁵ Even though Xenophanes was a poet he was very critical of other poets, like Homer and Hesiod.⁶²⁶ Xenophanes did not trust myth and as a path to the truth, he took Homer and Hesiod to task for the anthropomorphism of their gods. However, he accepted that myth could convey a truth. According to him the gods as presented by the poets, were immoral, because they steal, commit adultery and lie.⁶²⁷

⁶²¹ Cf. Kirk et al., *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 144-152.

⁶²² DK, 13B5, 13B6, and 13B7.

⁶²³ Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, 1.26 (Edited by Ax).

⁶²⁴ Augustine, *De civ. Dei*, 8.2 (Edited by Capánaga).

⁶²⁵ Kirk et al., *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 164.

⁶²⁶ DK 21B11.

⁶²⁷ DK 21B11.

However, if we consider that myths have content and form, it seems that Xenophanes is opposed not to the content of the myth, but rather to the form it takes.

The origin of this is that men conceived the gods on their own image, giving to the gods, human attributes. To this anthropomorphic concept of god, Xenophanes opposes his own vision: εἷς θεός, ἔν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος, οὐτι δέμας θνητοῖσιν ὁμοίος οὐδὲ νόημα,⁶²⁸ one supreme god among gods and men, not like mortals in body or thought, but guiding and influencing all things with its thought.⁶²⁹ This concern for an appropriate definition of god led Werner Jaeger to affirm that Xenophanes was one of the most influential philosophers on the development of religion.⁶³⁰ Also, this god:

αἰεὶ δ' ἐν ταύτῳ μίμνει κινούμενος οὐδέν
οὐδὲ μετέρχεσθαί μιν ἐπιπρέπει ἄλλοτε ἄλλη,
ἀλλ' ἀπάνευθε πόνοιο νόου φρενὶ πάντα κραδαίνει.⁶³¹

Always exists in the same place, not moving at all; he is immobile, but without effort he shakes all things by the thought of his mind.⁶³²

⁶²⁸ DK 21B23.

⁶²⁹ DK 21B23 (Translation mine).

⁶³⁰ Jaeger, *Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers*, 59.

⁶³¹ DK 21B26 and 21B25.

⁶³² DK 21B26 and 21B25 (Translation mine based on Freeman).

Xenophanes' god is universal and unmoveable, he is the uncaused cause. This deity is atemporal. That god rests in one place, and also he sees, thinks and hears as a whole⁶³³ (οὐλοσ ὀρᾶ, οὐλοσ δὲ νοεῖ. οὐλοσ δὲ τ' ἀκούει).⁶³⁴ There is no time or space that fits him.

According to Kirk, Raven and Schofield⁶³⁵ that deity is a further advance into a philosophical Greek monotheism, preserving a substrate of the Hesiodic Zeus, to whom is added eternity and immobility. Xenophanes says:

οὔτοι ἀπ' ἀρχῆς πάντα θεοὶ θνητοῖσ' ὑπέδειξαν,
ἀλλὰ χρόνῳ ζητοῦντες ἐφευρίσκουσιν ἄμεινον.⁶³⁶

...the gods did not offer knowledge of all things to mortals from the beginning, instead they discover it in time, which is better.⁶³⁷

Only the ones that look for the knowledge can find it, but the gods did not grant that knowledge or the capacity to understand it. This knowledge of the gods is not totally transmissible. That knowledge is not transferable, and human beings could have difficulties in achieving it.⁶³⁸

This interest in knowledge reminds us of the concern of Hesiod for the pursuit of the knowledge that is also transmitted by divine means. I am referring to the passage in *Th.* 26-8.⁶³⁹

⁶³³ DK 21B24 (Translation mine).

⁶³⁴ DK 21B24.

⁶³⁵ Cf. Kirk et al., *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 168 ff.

⁶³⁶ DK 21A18.

⁶³⁷ DK 21A18 (Translation mine based on Freeman).

⁶³⁸ DK 21A34.translation from Kirk et al., *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 179.

⁶³⁹ ποιμένες ἄγραυλοι, κάκ' ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες οἶον,
ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα,

Xenophanes has appropriated himself with concept of Zeus as the supreme god in the Hesiodic tradition, taking out immoralities and adding eternity to form his concept of god. The supreme god is supreme by definition; there is no other god whom he should fight or act against or favour. Eternity comes to solve the problem of 'the very first being'. If he declares that the god is eternal, as Anaximander did with the *apeiron*, there is no need for 'the very first being'; in this case the logical role played by Hesiodic Chaos is taken by a being that is supreme and eternal.

Yet there still remains a problem: does the 'being' change or not? The problem of an unchangeable or not eternal being was also a concern not only for the pre-Socratics, but it appeared as a problem when Hesiod invoked the existence of Chaos and from here the existence of that succession of dynasties of the gods culminating in the rule of Zeus. For Hesiod Chaos was fixed, unmoved and static. Even though there is no explicit mention to characterize Chaos as 'unmoved', we can agree that this is a property of Chaos by default, because there is no textual evidence to suggest the contrary, i.e., we are unable to detect a change with respect to the initial state of Chaos. Also, on the semantic value of the verbal form γένετο, discussed in Chapter 2, we propose a stative meaning, and because this is the only verb associated with Chaos, we can conclude that

ἴδμεν δ', εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν, ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι

Th 26-8. For a translation cf. n. 215.

Chaos is static. The Milesian thinkers transformed the primeval being into a primeval principle. Xenophanes transformed the primeval being into a god. The Milesians attributed to this principle the property of change; otherwise it is not possible to understand how the initial element could become other things.

