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Revision by comparison
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Autores
Orientador(es)
Resumo(s)
Since the early 1980s, logical theories of belief revision have offered formal methods for the
transformation of knowledge bases or “corpora” of data and beliefs. Early models have dealt with
unconditional acceptance and integration of potentially belief-contravening pieces of information
into the existing corpus. More recently, models of “non-prioritized” revision were proposed that
allow the agent rationally to refuse to accept the new information. This paper introduces a refined
method for changing beliefs by specifying constraints on the relative plausibility of propositions.
Like the earlier belief revision models, the method proposed is a qualitative one, in the sense that
no numbers are needed in order to specify the posterior plausibility of the new information. We use
reference beliefs in order to determine the degree of entrenchment of the newly accepted piece of
information. We provide two kinds of semantics for this idea, give a logical characterization of the
new model, study its relation with other operations of belief revision and contraction, and discuss its
intuitive strengths and weaknesses.
Descrição
Palavras-chave
Belief revision Theory change Sphere semantics Epistemic entrenchment AGM approach Iterated revision Non-prioritized revision Severe withdrawal Irrevocable revision . Faculdade de Ciências Exatas e da Engenharia
Contexto Educativo
Citação
Fermé, E., & Rott, H. (2004). Revision by comparison. Artificial Intelligence, 157(1-2), 5-47.
Editora
Elsevier