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Advisor(s)
Abstract(s)
Belief change and non-monotonic reasoning are usually
viewed as two sides of the same coin, with results showing
that one can formally be defined in terms of the other. In this
paper we investigate the integration of the two formalisms
by studying belief change for a (preferential) non-monotonic
framework. We show that the standard AGM approach to be lief change can be transferred to a preferential non-monotonic
framework in the sense that change operations can be defined
on conditional knowledge bases. We take as a point of depar ture the results presented by Casini and Meyer (2017), and we
develop and extend such results with characterisations based
on semantics and entrenchment relations, showing how some
of the constructions defined for propositional logic can be
lifted to our preferential non-monotonic framework.
Description
Keywords
Belief change Non-monotonic reasoning Theory change . Faculdade de Ciências Exatas e da Engenharia
Citation
Casini, G., Ferme, E., Meyer, T., & Varzinczak, I. (2018). A semantic perspective on belief change in a preferential non-monotonic framework. In Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR 2018) (pp. 220-229). AAAI Press.