It is true that the first principle of the Milesians, Xenophanes's god, Parmenides's being or even the Pythagorean numbers have eternity as the common characteristics of the primeval being of thinkers posterior to Hesiod. There is a difficulty in understanding that Hesiodic Chaos is immortal, perhaps because it is not a god, and according to Hesiod the gods are immortal. However, note that, if a being is immortal, it does not necessarily follow that it is a god, for example Ganymedes, becomes deathless and unageing, but there is no suggestion that will become a god.⁶⁴⁰

The unmoved god of Xenophanes will influence Parmenides' 'being'. His first discussion is about the truth and the ways to reach it, and, in the same way as Hesiod, he begins his poem with the notion of truth. Parmenides' main poem starts with a preamble,⁶⁴¹ in which a goddess leads the poet having the sun as their Auriga. According to Burkert, the Parmenidiam mystical journey shows echoes both Near Eastern sources

⁶⁴⁰ Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite, 202-17.

⁶⁴¹ DK 28B1.

and Hesiod's *Theogony*, particularly in the fact that the journey has as its main purpose the pursuit of truth.⁶⁴²

There are several points to note about the influence of the Hesiodic concept of cosmos on Parmenides. Miller finds a Hesiodic echo in the yawning gap or wide opening of line 18 of the proem of Parmenides's poem.⁶⁴³

...ταὶ δὲ θυρέτρων

χάσμ' ἀχανὲς ποίησαν ἀναπτάμεναι πολυχάλκους

ἄξονας ἐν σύριγξιν ἀμοιβαδὸν εἰλίξασαι

γόμφοις καὶ περόνησιν ἀρηρότε·

Then, when the doors were thrown back,
they disclosed a wide opening, when their brazen
hinges swung backwards in the
sockets fastened with rivets and nails.⁶⁴⁴

There are two problems with this route to find Hesiod's elements in Parmenides poem. First, as we have said in Chapter 2, it is not totally clear if the Hesiodic Chaos is a 'yawning gap'.⁶⁴⁵ Second, the gates mentioned are similar to the fence of bronze that surrounds the Tartarus.⁶⁴⁶

Maja Pellikaan-Engel proposes a similar approach by identifying the

⁶⁴² Burkert, 'Das Proöemium des Parmenides und die Katabasis des Phytagoras'.

⁶⁴³ Miller, 'Ambiguity and Transport', 26-8.

⁶⁴⁴ DK 28B1,17-20. Translated by Freeman.

⁶⁴⁵ See Chapter 2, section 2.2. this thesis.

⁶⁴⁶ Most, *Th.* 726.

Hesiodic Tartarus with the Parmenides' House of Night.⁶⁴⁷ The influence of Hesiod is clear. Parmenides, like Hesiod,⁶⁴⁸ starts the poem in a state of mystic inspiration. The goddess as Hesiod's Muses can say true things and false things:

Ἴπποι ταί με φέρουσιν, ὅσον τ' ἐπὶ θυμὸς ἰκάνοι,
πέμπον, ἐπεὶ μ' ἐς ὁδὸν βῆσαν πολύφημον ἄγουσαι
δαίμονος, ἣ κατὰ πάντ' ἄστη φέρει εἰδότα φῶτα·
τῆ φερόμην·

The steeds that bear me carried me as far as ever my heart
Desired, since they brought me and set me on the renowned
Way of the goddess, who with her own hands conducts the man
who knows through all things.⁶⁴⁹

Parmenides takes his authority from this 'unknown' goddess who could represent the knowledge or his own thought. She leads him on the path of the truth. She knows how to tell true things:

ἀλλὰ θέμις τε δίκη τε. Χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι
ἤμην Ἀληθείης εὐκνκλέος ἀτρεμῆς ἦτορ
ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθῆς.⁶⁵⁰

...but right and justice. It is proper that you should learn all things,
both the unshaken heart of well-rounded truth, and the opinions of
mortals, in which there is no true reliance.⁶⁵¹

⁶⁴⁷ Pellikaan-Engel, *Hesiod and Parmenides*, 1-10.

⁶⁴⁸ *Most, Th.* 22-34.

⁶⁴⁹ DK 28B1,1-4. Translated by Freeman.

⁶⁵⁰ DK 28B 1-4 (Edited by Coxon).

⁶⁵¹ DK 28B1,28-30 (Translation in Kirk et al., *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 243).

In that way, Parmenides makes clear that it is necessary to learn all things and then have decided what is real true from what is not true or false true. The main reason to learn those things is grounded in the search for the virtue. The truth is the path to the virtue, while the path of falsehood guides one into misery.⁶⁵² Line 11-14 of the proem reads:

Ἔνθα πύλαι Νυκτός τε καὶ Ἥματός εἰσι κελεύθων,
καὶ σφας ὑπέρθυρον ἄμφις ἔχει καὶ λάινος οὐδός·
αὐτὰ δ' αἰθέρεια πλῆνται μεγάλοισι θυρέτροις·
τῶν δὲ Δίκη πολύποινος ἔχει κληίδας ἀμοιβούς.

