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Authors
Advisor(s)
Abstract(s)
Belief Revision addresses the problem of rationally incorporating pieces of new
information into an agent’s belief state. In the AGM paradigm, the most used frame work in Belief Revision, primacy is given to the new information, which is fully
incorporated into the agent’s belief state. However, in real situations, one may want
to reject the new information or only accept a part of it. A constructive model called
Selective Revision was proposed to meet this need but, as in the AGM framework,
focused on belief sets (sets closed under logical consequence). In this paper we adapt
the selective revision operators, that were proposed for belief sets, to the belief base
context, obtaining a model in which an agent’s epistemic state is represented by a
belief base and that allows the acceptance of only part of the new information. We
present several representation theorems for selective base revision operators based on
different base revision operators.
Description
Keywords
Belief revision Non-prioritized belief revision Selective revisions Belief bases . Faculdade de Ciências Exatas e da Engenharia
Citation
Garapa, M. Selective Base Revisions. J Philos Logic 51, 1–26 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-021-09606-8
Publisher
Springer