There are the gates of the ways of Night and Day, fitted above with a lintel and below with a threshold of stone they themselves, high in the air, are closed by mighty doors, and Avenging Justice keeps the keys that open them.⁶⁵³

There is a reference to *Th.* 748, making a possible reference to the gates of the Tartarus mentioned in *Th.* 732. Also, the avenging Dike is the key-holder of those doors. In Parmenides those doors keep knowledge of the divine away from mortals; however Parmenides will be able to pass

⁶⁵² It is also worth noting that, through the extant poem of Parmenides, we can find more than ten verses that use phraseology from Homer, which implies a great debt, for a surviving poem of 150 verses. A list of almost all those texts can be found and analysed in Coxon's book on Parmenides' fragments. A. H. Coxon, *The Fragments of Parmenides: A Critical Text with Introduction, and Translation, the Ancient Testimonia and a Commentary*, (Uitgeverij Van Gorcum, 1986), 9-11.

⁶⁵³ DK 28B1,11-4. Transl. Kirk et al. 243.

through those doors, because he is taken there by his desire and guided by the goddess. Those are not the only Hesiodic concepts used by Parmenides: the goddess who guards the gate to the netherworld is Dike.⁶⁵⁴ Parmenides' preface is a way or model to represent his position regarding notion of knowledge.⁶⁵⁵ As Burkert suggests, we can discover in Parmenides and Hesiod a common element that seems to be influenced by the Babylonian mythology, where the sun god lives and delivers judgements.⁶⁵⁶ Parmenides journey takes him to the Halls of Night⁶⁵⁷ in the Netherworld, place that is guarded by Dike⁶⁵⁸.

Observe that Night appears as Zeus' adviser in some of the Orphic *Rhapsodies*,⁶⁵⁹ she advises Zeus on how to preserve the unity of the cosmos that will be a fundamental key to Parmenides' metaphysics.⁶⁶⁰ Note that this element appears in Hesiod, where Metis takes the role of counsellor after her marriage-fusion with Zeus. As we said before, a relevant element in Hesiod's cosmogony is the conception of unity that opposes in Hesiod to the separation of Gaia and Ouranos.⁶⁶¹ Note that Hesiod in *Op.* 660-1 transmits us the will of Zeus, because the Muses

⁶⁵⁴ Cf. Burkert, 'Das Proöemium des Parmenides und die Katabasis des Pythagoras'; and Cerri, 'Cosmologia dell'Ade in Omero, Esiodo e Parmenide', Jaeger, *Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers*. Chapter 6;

⁶⁵⁵ Cf. Miller, 'Ambiguity and Transport', 18-21.

⁶⁵⁶ Cf. Walter Burkert, "Das Proöemium des Parmenides und die Katabasis des Phytagoras", 14.

⁶⁵⁷ DK 28B1.9.

⁶⁵⁸ A discussion about the deity that shows as principal in Parmenides see , Northrup, 'Hesiodic Personifications in Parmenides A 37'.

⁶⁵⁹ West, *The Orphic Poems*, 70-5.

⁶⁶⁰ Cf. Hermann, *To think like God*, 17 ff. and 267 ff.

⁶⁶¹ Cf. Chapter 2, section 2.

taught him, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς ἐρέω Ζηνὸς νόον αἰγιόχοιο: Μοῦσαι γὰρ μ' ἐδίδαξαν ἀθέσφατον ὕμνον ἀείδειν.⁶⁶²

The adventure of Parmenides in his quest to understand the unique fixed being will give way to another pre-Socratic who instead of the unmoved being, added to his system fire⁶⁶³ which is constant movement. This fire will take the place of the principle that is the substratum of all things. Heraclitus advances criticises his predecessors:

πολυμαθίη νόον ἔχειν οὐ διδάσκει· Ἡσίοδον γὰρ ἂν
ἐδίδαξε καὶ Πυθαγόρην αὐτίς τε Ξενοφάνεά τε καὶ
Ἑκαταῖον.⁶⁶⁴

Learning of many things does not teach intelligence; if so it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and again Xenophanes and Hecataeus.⁶⁶⁵

Heraclitus' philosophy relies on the supposition that there is a first principle like for the Milesians. This first principle will be the fire, substance that seems to him predominant in the cosmos. His Cosmos is eternal, therefore it has no beginning and it is the result of the eternal interaction between the unmoved λόγος and the eternal movement of

⁶⁶² *Op.* 661-2, (Edited by Most).

‘Nevertheless I can tell you the mind of Zeus who is lord of the aegis, seeing the muses have taught me to sing an infinite poem.’

(Translated by Hine).

⁶⁶³ DK 22B30.

⁶⁶⁴ DK 22B40.

⁶⁶⁵ DK 22B40, (Translation mine based on Freeman).

matter. This movement of the matter and the fixity of the λόγος, produces a tension that keeps the universe together. Heraclitus talks about Hesiod in an ironic way, affirming that Hesiod could be a teacher of many men, but he is unable to recognize day or night as one.⁶⁶⁶

Still, Heidegger interprets this fragment, saying that Heraclitus is referring to *Th.* 123-4, where Hesiod gives the origin of day and night in two different cosmogonic lines.⁶⁶⁷ Heraclitus' challenge to Hesiod's authority does not mean that Heraclitus is not influenced by Hesiod. For him 'the being' was constituted by war, πόλεμος, causing us to think of Hesiodian strife,⁶⁶⁸ which is behind war, battles and any other conflict. Moreover, war takes the place of Zeus as ruler of the Hesiodic cosmos:

Πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ ἐστι, πάντων δὲ
βασιλεύς, καὶ τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς ἔδειξε τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους,
τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἐποίησε τοὺς δὲ ἐλευθέρους.⁶⁶⁹

War is both king of all and father of all, and it has revealed some as gods, others as men; Some it has made slaves, others free.⁶⁷⁰

⁶⁶⁶ 'Hesiod is teacher of almost all men. They are sure he knew about most things, he who could not recognize day or night, because they are one' DK 22B57 (Translation mine based on Freeman and Kirk et al.).

⁶⁶⁷ Heidegger and Fink, *Heraclitus Seminar*, 37-48.

⁶⁶⁸ *Op.* 11-26.

⁶⁶⁹ DK 22B53.

⁶⁷⁰ DK 22B53 (Translation by Freeman).

It is, however, pertinent to remember that Zeus became ruler of the cosmos after a sequence of battles and wars. As in Hesiod, strife and war are related, and the former is the cause of the latter:

τὸν πόλεμον ἐόντα ξυνόν, καὶ δίκην ἔριν, καὶ γινόμενα πάντα κατ' ἔριν καὶ χρεών.⁶⁷¹

One should know that war is general (*universal*) and jurisdiction is strife, and everything comes about by way of strife and necessity.⁶⁷²

But those wars cannot exist if peace does not exist, because in Heraclitus's understanding all opposites exist at the same time. According to Aristotle, ἔοικε δ' ὁ μὲν Ἡρακλείτου λόγος, λέγων πάντα εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ἅπαντα ἀληθῆ ποιεῖν, ('the doctrine of Heraclitus, which says that everything is and is not, seems to make all things true')⁶⁷³ and continues his criticism:

...ταχέως

δ' ἂν τις καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν Ἡράκλειτον τοῦτον ἐρωτῶν τὸν τρόπον ἠνάγκασεν ὁμολογεῖν μηδέποτε τὰς ἀντικειμένας φάσεις δυνατὸν εἶναι κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀληθεύεσθαι· νῦν δ' οὐ συνιεὶς ἑαυτοῦ τί ποτε λέγει, ταύτην ἔλαβε τὴν δόξαν.⁶⁷⁴

⁶⁷¹ DK 22B80.

⁶⁷² DK 22B80 (Translation by Freeman).

⁶⁷³ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1012a 24-6 (Edited and translated by Ross).

⁶⁷⁴ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1062a31-5 (Edited and translated by Ross).

Perhaps even Heraclitus himself, if he had been questioned on these lines, would have been compelled to admit that opposite statements can never be true of the same subjects; as it is, he adopted this theory through ignorance of what his doctrine implied. In general, if what he says is true, not even this statement itself is true.

As it is clear, Aristotle thinks that Heraclitus made a wrong statement. The co-existence of contraries is not admissible in an Aristotelian logic.⁶⁷⁵ Guthrie gives another interpretation of Heraclitus' doctrine of the identity of opposites.⁶⁷⁶ According to him, there is a continuum between the opposites, like day and night, summer and winter, hunger and satiety. At the same time Guthrie recognises in Heraclitus the existence of opposites that are not absolute, but they show themselves as opposites to a particular subject. Therefore, those opposites depend on the subject experience. Finally, for Heraclitus the values are understood as values when in contrast with their related opposites.⁶⁷⁷ I would propose that they are more than opposites, complements. This idea of complements echoes the discussion above about the otherness of Gaia in Hesiod's cosmogony. Prier, it may be recalled made an attempt to oppose Gaia to Chaos in the logical sense, which I have demonstrated to be

⁶⁷⁵A 'logic' is called Aristotelian if it satisfy three principles: identity ($x=x$), excluded third (a proposition is true or false) and non-contradiction (if a proposition p is true, then its negation $\sim p$ is false).

⁶⁷⁶Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, I, 442-9.

⁶⁷⁷Ibid. 445.

impossible from a point of view of logic.⁶⁷⁸ But this idea of co-existence of opposites is present in Hesiod, e.g., his cosmogony recounts that the Day was born from Night,⁶⁷⁹ *Hipnos* and *Thanatos*,⁶⁸⁰ or the Styx, a spring of sweet waters daughter of Ocean.⁶⁸¹ The following fragment from Heraclitus is abundant in examples of opposites:

ὁ θεὸς ἡμέρη εὐφρόνη, χειμῶν θέρος, πόλε-
μος εἰρήνη, κóρος λιμός (τάναντία ἅπαντα· οὗτος ὁ νοῦς),
ἀλλοιοῦται δὲ ὅκωσπερ <πῦρ>, ὅπoταν συμμιγῆι θυώ-
μασιν, ὀνομάζεται καθ' ἡδονὴν ἐκάστου.⁶⁸²

This position of the prevalence of the opposites in Greek thought would continue beyond Heraclitus.

Another philosopher that I want to consider is Empedocles. He returned to the Milesian physiologists' position, in the search for a 'physical' first principle. The novelty of Empedocles was to propose that there is no one single principle but four different essential elements, air, earth, fire and water. Those elements will be behind the cause of everything that exists in the universe by mixing among them in a process of separation and agglutination.

⁶⁷⁸ Prier, 'Archaic Structuralism?', 1-11.

⁶⁷⁹ *Th.* 124 (Edited by Most).

⁶⁸⁰ *Th.* 758-66 (Edited by Most).

⁶⁸¹ *Th.* 775-806 (Edited by Most). Styx seems to be a fountain of sweet spring water, because the water comes out of a stone.

⁶⁸² DK 22B67. 'God is day-night, winter-summer, war-peace, satiety-famine. But he changes like (fire) which when it mingles with the smoke of incense, is named according to each man's pleasure.' (Translated by Freeman)

τέσσαρα γὰρ πάντων ῥιζώματα πρῶτον ἄκουε·
Ζεὺς ἀργῆς Ἥρη τε φερέσβιος ἠδ' Αἰδωνεὺς
Νῆστις θ' ἢ δακρῦοις τέγγει κρούνομα βρότειον.⁶⁸³

First of all listen the four roots of all things: shining Zeus, life-bringing Hera, Aidoneus and Nestis who with tears waters mortal springs.⁶⁸⁴

About Empedocles Aristotle says in the *Metaphysics*, A4, 985a31-3, ἔτι δὲ τὰ ὡς ἐν ὕλης εἶδει λεγόμενα στοιχεῖα τέτταρα πρῶτος εἶπεν ('Indeed, he was the first to establish that the material components were four')⁶⁸⁵.

The processes of separation and agglutination of elements were guided by the divine principles of love (φιλότης) and strife (νεϊκός), as Aristotle says:

... Ἐκ διεστώτων δὲ καὶ
κινουμένων οὐκ εὐλογον ποιεῖν τὴν γένεσιν. Διὸ καὶ Ἐμπε-
δοκλῆς παραλείπει τὴν ἐπὶ τῆς φιλότητος· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἠδύνατο
συστῆσαι τὸν οὐρανὸν ἐκ κεχωρισμένων μὲν κατασκευάζων,
σύγκρισιν δὲ ποιῶν διὰ τὴν φιλότητα· ἐκ διακεκριμένων γὰρ
συνέστηκεν ὁ κόσμος τῶν στοιχείων· ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖον γίνεσθαι
ἐξ ἑνὸς καὶ συγκεκριμένου.⁶⁸⁶

⁶⁸³ DK 31B6.

⁶⁸⁴ DK 31B6, (Translation mine based on Freeman and Kirk et al.)

⁶⁸⁵ Edition and translation of Ross.

⁶⁸⁶ Aristotle, *De Caelo*, 301a14-20 (Edited by Moraux).

It is not reasonable to make generation begin with bodies that are separated and in movement. This is why Empedocles passes over the generation under Love, for he could not have built up the universe by constructing it from separated elements and combining them through Love; for the cosmos consists of elements in a state of separation, so that it would have to come to be from what is one and combined.⁶⁸⁷

In one of the fragments of Empedocles⁶⁸⁸, Love and Strife maintain all living things in movement, harmony and unity.

ἄλλοτε μὲν Φιλότητι συνερχόμεν' εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα,

ἄλλοτε δ' αὖ δίχ' ἕκαστα φορεύμενα Νείκεος ἔχθει.

At one time amity bring all together into one,
At another in turn each one is separated through the hatred of
Strife.⁶⁸⁹

We should remember that Love and Strife are well known Hesiodic themes. Hesiod's influence is evident. The Hesiodic cosmic force Eros acts in the form of amity (*φιλότης*), like in the theogonia, restoring the initial unity and at the same time acting as the cause of generation. We can remember that Erebus and Night conceive sexually the first generation of beings Aether and Day after Eros joined them.⁶⁹⁰ On the other hand

⁶⁸⁷ Aristotle, *De Caelo*, 301a14-20, (Translated by Stock).

⁶⁸⁸ DK 31B17.7-8.

⁶⁸⁹ DK 31B17.7-8 (Translation mine).

⁶⁹⁰ *Th.* 125 (Edited by Most).

'strife' acts as a repelling force, separating the elements. This position of Empedocles describing amity as a cosmic force that joins elements and strife as a repelling force, could be associated to the following Hesiodic text:

τίκτε δὲ καὶ Νέμεσιν πῆμα θνητοῖσι βροτοῖσι
Νύξ ὀλοή· μετὰ τὴν δ' Ἀπάτην τέκε καὶ Φιλότητα
Γῆρας τ' οὐλόμενον, καὶ Ἔριν τέκε καρτερόθυμον.⁶⁹¹

...deadly Night bare Nemesis (Indignation) to afflict mortal men, and after her, Deceit and Amity and hateful Age and hard-hearted Strife.⁶⁹²

It is clear that Empedocles fragment is a variation of Hesiod's verses. Observe also that Deceit and Amity appears together in Hesiod, as another example of opposites bare by the same entity.

I follow partially Trépanier comments Empedocles' fragments. According to him:

'What else do we learn here? The causes of this alternation are clearly now first given: Love and Strife. These two may seem out of place in a cosmological passage, but then again, Hesiod's cosmogonic Eros, *Th.* 120, would have served as a precedent, as would have Parmenides' *daimon* (B12 and 13)⁶⁹³ and/or Eros.⁶⁹⁴

⁶⁹¹ *Th.* 223-5 (Edited by Most).

⁶⁹² *Th.* 223-5 (Translated by Evelyn-White).

⁶⁹³ These are references to DK 31B12 and DK 31B13.

⁶⁹⁴ Trépanier, *Empedocles*, 174.

For Trépanier Hesiod had a strong influence on Empedocles, who had a clear influence on Heraclitus, therefore the theme of the strife is passed to Heraclitus through Empedocles from Hesiod. Empedocles claims a divine authority or at least a semi-divine or *daimonic* character for himself.⁶⁹⁵ For him there was an initial unity between Gaia and Ouranos and their separation was caused by strife⁶⁹⁶. We do not have evidence to suppose that the separation of the elements occur in Empedocles for the same reason as in Hesiod.⁶⁹⁷ But the Hesiodic scheme of an initially undifferentiated idea of Gaia and Ouranos is also not unique. It can be found, for example, in Euripides' *Melanippe*: οὐρανός τε γαῖα τ' ἢ μορφή μία.⁶⁹⁸ According to Hesiod, they were one and then became differentiated. Unlike Hesiod, Empedocles authority derived not from the Muses but from his own nature, which will allow him to exercise his prophetic task of restoring true knowledge.

For Aristotle philosophy has a natural basis in the desire of men for knowledge, and the imposition of nature to be known: Πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει.⁶⁹⁹ The φύσις which attracted the interest of the first thinkers was interpreted in different ways. This interpretation

⁶⁹⁵ Cf. Osborne, *Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy*, 305-310.

⁶⁹⁶ Cf. fragment 371, Kirk et al., *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 300-1.

⁶⁹⁷ We should remember that, as discussed in Chapter 2, the separation of Gaia and Ouranos is done after Gaia recognizes that Ouranos is equal to her.

⁶⁹⁸ Euripides, *Melanippe Sophe*, Fr. 484.2.

‘Ouranos and Gaia were one form only’ (Translation mine).

⁶⁹⁹ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 980a21 (Edited by Ross).

resulted from an influence, again received as common knowledge, that had been in Hesiod's work and perhaps present in other, Near Eastern cultures.

We can summarise the propositions of the pre-Socratics as follows:

- Thales tries to explain the ἀρχή or the first elemental principle of the universe by the element of water or liquidity.
- Anaximander attempts to explain the origin of the world rationally, especially the origin of human beings. His ἀρχή is the indefinite or boundless.
- For Anaximenes, the ἀρχή or first principle of the universe is the element air. Air is eternally immutable and is god. Other gods exist, but are subordinate to this one.
- Xenophanes proposes a god that is more important than other gods, having characteristics of the Hesiodic Zeus, who is immortal, atemporal and non-spatial.
- Heraclitus has fire or heat as the first principle.
- For Empedocles earth is the first principle of the universe; nevertheless, matter is composed of combinations of different elements.

We can have no doubt that Hesiod as a thinker had a strong influence on most of the pre-Socratics, who based some of their ideas on

his insights.

As we have seen, Hesiod seems to be the first Greek to provide an atheistic origin of the cosmos: a cosmos that was not created, a cosmos that came into being and with no need of a creator, but with the answer to the question, what was the first thing? Hesiod answers that question with the entity called Chaos, which is not a god and is essentially 'the very first'. Some of the pre-Socratics need a demiurge, others an eternal god or entity. It seems that the Hesiodic idea of Chaos was too sophisticated for incipient Greek thought. The idea of the very first entity was taken up in Aristotle's 'first cause', though Hesiodic Chaos is not a cause.

Also, the property of an element of being essential and supporting everything was attributed to Gaia in Hesiod's poems. The pre-Socratics took that idea in a more or less elaborated form to talk about the first principle. The ideas of Justice and Custom are in great debt to Hesiod. Also, confronted with the problem of multiple gods and the implication that they could be naturally generated like human beings, Hesiod posits a powerful Zeus, *primus inter pares*, difficult to dissociate from *Moirai*, Dike and Themis. This idea was recurrent in some early philosophers in an analogous form, or became the seed of a 'philosophical god'. Hesiod established the opposite forces of nature, strife and love, an influence that is strong in Heraclitus' thought. Those cosmic forces were able to produce and reproduce gods, and under the power of Zeus Hesiod ordered them.

In recent works, where scholars turned their arguments to deciding whether or not a piece of discourse is philosophical thought, the argument turns generally to the method, the aims or a mix of both. This is the case of one of the most recent works on the pre-Socratics, written by Daniel Graham.⁷⁰⁰ According to Graham's book, the pre-Socratics propose a change in the traditional way of understanding the ontology of the first-principle, from Thales to Diogenes of Apollonia. However, a secondary, important point dealt with in that study is what Graham has to say on the secular discussion as to whether the alleged beginning of philosophy with the Ionians, particularly the Milesians, actually embodied a clear break with the mythical-religious representations attested in Homer and Hesiod.⁷⁰¹ I should add that the contribution of Burkert in which he argues that logic is showed over and present in the transition from mythical to non-mythical Greek literature.⁷⁰² Ivan Gobry offers another point of view, defending a Near-Eastern source for Anaximander's *apeiron* principle, which seems to resemble the original *tohu wabohu* state of Genesis 1:1.⁷⁰³ In this connection we should remember that the influence of Hegel on the interpretation of the pre-Socratics, regarding Aristotle as the right source, has been influential on the standard position on this matter.⁷⁰⁴ Graham made a first attempt to argue that the Ionian philosophers break totally with

⁷⁰⁰ Graham, *Explaining the Cosmos*, 1-27, 88-90 and 294-308.

⁷⁰¹ Ibid, 10 n. 25.

⁷⁰² Burkert; 'The Logic of Cosmogony', 87-106.

⁷⁰³ Gobry, *La cosmologie des Ioniens*, 23-59.

⁷⁰⁴ Cf. Tsumura, *Creation and destruction*, p. 33

myths in his opening chapter on 'The Ionian Program'. His argument is not consistent, when he acknowledges that some scholars have pointed to aspects of continuity with Hesiod, and that there are differences with modern science, but he is more focused on Anaximander and considers him, not Hesiod, to be the first to have held scientific speculation. In particular, he says that Anaximander's scheme involves *explanantia* and *explananda* that are purely 'natural' events, but it is not clear what he means by natural events, and how they are not related to the Hesiodic deities.⁷⁰⁵ Graham uses other arguments, such as the presence of the inspiration of the Muses in Hesiod to contrast with the empirical development of Anaximander and other pre-Socratics. But those claims are very weak, because, as we have seen, Parmenides is guided and inspired by a goddess and the idea of *apeiron* does not appeal to experience, but to a similar degree of abstraction as the idea of the Hesiodic Chaos.

The evidence shows a relevant influence of Hesiod on later generations of Greek thinkers. Hesiod himself had other sources, as we have seen; some of those sources could be Near-Eastern literature that eventually was not foreign to him, due to his family origins from Asia Minor.

Still the main objective of Graham is to show that most of the pre-Socratics, particularly Anaximenes, developed a conception of the world

⁷⁰⁵ Graham, *Explaining the Cosmos*, 5-14.

based on what Graham himself calls the generating substance theory, as opposed to the traditional position, where a substance was supposed to be the origin of everything. Graham has named the traditional position material monism. As I understand it, the conventional monism theory is Graham's interpretation of the passage, τῆς μὲν οὐσίας ὑπομενούσης τοῖς δὲ πάθεσι μεταβαλλούσης, τοῦτο στοιχεῖον καὶ ταύτην ἀρχὴν φασιν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων,⁷⁰⁶ where Aristotle considers the *stoicheion* and the *arche* of things as equivalent. He argues against this theory, defending his theory according to which the element is not a part of Milesian thought, and is different from the *arche*, a theory that is also supported by Keimpe Algra.⁷⁰⁷ Kirk et al. maintains the traditional interpretation of equivalence between both terms.⁷⁰⁸ Graham⁷⁰⁹ uses this opposition to argue that Hesiod's generation of primeval beings has influenced the interpretation of the pre-Socratics under the monist theory, where the monist theory means that from a unique element everything is generated in the cosmos. The pre-Socratics' texts indicate that certain ideas, such as the *arche*, had their origin in Hesiod's texts. Hesiod never proposed explicitly a principle called *arche*, yet he was able to have the intuition of the need for a first abstract entity, which he called Chaos, that certainly have influenced the Milesians.⁷¹⁰ Also, the idea of *Moirai* as a

⁷⁰⁶ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, A3, 983b10-11 (Edited by Ross).

⁷⁰⁷ Algra, 'The Beginnings of Cosmology.', 57-8..

⁷⁰⁸ Kirk et al., 145-6.

⁷⁰⁹ Graham, *Explaining the Cosmos*, 93-8.

⁷¹⁰ *Th.* 116-40 (Edited by Most).

paradigmatic structure reflects a dynamic idea of cosmos, which is partially equivalent to Graham's Generating Substance Theory. What I mean is that it would be more convincing if he accepted the continuity between Hesiodic thought and the pre-Socratic theories, rather than try to extract Hesiod from his interpretative system.

Finally I should say that there is a point where the pre-Socratics did not agree with Hesiod: the immortality but non-eternity of the first being, principle or element. This property that defines Chaos is not found in other pre-Socratic thinkers. The idea of an entity that came into being, was not created and is immortal, is contrary to their conception of being. Observe that even the Parmenidean 'Being' is immutable, and probably atemporal (if we accept that change characterizes time), and does not have the property of coming-into- being *ex nihilo*. This concept will appear in a creationist form of Christianity. As noted above, the concept of the first being, un-created and non-eternal, has a level of abstraction higher than a created, non-eternal being or an un-created, eternal being. For something to be un-created and non-eternal, it had to have an origin, but before that origin there is nothing. To be eternal means to have always existed, like the 'being' of Parmenides or the *apeiron* of Anaximander. Time is not an issue for eternity. Hesiod was able to depict the concept of the first being as probably immortal but non-eternal, interpreted by the pre-Socratics in many different forms; but they were unable, based on the fragments we

have, to accept the idea of non-eternity, necessary in an atheistic cosmos.
If we accept that there is philosophical thought in the pre-Socratics, we
should accept that there is philosophical thought in Hesiod.

Conclusion

We started with the question whether or not we can characterise Hesiod's cosmogony as philosophical thought. The answer to this question depends on what we understand to be philosophical thought. In general, scholars have been too much seduced by the positivist pretension to separate mysticism and philosophical knowledge. On that premise, an author who starts a composition talking about his or her inspirational processes is normally condemned as a non-philosopher. But, if we keep in mind that mysticism and rationality are not mutually exclusive and can be complementary, there would be a new perspective to look at authors who are not considered to propose a philosophical thought. Still, we need to take into consideration that mystical and rational processes lie on two different levels and must therefore be examined with different methods.

In general, we can say that philosophical thought is systematic, deductive and predictive. However, looking deeper we see that the answer is related also to the way a thought is presented. In a modern manual of philosophy -- and in this dissertation -- philosophy takes the form of a clear proposition of a problem coupled with the means for finding the answer (method), which, when followed through, brings about an answer. This is the proposal of the positivism. It is also the traditional Aristotelian idea of science and philosophy. We recall that it was Aristotle who said that Thales was the first to make enquiries about nature.

Yet it is possible to carry out philosophical investigation without a clear positivist structure. It could happen in at least two cases. First, if we have only a fragmentary set of texts from the author, which is the case with many of the pre-Socratics, where we have to work with what we have and must assume that for each there was once a more comprehensive system of thought; or second, if the author did not follow a clear scheme, and most of questions are implicit, as happens in Parmenides or Empedocles. Aristotle discusses Empedocles as a philosopher, for instance, who speculated about the state of motion/rest of the world when considering whether the world began.⁷¹¹ Also, it could be the case that the author is aware that he is writing philosophy, in the sense of looking for the truth, like in the case of Epimenides, who felt slept in a cave and was faced with the goddesses *Dike* and *Aletheia*.⁷¹² I have shown that there is philosophical thought in Hesiod, because of the subject matter of his text: the cosmogony. I have also shown, using several methods, that the text presents thinking that is in fact systematic and rational. I showed first how there is an ethical system based on the relationship between members of society, such as respect for parents, good relationships with neighbours, special care for orphans and respect for each other's property. All these social rules are supported by justice, the spine of Zeus' new kingdom and also based on the respect for *moira*, each person's lot. I proposed an interpretation of *moira* as the paradigmatic structure of the universe,

⁷¹¹ *Physics* viii, 1 250b27-251a4 (Edited by Ross).

⁷¹² DK3B1

complemented by 'the will of Zeus'. Both structure together depict the Hesiodic cosmos. I gave as an example of the way this combined structure works, during the discussion of the Prometheus' myth in the *Theogony*. Zeus decided to change the punishment of Prometheus, in that the eagle stops eating his liver but he remains bound. Even though there was a change in the sentence, he still is paying for his crime, showing that his *moira* continues to be the same paradigm, but according to Zeus' will the realization of that paradigm changed. There is no contradiction, it is just part of a dynamic structure.

Recognition of the importance of justice in the newly established kingdom of Zeus is not new, however what I am offering is a structured vision, where this justice is linked to an ethical system, *moira*, the will of Zeus and ultimately the cosmology. This is the basis for the creation of a new cosmos.

The new cosmos is depicted by Hesiod in a theogony supported by a cosmogony, and has the peculiarity of being atheistic, at least in the beginning. It is a cosmogony that forms part of a theogony, without an initial god that could be considered un-created and creator of everything. Instead of such an entity, Hesiod offers us Chaos, a mysterious entity that is not a deity, that came into being *ex nihilo* and after him Gaia came into being she is the first deity and starting point of the Theogony.

About Chaos many things have been said, since Antiquity to today. The most persistent characterization of Chaos was given by Aristotle, who explained it as absolute space. In Aristotle terms the space necessary for earth and the heaven in the beginning.⁷¹³ Also we have seen that the property *sine qua non* of Chaos is that it is atemporal; otherwise it could not be the first that came into being. This property, together with the analysis of other archaic cosmogonies, has prompted me to propose a stative meaning for the 'epic aorist' form of the verb γίγνομαι. To join this property of atemporality and to reinforce it – explain this property of atemporality, I have proposed the empty set as a possible model for Chaos. At a first glance it seems that the idea of empty space is considered here, but the idea of an empty set is related to the absence of properties and not to the definition of vacuum. I have used the conventional definition of the empty set, as the set defined by ontological contradiction. From its definition, it is possible to prove that it is a unique property that is shared with the Hesiodic Chaos, as we expected.

In Hesiod's process, Gaia follows Chaos in coming into being in a logical order. Gaia comes into being after Chaos, but she is not the daughter of Chaos; or rather, Gaia is the first deity while Chaos is not even

⁷¹³ This idea, as we have said, has been maintained through time to our day, still defended by some scholars. Although we know according to modern physics that absolute space is not possible, at least this is known since the works of Riemann and Einstein, we should remember that the space according to Leibniz was always related to a monad, in opposition to the Cartesian idea of absolute space.

a god. It seems that Chaos is a logical object, an absolute abstraction provided by the author to make a logical and atheistic cosmogony.

With Chaos and Gaia starts the theogony. From Gaia comes Ouranos, by an ezquisophrenic process of internal otherness. This process of internal otherness appears in other theologic entities, such as the Holy Trinity in Christian theology, where the existence of three persons does not require additional space -- in fact it even requires non-space.

Gaia is the support of everything and the everlasting mother. She is involved in the establishment of the kingdom of Zeus. She has a prophetic role in the maintenance of Zeus's new order and protects him releasing his weapons, thunder and lightening.

Closing the first part of the discussion of the cosmogony, I continue the second part, in Chapter 3, showing the concept of *moira* in Hesiodic thought. In Hesiodic poems *moira* is associated with the will of Zeus and with the mind of Zeus, and it is associated with Zeus' justice. However *moira* in Hesiod's thought is not an absolute that cannot be changed. I have shown instead that it is a dynamic structure, capable of undergoing change. Thus *moira*, linked to Zeus will, is changeable. *Moirai* can also be called dynamic. Even mortality, considered an absolute fate, seems to be changeable, as we see in the case of Ganymede who became immortal like the gods, due to Zeus' decision.

However this link between Zeus' will and *moira* in Hesiod is not unique. What may be seen as a new idea, at least as compared with Homer, is that *moira* seems to be something other than each person's lot, and becomes a sort of un-interpreted structure that can change when in the mind of Zeus, giving to each one's lot. This link is openly accepted in the Derveni papyrus, where *moira* is the intelligence of Zeus, at least, before he takes the name Zeus.

The poetic language of Hesiod allows him to talk about Chaos, without giving more information than what is in his poem, making it a difficult entity to describe. Poetry gives us likeness to convey meaning, without saying that something definitely is what it is likened to, perhaps, because Hesiod was able to understand the complexity of the concepts he described. Still, as part of an analytical process we have created a model for Chaos, that allows us to understand better its role in the cosmogony and the relationship to other primeval deities and entities.

I have demonstrated that Hesiod's thought is systematic and can be considered philosophy; hence Hesiod's myth, while in its expressive mode remains within the boundaries of myth, as a speculative penetration into the meaning of order and the origin of the cosmos is closer to the philosophy of the pre-Socratics than to other authors of cosmology.

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